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Abstract 
 
The inhabitants of Kinshasa, who call themselves Kinois, deal with insecurity and violence on 
a daily basis. Cheating and thefts are commonplace, and pillaging by street gangs and 
robberies by armed thieves are everyday occurrences. The state infrastructure is so poorly 
regulated that deaths by accident or medical negligence are also common. This, and much 
more, contributes to a challenging social milieu within which the Kinois’ best hope is simply 
to ‘make do’. 
This thesis, based on extensive fieldwork in Kinshasa, analyses different forms of 
violence which affect the Kinois on a daily basis. I argue that the Kinois’ concept of violence, 
mobulu, differs from Western definitions, which define violence as an intrinsically negative 
and destructive force. Mobulu is for the Kinois a potentially constructive phenomenon, which 
allows them to build relationships, coping strategies and new social phenomena. Violence is 
perceived as a transformative force, through which people build meaningful lives in the face 
of the hardship of everyday life.  
Broadly speaking, this thesis contributes to the Anthropology of violence which has 
too often focused on how violence is imposed upon a population, often from a structural level 
of a state and its institutions. Such an approach fails to account for the nuances of alternate 
perspectives of what ‘violence’ is, as evidenced in this thesis through the prism of the Kinois 
term mobulu. The concept of mobulu highlights the creativity of those forced to ‘make do’ on 
the streets of Kinshasa, to negotiate not only every day physical needs, for food and shelter, 
but also to navigate the mystical violence of witchcraft. By exploring the coping mechanisms 
across all sections of society, I analyse how the Kinois not only have built their lives in the 
wake of the violence of the state, but they have also found means of empowerment within it, 
using mobulu as a springboard for the development of some social phenomena. 
Whereas the anthropology of violence has focused mainly on physical and mater ial 
violence, this thesis also argues that mobulu in Kinshasa is a total social fact that combines 
state violence with everyday violence, and physical violence with the invisible violence of 
witchcraft. This thesis seeks to enrich discussions on witchcraft in Kinshasa and in the 
African context in general, by analysing in depth how the cosmology of Kinshasa has 
differentiated itself as a result of the politico-economic events of recent decades. As 
witchcraft and material insecurity go hand in hand, a detailed analysis of the mechanisms of 
witchcraft is necessary, if we are to grasp the complexity of the concept of mobulu and how 
material and invisible violence inform each other.  
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- CHAPTER ONE - 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis offers an anthropological investigation into the lives of the inhabitants of 
Kinshasa (who call themselves Kinois) and their everyday experiences of violence, 
which they conceptualise through the notion of mobulu. In particular, I aim to describe 
the constant interplay which exists between the violence perpetrated by the state and its 
institutions, and the violence which affects the everyday lives of the Kinois at the local, 
community level. At the same time, because much of the violence which takes place in 
Kinshasa is fomented by rumours and gossip on witchcraft (kindoki in Lingala, the 
vernacular language in Kinshasa), I aim to describe the interplay which exists also 
between material violence, and the invisible violence of witchcraft. Material and 
invisible violence, and state violence and everyday violence, are interconnected in such 
a complex way that a study of the multi- faceted notion of violence (mobulu) in 
Kinshasa is at the same time necessary and urgent, if we are to understand the choices 
and strategies of the Kinois in their everyday lives – choices dictated by necessity 
which nonetheless have resulted in original and creative social phenomena. 
In 2012, the Congo regained the last place (out of 186) in the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Index. Recent estimates suggest that 
there are around 70% of people living on under a dollar a day in Kinshasa (Lamb 2013; 
Ouayoro 2013) which constitutes the highest such population within a singular city in 
the world (De Boeck 2011a). There is an unemployment rate of 73%, and a life 
expectancy of 50.4 years for women and 47.2 for men (UN Statistics Division 2013). 
According to statistics, 4.3% of the Congo’s population is HIV positive (UNAIDS 
2009) and the infant mortality rate stood at 109.4 per 1000 births in 2011 (UN Statistics 
Division 2013). These values are the result of a complex array of factors such as ill-
fated state policies and the malfunctioning of a number of state institutions, ranging 
from the health system to the economic sector. 
During my fieldwork I had the opportunity to witness how the malfunctioning 
of such institutions created an uncertain terrain within which the Kinois negotiated their 
everyday lives – a terrain of violence (mobulu). Moreover, the corruption which 
reigned at the political level meant that wealth was concentrated in the hands of few, 
while the rest were obliged to cope with economic insecurity by themselves. The 
jobless citizens of Kinshasa were forced to find alternate means of income – however 
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fluctuating and precarious. Others preferred to make do through robbery, pillage and 
fraud: street gangs attacked the population and fought against other gangs in the streets 
of Kinshasa; thieves in military and police uniform robbed people’s houses and killed 
those who resisted them; while unpaid soldiers and public officials harassed the 
population through fictitious taxations, blackmailing and scams. 
Violence also affected people’s lives within the more intimate circle of the 
family and the household. Solidarity networks among kin have started to alter, with 
many young people unable to afford the customary bridewealth necessary to marry. 
Moreover, household members have started to steal from each other in order to make 
do and feed their children. The unity of the family and the trust between household 
members were at stake. Tensions within the family circle not only resulted in physical 
and psychological hardship for many Kinois, but also in witchcraft accusations. Indeed 
people started to accuse each other of impeding them to progress in lives, or simply 
trying to get rid of them through witchcraft for jealousy, tension and 
misunderstandings.  
These different forms of violence on the ground can be read as the response of 
the Kinois in the face of the macro- level violence of the state policies and institutions. 
However, rather than being considered merely as a destructive and negative e ntity, the 
Kinois used violence as a social catalyst, transforming it into a coping mechanism in 
several fields: members of street gangs were able to create a different form of 
sociability in the face of the gerontocratic rules of society and to establish a new model 
of manhood through their violent fights; people working in the informal economy 
managed to take advantage of the faults of the state, and some of them exponentially 
improved their income through illegal dealings, scamming and cheating; and young 
people created alternative forms of romantic unions in order to bypass the obstacle of 
the bridewealth and demonstrate their independence to the elders of the family. All of 
these phenomena and more will be dealt in depth in this thesis in order to illustrate to 
the reader that violence (mobulu) in Kinshasa was a very complex term, perceived as a 
generative rather than a destructive force. Thus, an in depth description of the multiple 
shades and shapes of violence across different fields of society is necessary if we are to 
understand the role of mobulu in Kinshasa, and how the Kinois found this abstract and 
flexible notion to be a social space where they could carve out meaningful social lives 
on the fringes of a state, within which they perceived themselves to be largely neglected 
and forgotten.  
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In the next section I will provide an overview of the anthropological literature 
on Kinshasa in order to situate my thesis within the scholarly context of the region. 
Following this brief overview, I will introduce the reader to the concept of violence 
(mobulu) as the Kinois describe it. An understanding of this complex term will allow us 
to understand how the Kinois have been able to transform the violence they were 
subjected to into a powerful element of cohesion able to create new social phenomena 
and develop existing ones. 
The discussion over mobulu will lead us into the anthropological literature on 
structural violence. Taking Paul Farmer’s (1996, 2004, 2005, et. al. 2006) descriptions 
of structural violence as a starting point, I will analyse how discussions on violence in 
anthropology have lately shifted towards an approach ‘from below’, in order to 
understand how people have unwittingly incorporated structural violence into their 
everyday practices, gestures and choices. In the following section I will address the gap 
inherent to anthropological discussions on violence, explaining that scholars have so far 
missed a crucial catalyst of violence in society, which is witchcraft. I will introduce the 
reader to the anthropological literature on witchcraft and site my thesis within the 
scholarship. Because witchcraft is propagated within the community through ‘word of 
mouth’, in the following section I will analyse the power of rumours and gossip in 
influencing everyday life and relationships within a given community, and I will 
explain the ways in which witchcraft rumours and gossip in particular contribute to 
insecurity in society.  
Finally, I will outline the setting and methodology during my research in 
Kinshasa, introducing the reader to the world of mistrust, suspicion and paranoia which 
characterised everyday life in the suburb where I lived as well as throughout the city.  
 
Siting my thesis in Kinshasa 
 
Kinshasa is a rich and kaleidoscopic social space. From whatever angle one looks at it, 
the city reveals urban phenomena and rituals which continuously transform and evolve. 
As such, it has been a privileged locus for research within the social sciences, and has 
attracted the attention of numerous scholars from different branches of the discipline.  
The development of the city from early colonialism to post-independence has 
been extensively described elsewhere, most notably within the works of two French 
urban geographers, Pain (1979, 1984) and de Maximy (1984), and in those of two 
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professors of the University of Kinshasa (UNIKIN), Lelo Nzuzi (2008, 2011; Nzuzi & 
Beaujeau-Garnier 1989; Nzuzi & Mbuyi 2004) and de Saint Moulin (1969, 1970, 1976, 
1977, 2007). These authors have analysed the demographic trends of the city, its urban 
development and that of its public services in different historical epochs.  
Until 1971 the city was known as Leopoldville, named in honour of Belgian 
King Leopold II. During the colonial encounter this urban environment was a place 
where a new identity was born – that of the neo-citizen. Anthropologists such as La 
Fontaine (1970a), and later on Gondola (1996) and the sociologist Yoka (1995, 1999) 
started to explore the question of the identity of the citizens of Leopoldville – who have 
called themselves Kinois after President Mobutu changed the name of the city to 
‘Kinshasa’ in 1971. Being citizen was more than transposing the rural life to Kinshasa, 
but rather shaping one’s own identity within the new practices proper of the urban 
space. The city was the place where people defined their identities in the sphere s of 
religion, sport, the arts, music, fashion trends and l’ambiance, the party atmosphere of 
the capital.  
Several authors have focused themselves on the artistic scene in Kinshasa – one 
of the most bubbling and fruitful in central Africa. White (1999, 2008), Stewart (2000) 
and Trapido (2013) have focused on the musical scene of the capital, while Bogumil 
Jewsiewicki (1991, 1993, 1996, 2003), Fabian (1996) and Biaya (1988, 1996) have 
introduced the reader to the painting tradition in Kinshasa. Artists in the city denounced 
the inequalities of society, offered multiple solutions, expressed class consciousness 
and social malcontent. Political malcontent and d issent during colonial Leopoldville 
were also expressed through the body and the culture of clothing of les sapeurs (see 
chapter 2), people who wore expensive European brand clothes as a means of 
appropriating colonial power before Independence, and as a critique of power in its 
aftermath. Authors such as Gandoulou (1989a, 1989b), Gondola (1999a, 1999c), and 
MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000) have analysed les sapeurs in depth, which 
are still present in Kinshasa and in Brazzaville, the capital of the neighbouring Republic 
of Congo – although much less than in the past.  
The world of religious practice also became a privileged field of resistance to 
colonial rule for the Congolese. Kimbanguism, a prophetic movement which emerged 
in 1921 thanks to Prophet Simon Kimbangu, preached the liberation of the soul from all 
forms of oppression, including colonial authority (Asch 1983; Kodi 1993; MacGaffey 
W. 1983, 1986; Martin M-L. 1983; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Following the arrest and 
5 
the death in captivity of Kimbangu in 1951, after thirty years of prison, the movement 
increased in popularity. Today, the 'Church of Jesus Christ on the Earth by the Prophet 
Simon Kimbangu' (EJCSK) is one of the most popular religious movements in 
Kinshasa, alongside Catholicism and Protestantism. Moreover, since the 1980s the city 
of Kinshasa has seen the establishment of hundreds of Pentecostal ‘awakening 
churches’ (églises de réveil), in which elements of Christianity and of the local 
cosmology have come to coexist. Pastors in these churches preach the presence of the 
Devil and witches within the community, and exhort followers to undergo exhausting 
prayer vigils and exorcisms in order to be freed from the evil (see Devisch 1996a, 
1996b; Pype 2006a, 2006b, 2012). 
The changes in Kinshasa’s social context went hand in hand with the politico-
economic changes of the country as a whole. The endemic corruption and criminality 
which characterised Mobutu’s reign between 1964 and 1997 were followed by the 
armed clashes, rapes and pillages which took place at the east of the country during, 
and in the aftermath of, the two Congo Wars (1996-1997, 1998-2003)1. This has had 
heavy repercussions on people’s lives and led to more insecurity and violence in several 
fields of society: economic hardship went along with an increasing number of 
witchcraft accusations and Pentecostal churches in which people sought refuge from the 
insecurity of everyday life. 
Surprisingly, most of the anthropological literature on violence and insecurity in 
Kinshasa deals either with material or with ‘spiritual’ insecurity and doesn’t reflect 
upon the relationship between the two. On one hand, many anthropologists 2  have 
focused on the hardship of ‘making do’ and survival strategies in the informal 
economy, which have arisen in spite of, and in response to, deep-rooted and 
multifaceted crises. Other approaches have focused on how some young Kinois have 
found a fruitful means to make do through joining street gangs and gain social prestige 
among their peers (La Fontaine 1970b; Geenen 2009; Gondola 2009). At the same time, 
poverty, insecurity and the malfunctioning of the health system have resulted in a 
normalisation of death across Kinois society. De Boeck (2005b, 2006, 2008) analyses 
                                                 
1
 On the two Congo Wars see Prunier (2006, 2009), Turner (2007), French (2009), Lemarchand 
(2009) and Jourdan (2010). 
2
 See MacGaffey J. (1986, 1987, 1991), De Herdt and Marysse (1996, 1999), Gondola (1997), wa 
Mwanza (1997), Emizet (1998), MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga (1999, 2000), De Herdt (2002), 
Nlandu (2002), Trefon (2002a, 2002b, 2004), Petit and Mulumbwa (2005) and lately Ayimpam 
(2014). 
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how dead bodies have literally invaded the streets, as mourning practices started to take 
place in public squares or in the street. 
On the other hand, studies have focused on the invisible violence of witchcraft, 
and on the role of diviners in divining the cause of witchcraft and fighting it. Devisch 
focused extensively on Yaka divinatory practices (Devisch 1991, 1993; De Boeck & 
Devisch 1994; Devisch & Brodeur 1999), while Tonda (2008) and De Boeck (2004, 
2005a, 2005b) analysed in depth the imaginary of violence and killings of the world of 
witchcraft in Kinshasa, especially in regards to the phenomenon of the witch-children 
(bana bandoki in Lingala). 
Amid all the works which analyse violence in Kinshasa either from a material or 
from a mystical point of view, a notable exception would be Devisch (1995), who 
attempted to address the interplay between changes in everyday life and in the 
cosmology of the Kinois from Independence until the 1990s. Devisch illustrates how 
people have been able to position themselves “between an alienating colonial past, 
modernity, and the predatory State” (Ibid: p. 593) by creating strategies of survival and 
social affirmation in a number of different fields. One of these strategies was the 
development of new spaces of socialisation, like the church, following a revival of 
village-like solidarity ties among the community – a phenomenon which Devisch 
labelled as “villagisation”(1995, 1996a). The churches that have been established 
across Kinshasa since the 1980s were a response to the colonial intrusion and the 
modern state. As Devisch (1995: 626) explains: 
[H]ealing churches offer a plural aetiology of the vices and dangers of 
contemporary urban life. The coming of the Holy Spirit represents healing and 
an end to misfortune. In this way these churches transform a situation of failure 
and suffering into an opportunity for grace. 
Although Devisch’s account addresses the relationships between colonialism, 
violence and new coping mechanisms in the face of the contradictions of modernity, it 
does not go beyond the rise of charismatic churches to explore how the witchcraft 
discourse promulgated across the everyday lives of people under the church’s 
influence. This has been later analysed by De Boeck and Plissart (2004) in their book, 
“Kinshasa: Tales of the Invisible City”. 
De Boeck and Plissart (2004) analyse the urban reality of Kinshasa alongside its 
‘double’, an invisible, mirroring reality lurking underneath the visible world. The 
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authors highlight how despite the colonial and post-colonial projects of modernism and 
civilisation of the city, which left the Congolese as mere spectators and subjects of the 
colonial project, the Kinois have been able to put the interplay between modernity and 
tradition, Christianity and traditional cosmology, and between the city and the village to 
their own benefit, creating original paths and resources for survival and social 
recognition. Such reworking of the urban landscape has also taken place in the invisible 
world of witchcraft: the new market economy and its perceived mysterious mechanisms 
promoted rumours of accumulation through witchcraft, while an increasingly number of 
churches in Kinshasa have taken up the role of expurgators of witchcraft through the 
word of God and exorcism procedures. It is through the invisible world underneath the 
physical reality that the Kinois are infusing the city with their own moralities, praxis, 
values and temporal dynamics (De Boeck & Plissart 2004: 34). 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the anthropological scholarship of 
Kinshasa by offering an in-depth account of how material and mystical violence 
interrelate. My research develops upon Devisch (1995) and De Boeck and Plissart  
(2004) inasmuch as it analyses how the relationship between everyday life and the 
invisible world of witchcraft has changed in recent years, also according to politico-
economic developments. In order to do so, I shall analyse in depth some social 
phenomena which have not been analysed in the scholarship so far, such as street gangs 
known as kulunas as well as circulating rumours of uses of witchcraft powers in order 
to become rich – a phenomenon the Kinois call ‘magic’ (la magie). At the same time, I 
will ground this analysis within the shifting familial context and the new forms of union 
in contemporary Kinshasa, as witchcraft accusations were highly dependent on the 
tensions such unions created across generations. 
To summarise, I aim to provide a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of material 
and mystical violence, how the two are linked, and what they create at the everyday 
level. I specifically pose the questions: How does the violence of the state correspond to 
the violence of everyday life for the majority of the Kinois, and how does the latter 
relate to the violence created by witchcraft rumours and accusations? Before delving 
into this argument, I shall offer some context for the complex ways in which violence is 
realised and perceived by the Kinois in their everyday life. I shall begin by exploring a 
Lingala term the Kinois use to describe the polymorphic nature of violence. That word 
is mobulu. 
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Mobulu: Violence as a Catalyst for Social Relationships  
 
In Kinshasa, mobulu denoted not only physical violence, but also disorder and social 
violence. This form of violence, although less direct or immediately physically harmful, 
had the power to subvert power relationships and create new ones, and to cast people 
out from society. The concept of mobulu stands opposed to kimia, which is translated as 
peace, calm and tranquillity. In the words of Paul, a political refugee who fled Kinshasa 
in the 1990s, mobulu, “has got many words hidden within it: troubles, unconsciousness, 
immorality, violence... In some occasions it can mean also disorder”. Paul, who now 
lives in London with his wife and two children, offered several examples to explain 
how mobulu was used in everyday contexts. Mobulu could be referred to as the 
violence of the street gangs, who robbed and killed pedestrians in the market, or to the 
actions of soldiers who harassed people for money, both at night and during the day 
(“they are people of violence”, “baza batu ya mobulu”). Mobulu also incorporated the 
violence of witches who killed people through witchcraft (“the violence of witchcraft”, 
“mobulu ya kindoki”). At the same time, a State that did not provide for its citizens, but 
enriched only those few within its government, was considered a source of mobulu 
(“violence is in the country”, “mobulu aza na mboka”). 
Mobulu could also refer to people who misbehaved in the face of moral rules of 
conduct. For example, women who engaged in multiple relationships, or who lied to 
their husbands, were considered mobulu, or troublesome. So for example when Martin 
Azekwa3, a friend of the couple I lived with, came to our house in Kinshasa and started 
to ask about Clarisse, our young and beautiful neighbour, my friend Joseph replied: 
“Forget that woman, she’s trouble” (“Tikka mwasi wana, aza mobulu”), recalling the 
time when she forcibly entered our house because she wanted to beat one of youngest 
relatives of the family who I lived with. Also, children who were adjudged to be 
stubborn and impolite were mobulu (“the child is troublesome”, “mwana aza mobulu”), 
while young men who fought under the effect of marijuana and alcohol on the streets 
without apparent reasons, were often described as mobulu because they displayed 
behaviours considered to be amoral, and were potential sources of violence against 
other people. 
                                                 
3
 All names in this thesis, with the exception of those of public figures, are pseudonyms. 
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Through the lens of mobulu, the Kinois exhibited a broader understanding of 
violence. It is only through a systematic and in-depth description of the local meaning 
of mobulu that we can understand how violence presides also in apparent non-violent 
contexts. For example, a child adjudged to be stubborn and impolite was considered a 
manifestation of violence because that child embodied the possibilities of becoming a 
witch and perpetuated fears of death through witchcraft4. A woman who had sexual 
relations with multiple men was considered to be mobulu because she might potentially 
create tensions between her lovers, which could result in witchcraft accusations. A thief 
or someone who cheated people financially was considered to be mobulu because he 
contributed towards poverty and interpersonal tensions within the community. 
Mobulu in Kinshasa occurred throughout daily life. People of the same family, 
as well as strangers, were not afraid to show their disappointment and their rage against 
each other. For Paul, this was a clear sign of the coolness of the Kinois:  
In Kinshasa, it heats up [ça chauffe in French] very easily! But the good thing 
about Kinshasa is that it is from there that true relationships are born. You fight, 
and then you hold no rancour! The day after you run into each other and you 
say: ‘Ah! Mate, how are you [masta ndenge nini?]’, ‘Bien!’ Brother, if you are 
stronger than me, go on and beat me. I will go and take a shower, and it is over 
[Ah mon frère, soki oleki ngai makasi, obeti ngai, nakei nasokoli c’est fini eh]... 
It’s normal! 
Not only did mobulu in Kinshasa become normalised and routinised, but it was 
also perceived by Paul, and by many others whom I interviewed, as a catalyst for social 
relationships. Stories of enemies who used to fight each other and then aligned with one 
another to fight a common enemy were recurrent in Kinshasa. This was also the case 
for those members of the government and its security forces, like politicians or police 
men, who at first seemed to fight street gangs and thieves, but would later cooperate 
with them, as explained in chapter 4. These people, who behaved against their mandate 
to protect the citizens from criminals, only to later become those criminals, were 
considered to be as much mobulu as thieves and street gangs’ members.  
 
                                                 
4
 In Kinshasa, children who did not respect their parents and misbehaved were considered more 
likely to be bewitched and become witches themselves. Once they became witches, they were 
believed to kill members of their families in order to sacrifice them in the world of witchcraf t (see 
chapter 7). 
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In the economic sector, mobulu was perceived by many Kinois I interviewed as 
a form of emancipation from the hardship they were subjected to through the economic 
crisis. In the face of adversity people managed to build their lives through illicit 
economic practices outside the law. It was through mobulu that some people were 
perceived to be able to accumulate enough wealth to marry and sustain entire 
households. In this sense, mobulu resulted in social bonding. 
While some were believed to cheat in the informal economy in order to get rich, 
others were believed to enter occult Masonic sects for the same reason. Rich people 
were believed to have sacrificed a relative in the world of witchcraft in order to be able 
to amass a fortune. The mystical violence of the sacrifice was balanced by immense 
wealth, which could help sustaining a whole extended family thanks to the familial 
solidarity networks. This is why people who were rumoured to enter these Masonic 
lodges were generally not ostracised or punished by the community: the mobulu of the 
sacrifice was able to create wealth and wellness in everyday life.  
Mobulu was also a powerful element of cohesion in the familial context. Often, 
tensions among family members over debts and quarrels resulted in witchcraft 
accusations among family members. Such accusations functioned also as an element of 
cohesion and reinforcement of familial ties. As witchcraft was deeply linked to kinship 
and was effective only against family members, witchcraft accusations stressed the 
boundaries of the family, distinguishing outsiders from insiders in the chaotic social 
context of Kinshasa, where boundaries and ties were made extremely loose (see chapter 
6). Witchcraft accusations had the merit to reassert kin obligations and power 
relationships within the household. 
The different forms of violence described above occurred in the same social 
context and took place simultaneously. Yet if we look at the existing anthropological 
literature on Kinshasa, it is unclear how each of these forms of violence are connected 
and inform each other – of particular interest for this thesis are the violence of the state 
and the violence of everyday life, as well as the relations between both material and 
spiritual violence. As such, my thesis will contribute to the literature on Kinshasa by 
analysing how all these aspects of violence cohabit, and influence the choices of the 
inhabitants of Kinshasa, choices often dictated by emergency and insecurity.  
A few scholars in recent years have focused on the mutual relationship between 
state violence (or structural violence) and everyday violence in a number of social 
contexts. Thus, in the next section I shall proceed to outline a theoretical history of the 
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interplay between structural violence and everyday violence by analysing some of the 
most influential works in this particular field. This exploration will provide a means of 
exploring the academic niche within which this thesis resides.  
 
Anthropologists, Structural Violence and Everyday Violence  
 
My research has been influenced by discussions on “structural violence” (Galtung 
1969, 1990; Farmer 1996, 2004, 2005, et. al. 2006; Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois 2004; 
Bourgois & Shonberg 2007; Bourgois 2009), which in its broadest sense is defined as 
the inability of the state and its institutions to provide its citizens with basic needs. Such 
structural violence affects the poorest segments of the population in different social 
contexts, resulting in hardship, insecurity and manifestations of “everyday violence” 
(Scheper-Hughes 1992) or “violence of everyday life” (Kleinman 2001).  
The concept of structural violence was first introduced by Johan Galtung (1969, 
1990), professor of the discipline of Peace Studies, and founder of the International 
Peace Institute in Oslo in 1959. Galtung (1969) describes different types of violence, 
which he distinguishes between by means of different dichotomies: physical – 
psychological, manifest – latent, and personal – structural. Structural violence is 
defined as that violence which is built into a structure, which manifests itself as unequal 
power, and subsequently as unequal life chances. In particular, Galtung (Ibid: 171) 
explains that structural violence manifests itself when:  
 
“Resources are unevenly distributed, as when income distributions are heavily 
skewed, literacy/education unevenly distributed, medical services existent in 
some districts and for some groups only, and so on. Above all the power to 
decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed” (Emphasis in 
original).  
 
Thus, he explains, if a person died from tuberculosis in the 18th century, it 
would be hard to describe that as violence. However, if a person were to die from 
tuberculosis at present, in spite of all the medical progress and resources potentially 
available to those who can afford them, then violence is taking place. Similarly, if 
people are starving where this is objectively avoidable, despite flourishing economic 
relationships worldwide, then violence is being committed (as a direct result of the 
unequal way in which these very economic relationships are organized). Structural 
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violence often does not present itself as evidently as it does in episodes of physical 
violence: it is static, and produces situations in which inequalities are taken for granted 
and justified as the normal working principle of a society. From this point of view, 
structural violence is the “tranquil waters” (Ibid: 173) which may seem as natural as the 
air we breathe, whilst actually containing more violence than it manifests.  
Bourdieu (1977, 1989, 2000) argues that the naturalization or “normalization” 
of violence is the outcome of the symbolic dominance of the state, which maintains the 
population in a situation of control, impasse and “inertia” from which it is difficult to 
escape. Symbolic violence, he argues, is “a gentle violence, imperceptible  and invisible 
even to its victims, exerted for the most part through the purely symbolic channels of 
communication and cognition (more precisely, misrecognition), recognition, or even 
feeling” (Bourdieu 2001: 2). Symbolic violence creates boundaries and inequalities, dos 
and don’ts which are given as biologically determined, whereas in fact, they are “the 
product of an incessant [...] labour of reproduction to which singular agents [...] and 
institutions – families, the church, the educational system, the state – contribute” 
(Bourdieu 2001: 34). 
Galtung (1990), some years after his first article on violence, seems to draw 
from Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence in order to shape his concept of “cultural 
violence”. He describes “cultural violence” as “those aspects of culture, the symbolic 
sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, 
empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify 
or legitimize direct or structural violence”. From this point of view, structural violence 
may not only be exerted by the state: institutional violence is only one shape of 
structural violence. Galtung (Ibid) makes an example of how religion can be considered 
as a tool for cultural violence by looking at the Palestinian-Israeli example: the Chosen 
People of Israel translate their claim of the Promised Land by engaging in direct and 
structural violence against Palestine. Cultural violence, thus, becomes a steady flow at 
the bottom of structural violence, a substratum from which structural violence draws its 
power and legitimacy. 
The concept of structural violence has been revived in anthropology by Paul 
Farmer (1996, 2004, 2005), a physician-anthropologist engaged specifically in 
humanitarian work. In his words, structural violence can be defined as a: 
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[B]road rubric that includes a host of offensives against human dignity: extreme 
and relative poverty, social inequalities ranging from racism to gender 
inequalities, and the more spectacular forms of violence that are incontestably 
human rights abuses, some of them punishment for efforts to escape structural 
violence. [...] In each of these situations, acts of violence are perpetrated, 
usually by the strong against the weak, in complex social fields (2005: 8-9). 
Farmer developed this concept following his humanitarian experience and 
scholarly research among the poor of Latin America, United States, Russia and more 
recently, Rwanda. Struck by the inequalities of power and the impossibility for most 
Haitian and Rwandan people to access resources such as basic medical assistance and 
decent living conditions, he denounces the indifference – or rather, the calculated act of 
exclusion – of disadvantaged citizens by “neoliberal economics” (2004: 312). Indeed 
although neoliberalism poses an accent to the autonomy of each individual as rational 
producers and consumers driven by economic or material concern, little is said about 
the socio-economic inequalities that distort real economies and affect the powerless and 
disadvantaged people on the ground. From Farmer’s point of view, the state and those 
who profit most from such economic policies actively maintain inequalities of power. 
In those countries in which these inequalities are most visible, the power is 
concentrated in the hands of the government and those involved in it, to the detriment 
of the poorest segment of the population. As Sen (in Farmer 2005: xvi) describes in the 
foreword to Farmer’s book “Pathologies of power”: “The asymmetry of power can 
indeed generate a kind of quiet brutality”. This recalls Galtung’s notion of structural 
violence, silent and static like ‘calm waters’.  
Farmer’s analysis of the concept of structural violence is appealing because it 
“allows us to place in broader contexts both human rights abuses and the discourses 
(and other responses) they generate” (Farmer 2005: 219), while grounding our 
understanding of injustices against the poor on broader analyses of power and social 
inequality. The case studies which Farmer demonstrates allow the reader to glimpse 
into the hardship of people in different contexts around the globe, which are dictated by 
broader politico-economic agendas from which the poor find it difficult to escape. 
Farmer’s aim is to gather together and comparatively analyse so cial hardship in 
different contexts, in order to devise an analytic model for understanding suffering on a 
global level and promote a broader human rights agenda. Despite Farmer’s undeniable 
contribution to studies on violence, his analyses overlook people’s embodiment, 
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appropriation and re-distribution of violence in their everyday life. Between the macro 
level of structural violence and the micro level of everyday life there is a whole range 
of micro-transformations, or rather “micrologics of power” (Green in Farmer 2004: 
320) which position the individuals as active protagonists.  
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004), highlight in their book “Violence in War 
and Peace” that when violence is addressed in the university curriculum, it is often 
cordoned off in Peace and Conflict Studies, or it tends to be subsumed under biologised 
notions of ‘human aggression’. In the words of the authors:  
These ideological approaches misrecognise the extent to which structural 
inequalities and power relations are naturalised by our categories and 
conceptions of what violence really is. They also fail to address the totality and 
range of violent acts, including those which are part of the normative fabric of 
social and political life. Structural violence is generally invisible because it is 
part of the routine grounds of everyday life and transformed into expressions of 
moral worth (Ibid: 4). 
Taking Farmer’s definition of structural violence as a starting point, Scheper-
Hughes and Bourgois (2004) highlight how it is the everydayness of the production and 
replication of inequalities, or in other words, “the social and cultural dimensions of 
violence” (p. 1) that gives violence its meaning. The interplay of such ‘micrologics of 
violence’ creates specific phenomena within given social contexts. This is why they 
stress the need to relate structural violence to the “little violences produced in the 
structures, habituses, and mentalités of everyday life” (p. 19). People become the 
bearers of the violence imposed by the state, through their attitude towards class, 
gender, race and so on. A failure to focus on the everyday level of appropriations of 
violence leaves the many nuances of violence omitted. Indeed, while genocides, 
massacres and revolutionary violence are often visible, “the everyday violence of infant 
mortality, slow starvation, disease, despair, and humiliation that destroys socially 
marginalised humans with even greater frequency is usually invisible or 
misrecognised” (p. 2). 
Scheper-Hughes’ account of maternal love and child death in North-eastern 
Brazil (1992) is exemplary in showing how the poor incorporated and embodied 
structural violence in their everyday lives. In order to make sense of the huge number 
of infant deaths for malnutrition and lack of health care, mothers came to categorise 
their malnourished babies as “angel-babies”, babies that were already considered as 
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angels. These babies were described as “having no ‘taste’, no ‘knack’, and no ‘talent’ 
for life” (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois 2004: 371). As such, their deaths were envisaged 
by their mothers to such extent that women reduced their babies’ intake of food and 
liquids “so to help them, their mothers said, to die quickly and well” (Ibid). So, 
alongside killings and abductions, violence in Brazil was also exercised by the doctors 
who prescribed tranquillisers to hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrated the 
death of “angel-babies”, and the municipal bureaucrats who dispensed free baby coffins 
but no food to poor families. 
In the same fashion, Bourgois and Schonberg (2007) explain the hidden reasons 
why black drug addicts in the neighbourhood of Harlem, New York, are called thieves. 
The authors show how the legacy of slavery and the active experience of racism in the 
United States help explain why black drug-addicts in Harlem refused humiliating jobs 
and submissive attitudes with their patrons, and preferred to resort to illegal income-
generating activities. This earned them a reputation as thieves not only among the 
population, but also among white drug addicts. Assertions such as “Niggers are 
thieves” (Ibid: 15), demonstrate how the power of the violence of the state had been 
naturalised in everyday practice. To put it in the words of Scheper-Hughes and 
Bourgois (2004: 21), violence “is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognised 
because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible”.  
The concept of structural, symbolic and everyday violence is useful in 
understanding how mobulu has reproduced itself in every sphere of society in Kinshasa. 
Whether in church or at home, or while fending for themselves in the street, the Kinois 
have been affected by different forms of violence inflicted by different actors. 
However, the Kinois have always been able to make the most out of the hardship 
afflicting them, turning adverse situations to their favour.  
As Galtung (1969, 1990), Farmer (1996, 2004, 2005) and the abovementioned 
scholars have explained, violence does not always take spectacular and apparent 
physical forms. Violence is often hidden, covert, and interweaved within everyday life. 
It is so taken for granted that it is sometimes also mistaken by its victims, who accept 
episodes of violence as the norm. La débrouille, the ‘making do’ economy of Kinshasa, 
is a clear example of that. In chapter 2, I will analyse how the state legitimised cheating 
and scamming among the population in the 1970s, when President Joseph Mobutu 
exhorted the inhabitants of the capital during a public speech to steal without being 
caught. ‘Making do’ through illegal and illicit means, often at the expenses of others, 
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became legitimised. As allowed and incited by President Mobutu, mobulu became 
permitted, transforming into a normal presence in everyday life. Violence thereafter 
became the domain of ordinary people. The Kinois were then subjected to different 
types of violence: the structural violence of the state, the everyday violence of la 
débrouille and street gangs, and so on. Many Kinois were both victims and perpetrators 
of violence, and did not hesitate to reproduce the same mechanisms of violence that 
they themselves were subjected to. La débrouille, as ‘making do’ is referred to in 
Kinshasa, is the result of the emancipation of legitimized mobulu upon society. 
Violence, as Galtung (1990) affirms, is not only carried out by the state – 
meaning institutional violence. Structural violence in Kinshasa was also exercised by 
the military, the thousands of Pentecostal churches which have mushroomed around 
Kinshasa, and Western actors like the missionaries. All these actors have influenced the 
choices and the coping mechanisms of many Kinois in different aspects of their 
everyday lives. In chapter 4, I will explain how the military has played an important 
role in shaping notions of power and success among the unemployed young men of 
Kinshasa. Pillaging and the abuse of force became the ‘normal’ means through which 
these young men could obtain social recognition in their neighbourhood, and carve out 
a meaningful space for themselves in society. 
Structural violence may also be employed involuntarily by some social actors 
who are not readily and/or easily associated with violence. In chapter 6 and chapter 7 I 
will explain how some contemporary Western institutions which are present in 
Kinshasa, such as the missionaries and Non-Governmental Organisations, have had an 
important role in shaping the notion of the nuclear family through their policies and 
their programmes. However, the cluster of mother- father-child has presented some 
challenges to many Congolese families, who still abide by the customary mechanisms 
of the enlarged family. This model of the nuclear family contributed to increased 
tensions within the household, particularly between the younger and the older 
generations, as young people tried to free themselves from the grip of their elders.  
Often, the tensions which resided within the family resulted in children being 
accused of witchcraft by some family members. Children were described by the Kinois 
I interviewed as innocent and in need of protection, a statement which resonates with 
the Western notion of the child as proclaimed by missionaries and Non-Governmental 
Organisations. This is explained in chapter 7. Due to their naivety, children were 
believed to be more easily lured into witchcraft deeds, and were the first to be cast out 
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by family members as witches. In this regard, Pentecostal churches can also be 
considered agents of violence in Kinshasa. Indeed it is the Pentecostal pastors who are 
able to confirm if a suspected child is a witch, during a public confession session in 
church. As I witnessed during my fieldwork, once the child was declared a witch, he 
had to undergo a violent exorcism procedure, which sometimes put the life of the child 
at risk. At the same time, the children’s confessions of witchcraft also involved 
accusations against other family members, who were believed to be the instigator of the 
child’s witchcraft in order to kill other family members. Therefore, on the one hand, 
Pentecostal pastors provided their followers with a space to reaffirm themselves and 
retake control of their lives through cathartic healing sessions and exorcisms; however 
on the other hand they did not hesitate to cast out small children and other relatives as 
evil individuals, thus threatening the unity of the family and causing further tensions 
among its members. By ostracizing children as witches, Pentecostal pastors offered the 
parents a reason to mistreat and abuse their children at home, both physically and 
psychologically, in order to convince the children to leave the world of witchcraft by 
any means necessary. 
 The Kinois depicted in this thesis were therefore both victims and perpetrators 
of violence. This makes it difficult to draw a line between structural and everyday 
violence, whilst at the same time demonstrating the need for a detailed analysis 
regarding mobulu in Kinshasa’s everyday life. Mobulu is not a straightforward notion, 
nor necessarily a negative one. This term represented a whole universe of possib ilities 
for many Kinois, of escaping mechanisms and coping strategies. La débrouille is a 
predatory context which people needed to learn how to navigate, if they wanted to 
make the most out of it. Witchcraft accusations could potentially reunite a whole family 
against a common enemy, and strengthen solidarity mechanisms. Violent fights have 
become, for some young people, a way to find their niche in society, in the face of the 
ineptitude of the state. The purpose of this thesis is to understand how the Kinois were 
able to make the most out of everyday hardship, and to empower themselves through 
mobulu. 
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Gap in the Theory: Witchcraft in Everyday Life  
 
In this thesis I aim to contribute to the existing literature on structural and everyday 
violence by addressing some notable exclusions from the present scholarship. 
Anthropological studies on violence so far have focused on how this influences the 
everyday practices of given social groups, regardless of the will of the individuals 
subjected to it. The mothers described by Scheper-Hughes seem powerless in front of 
the death of their children, incapable to react to their conditions of passivity in front of 
the symbolic violence of the state. And Bourgois (2003; Bourgois & Schonberg 2007) 
description of the social context of drug users leaves the reader with a sense of 
hopelessness in front of the racial and class discrimination to which black drug addicts 
are subjected to. In my thesis I wish to shift the focus from the impasse of the 
marginalised, to analyse the different ways in which they appropriate, transform and 
take advantage of processes of domination and control. In doing so, I wish to analyse 
how the abuses of the state in Kinshasa have given rise to new social phenomena. In 
particular I will emphasize the rise of the street gangs in response to the lack of jobs, 
the development of informal economy, and the creation of an imaginary rationale 
according to which the Kinois could enrich themselves through witchcraft. This is not 
mere resistance to a lack of opportunities, but rather the formation of a distinctly new 
opportunity for the creation of personal livelihoods. 
Often, as I have introduced earlier, the appropriation of the structural and 
symbolic violence of the state takes a violent form in Kinshasa: people cheat each other 
in the informal market, street gangs and thieves create insecurity within the community, 
and people accuse each other of witchcraft ordeals in front of misfortunes. However, I 
will show that many Kinois are not reluctant to engage in violent activities, as they 
consider mobulu as an intrinsic regenerative and transformative tool, able to turn their 
lives in a different – and intrinsically better – direction. 
As violence is a social and cultural construct, I argue that social research should 
pay more attention to the notion of violence as it is understood and experienced by the 
people of a given society. In this thesis I argue against the prevalent anthropological 
approaches to comprehend ‘violence’ as something inherently destructive and instead I 
wish to emphasize how everyday violence is envisioned and experienced as something 
transformative and potentially creative. In order to analyse the full range of potential of 
mobulu, I will focus each chapter on manifestations of mobulu in different fields of the 
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society in Kinshasa. In doing so, I will deconstruct the notion of violence, in order to 
explore its nuances in terms of economic hardship, domestic instability, street violence, 
and witchcraft. 
The scholarship on structural and everyday violence focuses on the material side 
of everyday life: they focus on the institutions of the state and its subjugating power, 
and on the multiple actions and reactions that people engage with at a quotidian level in 
order to make front to this. However, everyday violence is not only physical, but also 
invisible. These studies miss the role of witchcraft in shaping daily choices and 
relationships. Mobulu in Kinshasa was also carried out through the power of isolation 
and punishment of witchcraft (sorcellerie in French, kindoki in Lingala), through its 
rumours and whisperings. Despite its invisibility, the consequences of witchcraft were 
very visible and affected the Kinois’ everyday lives in a very dramatic way. This is why 
an analysis of witchcraft in the context of everyday violence is absolutely necessary.  
The anthropological literature on witchcraft is so vast that it is impossible to give an 
extensive picture of it here. Over the following paragraphs I will focus on the trends in 
witchcraft studies that are most relevant for this thesis, in particular the relationship 
between witchcraft, modernity and globalisation. 
Existing discussions on witchcraft in Kinshasa draw on the wider literature on 
witchcraft across Africa, which stems from Evans-Pritchard’s seminal study 
“Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande” (1937). During the 1950s and 
1960s, the social aspect, more than the invisible or mystical aspects of actual witchcraft 
belief, became one of the major concerns of the Manchester School. Nadel (1952), 
Mitchell (1956), Turner (1957) and Marwick (1965) analysed witchcraft as part of the 
history and social structure of specific societies, and highlighted how, particularly in 
rural villages, witchcraft accusations reinforced the local balance of power and were 
essential for the maintenance of the social order.  
Studies of witchcraft underwent a major renewal during the late 1980s, when 
scholars realised that, despite colonial theories that witchcraft would disappear under 
the influence of missionary education and their particular Westernised notions of 
progress, witchcraft was not only still present, but gained a renewed strength and novel 
dimensions. This is why, starting from the late 1980s, witchcraft studies have been 
integrated into wider debates about modernity and the state in Africa (see Geschiere 
1988; Rowlands & Warnier 1988). In many African contexts, witchcraft was able to 
reinvent itself, mingling elements from the past and the new modern eras. Starting from 
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the 1990s, scholars started to speak about a ‘modernity’ of witchcraft (Auslander 1993; 
Bastian 1993; Comaroff & Comaroff 1993; Geschiere 1997; Shaw 1997; Moore & 
Sanders 2001). In fact, as Moore and Sanders (2001: 11-12) put it, “witchcraft operates 
as part and parcel of modernity itself. In other words, contemporary scholars of 
witchcraft cast occult beliefs and practices as not only contiguous with, but constitutive 
of modernity”. 
In Africa, witchcraft showed its power to reinvent itself following colonialism 
and its new forms of production and distribution of wealth, new accumulation 
mechanisms, and the imposition of foreign sources of power. Scholars such as Ardener 
(1970), Brain (1982), de Rosny (1985) and Rowlands and Warnier (1988) interpreted 
the renewed boom in witchcraft rumours as the attempt by certain African societies to 
understand new, modern opportunities for economic and political advancement and the 
increasing economic polarisation and social differentiation that came with them. 
Studies on the relationship between witchcraft and illicit accumulation 
continued later on in the following decades, revealing to be a very fruitful field of 
analysis. In particular, anthropologists became interested in the way in which witchcraft 
could impact upon power relations, both political and economic, and how it could be 
utilised and adapted as African communities struggled to cope with the postcolo nial 
demands and stresses of modernity (see for example Apter 1993; Comaroff & 
Comaroff 1993; Pool 1994; Weiss 1996; Geschiere 1997; Sanders 1999; De Boeck 
1999, 2000a, 2001; Bond & Ciekawy 2001; Niehaus 2001). Stories of zombies, 
cannibalism and human sacrifices became tools to understand the new mechanisms of 
market economy such as wage labour, consumption practices, migration and 
development policies (Niehaus 2005; Shaw 1997, 2001; Masquelier 2000; White 2000). 
Moreover, some authors have highlighted how witchcraft became a tool to criticise 
development, modernity, capitalism and globalisation and their relations of production 
(Brain 1982; Parish 2000; Smith 2008). 
Witchcraft discourses have entered not only the economic, but also the political 
sphere, and many authors have explored the way in which political action and 
witchcraft interrelated in African states (see Geschiere 1988; Rowlands & Warnier 
1988; Geschiere & Fisiy 1994; Ciekawy 1997, 1998; Ashforth 1998b; Niehaus 1998, 
2001; West 2005). For example, Rowland and Warnier (1988: 121) state that in 
Cameroon: “[S]orcery is not only a mode of popular political action but lies at the 
centre of the state-building process both in the present and in the past”.  
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Witchcraft discourses have been described as extremely malleable. They are 
discourses about power, inequalities, desires and privations. This is why in recent 
decades witchcraft studies have witnessed a renewed proliferation. A first interesting 
element is that witchcraft studies have increasingly focused on the urban milieu or on 
the interstices between rural and urban (Bastian 1993; Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 1998; 
Geschiere & Gugler 1998; Ashforth 2001; Van Dijk 2001; Bähre 2002; De Boeck & 
Plissart 2004). It is in the city that witchcraft manifestations in relation to modernity are 
most visible. In the city, witchcraft has found a way through new technologies and the 
media, as highlighted for example by Bastian (1993, 2001), Meyer (1999a, 2001, 
2003), and Pype (2006, 2012). The city has also been the privileged space for 
Pentecostal churches to make their appearance and to become the official expurgators 
of witchcraft in society (see Meyer 1992, 1998, 1999b; Maxwell D. 1995, 2006; Van 
Dijk 1995, 2001; Pype 2012). 
In recent years, scholars have written about how witchcraft relates to everyday 
life in postcolonial situations. Kapferer (2003) argues that we can see witchcraft as an 
amoral “phantasmagoric space”, defined as an imagined, virtual field in which people 
seek ‘spiritual’ shelter that is not necessarily connected to the real world. Lambek 
(2003) and Kluchhohn (1967) examine witchcraft in terms of psychological processes 
of projection, as a channel through which emotions such as anxiety and aggression can 
be displaced into others. Niehaus (2001) and Lattas (1993) describe witchcraft as a 
symbolic vehicle for appropriating the power of white persons.  
While the authors above refer to witchcraft as a space ‘other’ than reality, and 
not necessarily interrelated to everyday life on a daily basis, Ashforth (1996, 1998a, 
1998b, 2001) and De Boeck (2005a; De Boeck & Plissart 2004) have analysed the way 
in which witchcraft and everyday life combine in the construction of a given social and 
imaginary context. During his research in the city of Soweto, in South Africa, Ashforth 
(1998b: 62) was struck by the “pervasive sense of insecurity in the face of unseen 
powers and invisible forces capable of causing real, palpable, material, physical (call 
them what you will) effects in the here and now” – a phenomenon which he called 
“spiritual insecurity” (Ibid). Witchcraft, he continues shortly after, “is a form of action 
akin to violence and crime in that it is understood to be the real cause behind palpable, 
physical, harmful results” (Ibid: 63). Witchcraft was an everyday occurrence, a power 
which lay “at the very heart of the relationships constituting politics in that place, from 
the household to the state” (Ashforth 1996: 1184). As such, it had the power to  put 
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people in a state of constant fear not only of misfortunes in general, but also of any 
other person – being him a neighbour, a son, a friend – who might be harbouring evil 
intentions through witchcraft. Witchcraft thus contributed on a daily basis to the climate 
of paranoia and insecurity within the community and within the family – a fact which 
has a striking resemblance with the social context of Kinshasa.  
De Boeck (2005a) and De Boeck and Plissart (2004) propose yet another way of 
thinking about witchcraft and everyday life, describing witchcraft metaphorically as a 
mirror. In their work on Kinshasa, witchcraft is described as a “second world” 
(deuxieme monde), a “second city” (deuxieme cité), a “pandemonium world” (monde 
pandemonium), or “fourth dimension” (quatrième dimension) (De Boeck & Plissart 
2004:57) in which the marvellous and the dimension of terror are reflected through a 
mirroring mechanism into daily life. This mirroring process has been so powerful that, 
according to the authors, witchcraft has lately superseded reality, leading to an 
“indiscernibleness between ‘réel’ [real] and ‘irréel’ [unreal]” (Deleuze 1990 in De 
Boeck 2005:189). De Boeck and Plissart (2004: 57) assert this idea of 
interconnectedness when they say “the activities of the day constantly include the world 
of the night, of the dream and of the shadow” (De Boeck & Plissart 2004: 57). 
Witchcraft was like a shadow to reality, which followed people everywhere 
interpenetrating in their daily life, while dreams were “beacons” ( Ibid) that allowed the 
Kinois to spot who conspired against them in the second world. Reality and the 
imaginary interpenetrated, creating multiple dimensions of perception.  
My thesis will contribute to the scholarship on witchcraft in two ways. First, I 
will contribute to those studies which highlighted the interdependence between 
witchcraft and everyday life (Ashforth 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 2001; De Boeck 2004, 
2005a, 2009; De Boeck & Plissart 2004) by focusing on how the Kinois perceived 
mobulu at the intersection between material and invisible violence. Second, I will 
explain in detail some mechanisms of witchcraft in Kinshasa, which have developed in 
the last few years in parallel with the inequalities brought by market economy, as I shall 
now explain. 
During the last decade, studies on the cosmology of Kinshasa have focused 
mainly on two phenomena. The first is the use of witchcraft (kindoki) in order to kill or 
harm other people (see De Boeck 2004, 2005a, 2009; De Boeck & Plissart 2004). In 
this case, kindoki accusations often took place between the youngest and the elderly, as 
the result of intergenerational tensions caused by shifts of power within the social 
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hierarchy in Kinshasa. Young and old people accused themselves of trying to kill each 
other through kindoki – a phenomenon which I analyse extensively in chapter 7. The 
second field of study has been divination (see Devisch 1991, 1993, 2013; Devisch & 
Brodeur 1999; De Boeck & Devisch 1994). The diviner (nganga), through bodily 
practices, his ‘diviner basket’ and cla irvoyance, was able to envision the sources of 
afflictions or death through sorcery of the client, and suggested a therapeutic solution. 
However, another manifestation of witchcraft also demands detailed analysis. 
The neighbourhoods of Kinshasa were also filled with rumours of la magie5, which 
constituted a specific way of turning to the occult powers of kindoki for personal 
endorsement, rather than to kill. People involved in the phenomenon of la magie were 
believed to enter occult Masonic sects, where they were required to sacrifice a family 
member through kindoki in order to get rich. Modern commodities, aspirations and 
lifestyles have enriched and differentiated the spectrum of kindoki – and thus reality. 
Due to the relative novelty of this modality of witchcraft, no extensive studies have 
been conducted on this subject. 
Mobulu in Kinshasa was experienced both materially and imaginarily. People 
whispered that witches killed their relatives in the world of witchcraft in order to enrich 
themselves, and that occult covenants were taking place in the Masonic lodges around 
the cities. Much of the mobulu that took place in Kinshasa circulated within the 
community in the form of rumours and gossip. As such, the next section is devoted to 
the power of word of mouth in creating witchcraft accusations and tensions within the 
community. 
 
Rumours and Gossip in la Cité 
 
‘Pavement radio’ (radio trottoir, which is the definition the Kinois use for ‘word of 
mouth’ and ‘chit-chat’), was probably the most powerful instrument of ‘news 
distribution’ in la cité, the ensemble of the residential suburbs of Kinshasa as opposed 
to the bureaucratic centre of la ville (also called Gombe). Every type of event was 
discussed through ‘pavement radio’ in the form of rumours and gossip: recent political 
events, football matches, pastor’s successful exorcisms, fraud scandals, and witchcraft 
                                                 
5
 Although the term la magie can be translated with ‘magic’, I have preferred to keep the original 
term the Kinois use. Translating la magie into ‘magic’ risks overshadowing some original 
mechanisms and missing out on the nuances which are specific to the modern context of Kinshasa.  
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suspicions and accusations. In a city where electricity supply was erratic, newspapers 
rarely made their way to the inhabitants of la cité’s homes, and people spent most of 
their time on the street making do, gossip and rumours were for many the only way to 
have a grasp of large-scale events, as well as the more intimate events taking place 
within the community.  
The distinction between gossip, rumour and scandal is delineated by Stewart 
and Strathern (2004) who explain: 
Gossip takes place mutually among people in network groups. Rumour is 
unsubstantiated information, true or untrue, that passes by word of mouth, often 
in wider networks than gossip. Scandal is news that is unambiguously 
deleterious to those it is directed against, whereas gossip and rumour need not 
be so (although they often are) (p. 38-39). 
Since the 1960s, rumour, gossip and scandal became the focus of an ongoing 
debate over their purpose and implications. Gluckman (1963) highlighted the positive 
role of gossip in maintaining the unity and morality of a group, and to create bonds of 
intimacy among its members. Moreover, gossip enabled groups to “control the 
competing cliques and aspiring individuals of which all groups are composed” (Ibid: 
308). By analysing Colson’s (1953) study of the Makah Indians, Gluckman (1963) 
explained how they constantly use the tongue of scandal in order to keep each other in 
proper place. The Makah, a small group of people who were made American citizens, 
found in gossip and scandal a tool to assert their identity and uniqueness as a group set 
outside American society:  
The constant criticism, gossip and backbiting is a reassertion of these values, 
which today can be expressed in no other way. If they repressed the gossip and 
back-biting, the values themselves would disappear, and with them much of the 
feeling that the Makah are a distinct people (Gluckman 1963: 311). 
This particular approach was later criticised by Paine (1967) who denied the 
positive moral function of gossiping, shifting the attention from the community where 
the gossip took place to the individuals who gossiped. Paine believed that people 
involved in gossiping were driven by self- interest and they gossiped in order to 
“forward and protect their individual interests” (Paine 1967: 280). Gossip was 
described as an informal and indirect sanction where one cannot risk an open 
accusation or attack. In this sense, Paine attributed the role of gossip as similar to that 
25 
of witchcraft (p.278), as were the effects of such gossiping: projecting guilt on others 
might cause them harm – for example they could lose their job, be physically assaulted 
or socially marginalised.  
The negative impact of rumours and gossip on the accused was later analysed 
by Stewart and Strathern (2004), who highlighted how gossip was often destructive and 
invasive, and could function exactly like witchcraft accusations. The authors acutely 
added that the power of gossiping rests on the fact that it cannot be easily checked or 
verified by explicit means and is effective regardless of verification. This means that 
gossip, in order to be effective and to be considered true, must be spoken in contexts of 
ideology that are congenial to them.  
In recent decades, some authors have highlighted how rumours and gossip can 
instil suspicion and fear within the community vis à vis new forms of enrichment, 
consumption and class structure (see Geschiere 1997, White 2000). White’s (2000) 
analysis of vampire narratives in colonial East and Central Africa shows how vampire 
stories “reveal the world of power and uncertainty” (p.43) in which the Africans have 
been living in the past few decades. However, she asserts that attention on gossip and 
rumours should shift from looking at the reason behind make-believe to what such 
beliefs articulate in a given time and place. As such, gossip is useful because it allows 
people in a certain context to speak for themselves through stories that for them are 
meaningful and, consequently, true. As she puts it (2000: 64), “[g]ossip is a reliable 
historical source because it traces the boundaries created by talking about someone. In 
that talking, a world of value and behaviour is constituted”. Gossiping reveals 
motivations and interests of a person in a given time and depicts the web of power 
relations that people of a certain social context are trying to make sense of. Gossip as 
such becomes a way to catch a glimpse of the world as the speakers inhabited and 
imagined it to be. 
White (2000) distances herself from those scholars who refused to consider 
hearsay and gossip as worth considering because of the changing character of the 
stories conveyed through word of mouth. She highlighted how people construct 
experience through hearsay, and this is what makes stories true regardless of 
verification. In her words: “The labelling of one thing as ‘true’ and the other as ‘fictive’ 
or ‘metaphorical’ – all the usual polite academic terms for false – may eclipse all the 
intricate ways in which people use social truths to talk about the past” (Ibid: 68) – or 
indeed the present or future, one might add. People do not speak from experience but 
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rather carry and rework stories that are meaningful according to the situation. As such, 
elements within stories can vary radically from one version of a story to another. It is 
not the accuracy of information that matters to them, but rather the message and the 
values such stories convey. 
In Kinshasa, gossip had a central role in everyday life. Basongi-songi, as people 
called gossip in Lingala, was a central means of communication and value-conveyor 
within the community. Many of the situations I depict are based on data which was not 
only secondary, but also tertiary and beyond: the more it circulates, the more gossip 
increases its power and reliability. At the time of my fieldwork, I did not personally 
witness any violent clashes between street gangs, nor was I directly implicated in 
robberies by the thieves that I describe in chapter 4. I did not witness any witchcraft 
dealing by children nor by adults, nor violent exorcisms by fiery pastors. What I 
witnessed was the result of street gang terror, people telling me how they avoided 
passing through certain areas of the city; the fears of those Kinois who rushed home at 
sunset not to be caught on the street by bandits; the painful memories of the street-
children accused of witchcraft, and the angry accounts of their families on how their 
children destroyed businesses and killed relatives. I collected whisperings, gossip, 
rumours, life histories and accounts on disparate subjects. I believe that all this data is 
extremely useful to understand the social world which the Kinois were trying to tame 
and turn to their own benefit. Moreover, although the stories the Kinois circulated about 
witches and street gangs fights often varied from informant to informant, they were all 
considered as truth and all had very serious physical implications on the people they 
gossiped about. 
The social context in which I carried out my fieldwork was one of profound 
insecurity and mistrust: hardship and poverty have made people more cautious not to 
run across risks and accidents they might not be able to manage. In the next section, I  
shall introduce the reader briefly to the climate of insecurity which reigned in the 
neighbourhood of Maman Yemo where I lived. I shall describe the complexities of how 
I conducted my research, and how I found myself positioned in the field in relation to 
rumours of witchcraft and questions of my true intentions. I will illustrate how mobulu 
in all its forms – hence comprised witchcraft – touched me and the family I lived with 
personally, and required us to adjust our lives according to it.  
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Setting and Methodology: Dealing with Mobulu in Maman Yemo 
 
This research is the outcome of a total of fifteen months of fieldwork in Kinshasa, two 
months of which were conducted during 2007 for my Master’s dissertation, followed by 
thirteen months between 2010 and 2011 for my doctoral thesis. In 2007 I stayed with a 
congregation of missionaries based in the west side of town. This is where I met Joseph 
Mutambu, a young man from the Oriental Province (see Map 1) who was pursuing a 
ministerial career. When we first met, Joseph was going through a hard time because of 
an accident during a football match. He was struck in the face by a football and as a 
consequence developed an eye infection. Health care is so poor in Kinshasa that this 
infection developed to the degree that Joseph lost the sight of his eye 6. Joseph soon 
became one of my closest friends, and helped me throughout the course of my research. 
In 2010, however, I decided to focus more on domestic life by living with a Congolese 
family. In order to do so, I contacted Joseph, asking him to help me finding a host 
family.  
Between my two periods of fieldwork, Joseph had gone through great changes 
in his life. He had decided to leave the seminary after twelve years because of repeated 
discrepancies with some members of the mission, and he had built a life on his own. 
After living for a short period in the house plot (parcelle7) of some distant relative who 
had come to Kinshasa some years before, he had finally found a room to rent in a 
parcelle in Kinsuka, a neighbourhood in the commune of Ngaliema. During one of our 
calls in those days, he told me he also had a baby, Yannick, and a girlfriend, Julia, both 
living in the girl’s family-house, not far from Joseph’s actual home. At this point 
Joseph suggested that, as I was not used to living in the suburbs (la cité), his girlfriend 
and their baby could come to live with us, and help me getting adjusted to my new life. 
My initial plan was to live with a Congolese family, so I had no other option but to 
                                                 
6
 This is an example of the mobulu of everyday life in Kinshasa. The structural violence of the state, 
in the form of poor health care, resulted in Joseph having to spend the rest of his life with one eye. 
This reflected not only on his self-esteem but also on his practical life, as he was slowed down in 
many daily activities and could not carry out others. This limited his possibilities of ‘making do’ in 
Kinshasa, a concept I will flesh out in chapter 3. 
7
 A parcelle (see also La Fontaine 1970a) is a house plot, or a plot in which several houses are 
organised around a central courtyard. While De Boeck and Plissart (2004) describe the parcelle as 
inhabited by “one’s (extended) family and ethnic affiliation” (Ibid: 53), today parcelles’ owners 
often rent them to people unrelated to each other and coming from different regions of the country. 
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accept his offer, which I considered to be mutually convenient, given my will to live in 
la cité and his need to sustain his girlfriend and child.  
Joseph proposed that we find a parcelle in which we would live on our own 
rather than sharing it with strangers. Out of personal experience, he was afraid that 
other members of the parcelle could steal something from us while we were not there. 
After some hunting, he found a parcelle not far from where he was living in Kinsuka, 
with high walls topped by broken glasses (a very common method in Kinshasa in order 
to defend the compound from thieves) in the neighbourhood of Maman Yemo. Because 
a white person in la cité risked attracting attention from bandits8, we also decided to 
hire a sentinel called Alpha Mumbela, a man from a close locality called D.G.C. who 
would spend the night in our parcelle, armed with a machete (which he ended up using 
to cut the grass) and eventually also a sling shot.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: A street in our neighbourhood, Maman Yemo 
                                                 
8
 ‘White’ in Kinshasa is synonymous with wealth, modern commodities and progress. In Kinshasa 
there is still a huge gap between the local Congolese population and the expatr iate community. 
While a large number of Lebanese and Chinese have the monopoly of the private sector, such as 
minerals trade and construction business, many Western expatriates work with non-Governmental 
and International Organization and embassies. The disparity between Congolese citizens and the 
White is extreme. 
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Maman Yemo9, the neighbourhood in which I lived during my stay in Kinshasa, 
is a 2.5 square kilometre area which in 2011 had 28,466 inhabitants. The population of 
the neighbourhood is quite heterogeneous, with people coming from every corner of the 
Congo. A 2009 census of Maman Yemo describes the diverse character of the 
neighbourhood – and of the city in general: 
 
 
FIGURE 2: The population of the neighbourhood of Maman Yemo in 2009, divided 
according to regions of provenance 
 
 
Among the Congolese, the majority hailed from the Bas-Congo region and quite 
significantly, the smallest group of population is formed by the autochthones of 
Kinshasa. 
Maman Yemo is part of the Commune of Ngaliema, South West of the centre of 
Kinshasa, la ville. The majority of the inhabitants of Maman Yemo had small 
businesses (petit commerce) often outside of the formal market economy and very few 
residents in the neighbourhood had any formal employment. As such, most residents 
were excluded from the circuits of Western commodities and salaried jobs. They were, 
to use Meyer and Van de Port’s words, “in the shadow of modernity” (1999 cited in 
Lambek 2003: 199). 
                                                 
9
 The name Maman Yemo, assigned under Mobutu’s regime, was in honour of Mobutu’s mother, 
Marie-Madeleine Yemo – informally called Maman Yemo.  
Maman Yemo Population 
(2009 census) 
Province of origin Inhabitants 
Congolese Bas-Congo 11753 
 Bandundu 5573 
 Kasai Oriental 3671 
 Equateur 3497 
 Kasai Occidental 1624 
 Oriental province 626 
 South Kivu 556 
 Maniema 426 
 Katanga 308 
 North Kivu 170 
 Kinshasa 66 
Foreigners Angolans 196 
Total population  28466 
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Relationships in our neighbourhood and in Kinshasa in general were very 
precarious: people from different tribes, with different backgrounds and customs were 
obliged to share overcrowded parcelles under precarious living conditions, confronting 
each other’s habits, families and fortunes. The situation was rendered tenser by the 
frequent robberies and assaults that took place both on the street and in people’s homes. 
I had frequently heard the expression “people don’t know each other” (batu bayebani 
te), which illustrated the atmosphere of diffidence that permeated the city, pushing 
people to doubt their neighbours and even their own family members. In fact not only 
did people not know each other well, but also, and foremost, they did not trust each 
other (see also Rubbers 2009a). They saw cheating and lies everywhere around them. 
This mistrust went beyond the limits of material, visible life and was exacerbated by the 
fear of witchcraft. Everyone could be a witch in Kinshasa, with their true identity 
concealed under the mask of normality and anonymity of everyday life, which makes 
every Kinois a potential danger. The climate of insecurity and paranoia, endorsed by the 
state’s abusive power against the population, had presented many challenges to my 
fieldwork within this neighbourhood. No one could figure out what a ‘true white’ (vrai 
mundele10) was doing living among the poor of la cité. As such, my presence and my 
role in the neighbourhood raised many doubts and suspicions. Despite my effort at 
explaining that I was a student, people did not believe me.  
Rumours started to circulate that I was a spy 11  sent by the Government to 
monitor the malcontent of the population. Some people believed that I was working 
undercover with Joseph, who was imagined as a general from the east of the country 
who had lost his eye in combat. Others believed I was a witch from London to learn 
Congolese witchcraft. In this case, Joseph was simply considered my apprentice, who 
had lost his eye while holding a pot of potion that spilled onto his face. One day while I 
was not home, some children threw small stones inside the wall of our parcelle yelling 
“Witch! Witch!” (Ndoki! Ndoki!) Such gossip caused me to experience both surprise 
and distress. I started to note people avoiding me, talking behind by back and I became 
quite paranoid about other peoples’ judgments. If on the one hand these complications 
deeply upset me, on the other they had the advantage of throwing me into the 
                                                 
10
 ‘True whites’ (vrai mindele) refers to Europeans or Americans, considered to be ‘proper 
Westerners’ as opposed to the Chinese and Lebanese businessmen present in town, who are 
considered only as ‘fake mindele’ or ‘half-mindele’. 
11
 On the same argument see Gordon (1990). 
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atmosphere of suspicion of my neighbours. I too felt “the invisible violence of fear and 
intimidation” (Green 1995: 105). I observed first-hand how insecurity lay between the 
macro-dimensions of history and structural violence, and between the micro-
dimensions of violence at the level of everyday life.  
The rumours surrounding my presence, made carrying out fieldwork with my 
neighbours very difficult. In front of my neighbours’ suspicions, I tried alternative 
methods to win their trust, such as selling frozen juice (jus) in front of schools and 
selling bread in one of the small open-air boutiques of the square. While my “economic 
adventures” earned me the sympathy of the neighbours, some topics remained taboo. I 
could not ask them about political events and their opinions in detail, or ask about 
witchcraft at all. 
As a consequence, I had to adjust my research strategies. I started collecting 
data outside the neighbourhood. A person’s community and solidarity networks, rather 
than being merely spatial, were conceptual. As such, my networks were not organised 
around my neighbourhood, but rather around a group of acquaintances and friends with 
whom I managed to create connections. A few key interlocutors – Julia and Joseph, a 
Congolese Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) and a few Pentecostal churches – 
played a central role in constructing these.  
I organised my fieldwork in a meticulous way. During the early months of my 
research, I reconnected with a Congolese Non-Governmental Organization working 
with street-children that I first came to know during my fieldwork in 2007. I 
interviewed many of these children, who I subsequently visited on the street 
independently with Joseph on a number of occasions. A couple of days a week I joined 
a member of the NGO visiting families scattered across all the neighbourhoods of 
Kinshasa. Whereas some families perceived me as a social worker and tended not to 
talk to me, others opened up and gave me very detailed accounts on witchcraft and 
many other topics. On many occasions, these people were adopting a strategy that 
Robben (1995: 83) calls “ethnographic seduction”, defined as a set of “strategies of 
persuasion and concealment” (Nordstrom & Robben 1995: 16) in order to disable the 
“ethnographic gaze” of the anthropologist and project him or her into an atmosphere of 
empathy, an universe of reason and emotion. Although I was very aware of these 
seductive strategies and of their partial truths in respect to witchcraft, I focused less on 
analysing the veracity of their statements than on the values and meanings people were 
conveying through their stories: when the witchcraft started, whom it involved, and 
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how the family reacted to it, all added very useful elements to understand the social 
context of people’s everyday lives, their relationships within the family and the 
community, their aspirations and their fears. Although some of my informants preferred 
avoiding the topic of witchcraft, they had no reservations in talking to me about their 
occupations and other family mechanisms such as marriages and child rearing in 
Kinshasa. We discussed a diverse range of issues, and these formed the bulk of my 
ethnographic data. 
I devoted a further two days of the week to ‘awakening churches’ (églises du 
réveil), which were religious sects in which pastors preached the Bible and held 
liberation sessions to free the devotees from the attacks of evil spirits and witches. I 
visited many Pentecostal churches, some of them more frequently than others. I was a 
regular of a Centre for Spiritual Healing (Centre de Guérison Spirituel) in Ma 
Campagne: I interviewed the pastor and his assistants, as well as several adults and 
children who had been identified as possessing mystical problems. I also interviewed 
the pastors and attendants of other churches, and some of these families even invited 
me to their homes, which signalled the beginning of a long series of visits.  
When I was not in churches or with the NGO members, I spent the days visiting 
the people I had met through established research participants. I went to visit schools 
and spoke with the children about their daily lives; I went to the market to buy food and 
to help sell cakes; I went to pastors’ home to discuss witchcraft; I interviewed many of 
the moto-taxi drivers that worked between Pompage and DGC. At the same time, I 
found multiple sources of friendship and data among Joseph’s and Julia’s kin and 
friends. With them I was free to speak about various issues and some of them shared 
with me very personal stories and points of view. Thanks to Joseph and Julia I managed 
to meet some former child-soldiers (the so-called ‘kadogos’), who were all distant 
acquaintances of Julia’s family from the east of the country, and also I came to meet 
some high ranking military officials who lived around our neighbourhood. I was also 
invited to weddings and funerals, sharing food and shelter with those whom I called my 
Congolese family. This thesis is the result of the contribution of all these networks of 
persons and families. 
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Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis is divided into three parts.  The first, formed by chapters 1 and 2, is a general 
introduction to my research and to the interplay between structural and everyday 
violence. In particular, chapter 2 explores how disenchanted young people in different 
epochs – from pre-Independence until the time of my fieldwork – were able to turn 
structural violence to their favour, creating original and empowering social phenomena, 
such as street gangs and fashion movements. Despite the mobulu perpetrated by the 
government and the military upon the population, the inhabitants of Kinshasa were able 
to empower themselves through subversive mechanisms, social phenomena and 
religious movements. The history of Kinshasa is a history of mobulu, and how the 
Kinois actively engaged with this mobulu throughout the years. 
The second part of the thesis opens with chapter 3, in which I focus on the 
economic strategies of survival within the poor of Kinshasa. I describe how the market 
economy and its mechanisms of wealth and inequality deeply affected the lives of the 
Kinois, creating resentment and insecurity among the population. As the market 
economy was inaccessible to most of Kinshasa’s population, there was a drastic 
increase in informal activities and circuits of self-help, but also of ‘cheating’ and illegal 
activities. However, the Kinois were able to reproduce such informal mechanisms in the 
public sphere, making crisis and corruption that affected the market economy, work for 
their own benefit. 
In chapter 4, I analyse how the mobulu at the economic level resulted in the 
formation of street gangs. The chapter explores the phenomenon of the kulunas, street 
gangs of young men who found a source of masculinity through violence and through 
the image of the military. The kulunas were a result of the economic crisis and the 
inabilities of many unemployed young people to find a place in society. As they could 
not attain adulthood through economic independence, they searched for respect by 
entering street gangs. In appropriating the symbolic power of the military, structural 
and symbolic violence were thus used to generate social organisation amongst the 
youth leading to street gangs.  
At the same time, the insecurity and volatility of wealth resulted in gossip about 
people enriching themselves by entering occult Masonic lodges, in which they were 
asked to sacrifice relatives in exchange for wealth. In chapter 5, I analyse this way of 
accessing and using witchcraft (kindoki), which the Kinois I interviewed generally 
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referred to as la magie or ‘freemasonry’ (franc-maçonnerie). This nuance of kindoki 
was believed to be linked to the Whites and to notions of development and progress. 
After an introduction to the concept of kindoki and its sub-category, la magie, I will 
focus on how adults were believed to use la magie to acquire wealth. Rumours on la 
magie and the mobulu they generated at the everyday level were strongly interrelated to 
economic hardship: through la magie, the poor of Kinshasa tried to explain the intrinsic 
tension between their struggle to ‘make do’ and the disproportionate enrichment of 
others. By describing wealth as bewitched, people actively engaged in a critique of 
social inequality and of the power of the state elite in Kinshasa.  
Chapter 6 opens the third part of the thesis, which focuses on the family and 
intergenerational tensions among its members. Indeed, economic insecurity resulted in 
a transformation of household patterns and familial solidarity. The impossibilities of 
some young people to build financial capital and pay bridewealth made it increasingly 
difficult for them to settle down and create a family. This resulted in young people 
moving from one household to another, and entering in short- lived relationships with 
different partners. These short unions often ignored the will of the elders of the family, 
who were left as spectators while the youngsters got married without official 
permission and without bridewealth. In this precarious context, unresolved debts and 
tensions between the younger and the elder generations generated both physical and 
mystical violence. 
In chapter 7, I explain how the ‘violence of the house’ (mobulu ya ndako) often 
resulted in accusations of witchcraft (kindoki) between kin members and how such 
accusations were double-sided, with young people and the elders accusing each other. I 
explain that children born out of customary wedlock, who found themselves at the 
intersection of households and familial tensions, were believed to be the emissaries of 
kindoki between the younger and the elder generations. Thus, in the second part of the 
chapter I focus on the phenomenon of the so called ‘witch-children’ (bana bandoki), 
who were children accused to be bewitched by some family members in order to 
deliver death through witchcraft to other members. I argue that the idea that children 
could be easily lured into witchcraft plots comes from a Western notion of the child 
promulgated by the colonial state-actors, missionaries and later Western non-
governmental organisations, which describe children as innocent and in danger. 
Although this vision of the child has revealed to be a catalyst for witchcraft accusations 
against children, I show how children, once they escaped from mistreatment at home 
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and lived on the street, were able to turn to their advantage the mechanisms of those 
same non-governmental organisations which involuntarily contributed to their 
becoming witch-children. Once again, the Kinois were able to turn structural violence 
and everyday mobulu to create fruitful coping mechanisms in their daily lives.  
In chapter 8, I return to the relationship between everyday violence and spiritual 
violence, and between material and mystical violence. I highlight the need to include 
witchcraft within scholarship of the anthropology of violence, and on the necessity of 
studying local situations from the privileged point of view of everyday life. I conclude 
the discussion with an overview of the concept of mobulu, and how the Kinois have 
transformed violence into a constructive force, able to create original social 
phenomena, coping strategies and strong relationships at the everyday level.  
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- CHAPTER TWO - 
CITY OF YOUTH: KINSHASA, MOBULU AND YOUNG PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS 
 
This chapter analyses how the Kinois have been able to transform and appropriate the 
everyday violence to which they are subjected in order to create meaningful everyday 
practices and coping strategies. In particular, this chapter will focus on some specific 
social phenomena which have placed young people as protagonists across various 
stages of Kinshasa’s history. First, I shall highlight the emergence of street gangs called 
bills and the development of the fashion movement of la Sape12 during the decades 
around Independence in 1960. These two movements allowed many young Kinois to 
turn the mobulu of state impositions on their heads, using it to build original social 
movements through which they could shape their identity in the new social context of 
the city. Second, I shall expand on the rise of informal economy and explore the 
development of Pentecostal churches and witchcraft accusations during the tenure of 
President Mobutu from 1964 to 1997. Although Mobutu’s reign was characterised by 
corruption, intimidation and economic impasse, people managed to create new 
phenomena in the leaks of state control. These phenomena shifted between formal and 
informal, legal and illegal, but also Western and local, demonstrating the ability of 
young people to navigate in between different registers. Third, I shall illuminate more 
recent social phenomena such as the street gangs known as kulunas, who have 
appropriated the figure of the soldier in order to create a new idea of manhood, and the 
emancipation of the children accused of witchcraft in the streets of Kinshasa.  
Although some of these phenomena, like the kuluna gangs and the phenomenon 
of the so-called ‘witch-children’, will be dealt with carefully in the following chapters, 
this chapter gives us the opportunity to situate such phenomena within a historical 
continuum, in order to understand how they interrelate and how they developed 
according to politico-economic changes. A rigorous exploration of the development of 
these social phenomena through time will help us understand the creative responses of 
young people to different forms of oppression – political, economic, and social. Indeed, 
these phenomena were born out of the will of unemployed and also uneducated young 
people to prove their worth and find their own space within a state which had forgotten 
                                                 
12
 An acronym for ‘Société des Ambianceurs et Personnes Elégantes’ (Society of Fun Lovers and 
Elegant People).  
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about them. Despite suffering mobulu on a daily basis through state neglect and 
economic hardship, some young Kinois have also been able to utilise mobulu as a 
springboard for the creation of original strategies and coping mechanisms in the ever 
changing social context of Kinshasa.  
The mobulu of everyday life, which has been at the basis of the creation of 
young people’s movements, is very much interrelated to the violence, corruption and 
impasse at the state level. Indeed throughout the history of Congo, violence has been a 
central instrument of coercion and control. Mobutu usurped power by means of a coup 
in 1964, and significantly aided by the might of the military in holding together a 
country as large as Western Europe for nearly thirty years. Laurent Désiré Kabila also 
became President of the country through a coup in 1997, marching to Kinshasa with his 
army of ‘little ones’ (kadogos in Swahili, the so-called child-soldiers). After his violent 
assassination, his son Joseph Kabila, who was chief of the army at the time, took his 
place as the leader of the country. Under Joseph Kabila’s governance, the Congo today 
is not officially at war, yet armed conflicts still regularly occur on the borders with 
Angola to the west and Rwanda to the east. In those areas, soldiers frequently harass 
local populations, pillaging, raping and killing both civilians and men in uniform.  
Kinshasa, like Congo itself, has witnessed profound political, economic and 
social changes over its history. Immediately after Independence in 1960, the city was 
shaken by revolts against the colonists in the capital, and abusive occupations and 
squatting. Between 1991 and 1993 two huge waves of pillaging struck the city, with 
malcontent soldiers and civilians attacking shops and boutiques of the city in order to 
combat poor wages and unemployment. Throughout different epochs, violent attacks 
and harassment by soldiers against civilians have been a common phenomenon. 
Military turmoil and the corruption and ineptitude of the state have had a profound 
effect at the community level, as explained in chapter 1. Poor services, inefficient social 
policies and social insecurity have touched the lives of the majority of the Kinois. 
Healthcare is dangerously ineffective, the market economy is unstable and often 
regulated through scam and cheating, and public services like running water and 
electricity are non-existents in several areas of the city. 
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The majority of the population of Kinshasa is less than 25 (De Boeck & Plissart 
200413). As such, most of the mobulu which affected everyday life – extreme poverty, 
premature deaths, unemployment, and so on – had a strong impact on this segment of 
the population. Rather than getting overwhelmed by mobulu and abandoning 
themselves to hopelessness and despair, young people have been able to transform and 
re-channel the mobulu they were subjected to into creative social phenomena. For 
example street gangs became a way for some young men to plot a pathway to manhood 
and to gain social recognition in a society which denied any agency to unemployed and 
uneducated people. In the same fashion, other young people found a new means to 
express their malcontent for the structural violence and the indifference of the 
government elites through the wearing of designer clothes. Each of these manifestations 
of mobulu refers to the youth of the population and shows how many young people 
constructed their lives in relation to an ever shifting social terrain. Their lives are entry 
points to understand the evolving and malleable concept of ‘mobulu’ which surrounded 
their lives – concept which restricted them but also freed them. 
The chapter starts with a digression over the anthropology of youth, and the 
latest developments in this field. In order to place this chapter within the wider 
anthropological literature on youth, I will indicate how young people in different social 
contexts have been able to turn negative situations to their own advantage. I will offer 
further context to the young lives I am presenting here with an exploration of the 
anthropology of the urban milieu in Africa, which informs much of what I will later 
discuss. This will allow us to situate Kinshasa within the recent scholarship on 
‘cosmopolitan cities’, which acknowledges the vital role of people in shaping the urban 
space through practices which draw from both local and global influences.  
The following section introduces the reader to the urban context of Kinshasa, 
and to some social phenomena which took place before Independence, such as the 
formation of the first street gangs called bills. Following a chronological continuum, 
the next section will be devoted to the creation of new Congolese elites called the 
évolués, and the rise of the first sapeurs, who dressed to imitate to the Belgian elite.  
                                                 
13
 The analysis of the population of Kinshasa according to age groups suffers from both a paucity of 
quality and reliability, in a country where public offices are characterised by operating failures (see 
chapter 3) and where the general census of the population is not regularly organised. No more recent 
data are available.  
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The next section analyses how the Kinois were able to develop an informal 
system of ‘making do’ strategies in order to fight the economic recession which hit the 
city under Mobutu’s tyranny. Despite economic impasse and political corruption, that 
epoch (which lasted thirty-two years) was characterised also by intense social activity. 
Street gangs now called kibills still roamed the streets of Kinshasa, and the 
phenomenon la Sape – now a contesting movement against corrupt state elite – reached 
its zenith in the 1980s. The religious scene also enriched itself under Mobutu, when 
hundreds of independent Pentecostal churches started to appear around the city; a 
phenomenon which went hand in hand with the rise of accusations of witchcraft against 
children. An in-depth description of the political, economic and social context of Congo 
under Mobutu’s rule will help us understand how these phenomena were born, and how 
they developed in the following years. 
The last section depicts the social context of Kinshasa in the decades following 
Mobutu’s decline, analysing how social phenomena previously described have 
developed according to more recent forms of mobulu. By appropriating and 
reinterpreting the mobulu of the state, young people have been able to shape 
countercultures and movements which empowered them in the challenging social 
context of Congo’s capital city.  
 
Contextualising Young People in Africa 
 
Up until recent decades, ‘youth’ has always been seen as a taken- for-granted notion, 
analysed in terms of its supporting and secondary role in all social re lationships 
(Argenti 2002; Durham 2004). Youth was seen only as an intermediary step to reach 
the more complete status of adulthood. However, in the late twentieth century, young 
people have started to gain more autonomy as a social category “in spite, or perhaps 
because, of their relative marginalisation from the normative world of work and wages” 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 2005: 21). They began to be described as a “lost generation” 
(O’ Brien 1996; Durham 2004), an “alien nation” (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999), or the 
generation of the “without-importance” (les sans importance – Bayart 1985, 1992) at 
the mercy of global, political, and economic changes.  
However, in the modern globalised era, characterised by technologies of mass 
production, communication and coercion, young people have gained an increasingly 
prominent role across various societies. They have been able to evade the control of the 
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adults and organise themselves in independent, often subversive groupings. Moreover, 
they have managed to turn their position of subordination into a powerful weapon to 
shape reality to their own will. Not only have young people been able to contest the 
social system, but also to borrow elements from the social category of those in charge, 
recontextualise them to shape their own identity, and adapt them to their needs. Rather 
than a lost generation, youth today is seen as a liminal or interstitial category (O’ Brien 
1996; Argenti 2002; Comaroff & Comaroff 2005; Honwana 2005), powerful and feared 
for its unpredictability. Deborah Durham (2004: 593) speaks about young people as 
social shifters, who “create the social configurations of their utterance but rely on 
meanings external to the utterance itself”.  
The creativity of young people in creating and recreating their roles in 
conditions of social and economic adversity have often clashed with the social 
impositions of the gerontocratic structure of power in society. Thus, in many fields 
disillusioned young people have found ways of empowering themselves by contesting 
and appropriating the power of the elders. For example Meyer (1998: 320) explains 
how in the religious arena in Ghana, young people have been exhorted by pastors to 
make a break with the past, and “liberate themselves socially and economically from 
their extended families and to be successful in life independently” (Meyer 1998: 320). 
In Pentecostal churches, young people have found a space to break free from the grasp 
of their elders, who are often ridiculed and despised (Van Dijk 1998). Authors such as 
Jourdan (2004), Richards (1996), Honwana (2005), Utas (2005), and West (2000) 
explain how young men and women empower themselves and cultivate independence 
by joining armed groups. Far from a stereotyped idea of innocent victims of violence, 
these young boys and girls utilise guns to act as producers o f violence rather than 
targets. 
Young people have also expressed their desire for independence and 
emancipation through sport and the arts. For example in Dakar, Senegal, during the 
1980s youngsters engaged in a city-cleansing movement called set/setal (Diouf 1992). 
Through cleaning sessions and the creations of graffiti on walls around the city, young 
people expressed their disdain towards the public infrastructures and the government 
which stayed indifferent in front of their needs and rights. At the same time new figures 
of power started to emerge within the young Senegalese community. Rappers and 
boxers started to become the embodiment of social prestige among youngsters (Havard 
2001). The movement ‘Be Indifferent’ (bul faale), to which rappers and boxers referred 
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to, was named after the attitude of the citizens in the face of the economic crisis (Biaya 
1997) and became the favourite means for young Senegalese to express their “desire for 
rupture and a remarkable capacity for innovation, which is based on processes of 
reformulation of identities” (Havard 2001: 75, my translation from French).  Likewise, 
Pype (2007) illustrates how in Kinshasa, in the last decade, many young Kinois have 
been influenced by models of masculinity of fighters and boxers.  
In some examples, music has provided a fruitful field of expression for youths 
exploring their lives positioned between tradition and globalisation. In Niger, 
Rasmussen (2000, 2003) has demonstrated how Tuareg women employed musical 
performances in order to express changing intergenerational relationships. Through the 
means of new technologies such as the radio, feminist organisations advanced their own 
agenda for gender and socioeconomic change. In Tanzania, Weiss (2002, 2009) 
explored how young barbers envisioned and imagined global fantasies in their 
barbershops. In there, young men listened to gangsta rap, read pornographic tabloids, 
watched Jackie Chan movies and aspired also to a return to Islam (Ibid). These shops, 
described as “things of today” and “unknown to ‘elders from the past’” (Weiss 2002: 
101) embodied links to an imaginative elsewhere, allowing young people to navigate 
between those ‘outside’ and ‘within’ their lived local context. 
Nunley in Sierra Leone (1987) and Argenti in Cameroon (1998) each explored 
how masquerades and dance performances have also become one of the spaces where 
young men could subvert the authority of the elders. Through their synthetic-fabric 
uniforms and modern-styled dances, the modern masquerade Air Youth described by 
Argenti (Ibid) drew their power from a world of modernity and globalisation which was 
a sharp contrast with the long-established masquerades of the palace, which drew from 
elements of the forest to symbolise state power. 
Last but not least, in several urban contexts, young people have demonstrated 
their capacity to shift from passive subjects of violence, discrimination and 
marginalisation, to active creators of counter-cultures and movements in the realm of 
the street (Biaya 1997, 2000; Abdullah 2005; Gondola 2009; De Boeck 2005a). The 
street has become the space for these young people to construct a new identity and 
forms of socialisation different from the familial sphere.  
In this respect, my thesis contributes to the anthropology of youth in Africa, by 
analysing how many young people in Kinshasa have been able to navigate adversities 
and create original phenomena across different fields of society such as economy, 
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family, and urban street culture. Through their ability to shift between global notions of 
wealth and commodities and local contexts, through customary laws and modern 
lifestyle, young people, often in adverse socio-economic contexts, have demonstrated 
an incredible capacity to break conventions and make a new society possible.  
In Kinshasa, young people have demonstrated their ability to cope with hardship 
by appropriating mobulu and using it as catalyst for creation of social phenomena 
which challenge the gerontocratic power of society. Those young men and women who 
find themselves in liminal positions within society – either due to being uneducated, or 
unemployed, or both – have been able to create alternative avenues for social prestige 
and empowerment, not approved of by the elders, and to defy their elders’ monopoly of 
power. 
Growing metropolises like Kinshasa are privileged spaces for young people’s 
creativity, providing a perfect ground to develop in the intersection between local and 
global, ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’. As such, a brief excursus over the anthropology of 
urban spaces in Africa is needed. Furthermore, the ethnography I will present over the 
course of this thesis will seek to contribute to this academic exploration of African 
cityscapes and the ways in which such urban spaces emerge through, but are also 
constructed by, the complexities of urban life.  
 
Theorizing the City in Africa 
 
The interest in urbanism in Africa arose as cities across began developing exponentially 
and in often surprisingly ways. As such, in the last few decades, studies have drastically 
shifted from rural realities to urban centres. Scholars have focused their interests on 
specific cities in Africa (Ferguson 1999; De Boeck & Plissart 2004; Trefon 2004; 
Mbembe & Nuttal 2004; Simone 2004a), on their development, and how African cities 
positioned themselves in relation to the wider literature on urbanisation.  
Urbanisation has often been measured in relation to concepts of modernisation 
and progress, as Ferguson summarises: “The established approaches to ‘urbanization’ 
have all depended, in different ways, on an underlying metanarrative of modernization” 
(1999: 20), which demonstrates how “some people are ‘adapting’ to the modern society 
while others lag behind in the old, traditional one” (Ibid). 
In this fashion, a cutting-edge paradigm for the analysis of African cities in 
recent decades has been the ‘failed states’ approach. One of the scholars of this trend, 
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Mike Davis in his book “Planet of Slums” (2006), describes African metropolises as 
ungovernable, incapable of implementing public policies and intrinsically on the edge. 
This approach to ‘crisis states’ and cities in crisis is often shared by humanitarian 
agencies, which treat African urban contexts as in need of help and support, as not as 
successful in comparison to their Western equivalents (see also Putzel & Di John 2012, 
and UN Habitat report 2004). Although the ‘failed states’ approach has the merit of 
shifting the focus on the struggles of ordinary people in the urban context, it also has a 
few obvious limitations, in that it seems to deny any agency to local actors, and 
analyses the development of cities according to Western standards of urbanisation. This 
approach perpetuates the idea that cities in Africa are “not-quite cities” (Myers 2011: 
4), as they are perceived to have failed to uphold the standards of modernisation and 
progress as dictated by the West. 
Ferguson in “Expectations of Modernity” (1999) urges to look beyond the 
dualism between West and Africa; modern and traditional. In Ferguson’s approach, the 
global North and South, their models and specificities are finally perceived as moving 
towards each other, to create a trans-territorial city; a cosmopolitan city which has 
stretched out and crossed oceans through transnational migration and technological 
innovation, a centre of generative and imaginative synergies which are original and 
unique. 
Anthropologists who have worked on cities in Africa have lately focused on the 
“worlding” (Simone 2001) of cities and their cosmopolitan formations (Ferguson 1999; 
Simone 2001, 2004b, 2009; Simone & Abouhani 2005; Mbembe & Nuttall 2004; 
Nuttall & Mbembe 2008; Malaquais 2005). Simone (2001: 18) explains the worlding of 
the city as the process by which “the salient features of urban life and  its 
accomplishments were always also taking place somewhere else besides the particular 
city occupied”. On the same note, Mbembe and Nuttall (2004: 360) write that: “[T]he 
city is increasingly a key articulator in a new, regional geography of centrality, 
dispersal, mobility, and connectivity that expands not only to the rest of the continent 
but around the globe. It is the site of a high concentration of strategic resources”. 
African urban residents are today able to operate in a broader world through the 
mobilisation of religious practices, modes of dress, food and musical taste which draw 
from multiple sources and create original phenomena. Cosmopolitan cities are formed 
of those who create their own specific world in between the foreign and the local, the 
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global and the local, the interior and the exterior, the rural and the urban, the periphery 
and the centre. 
Finally, the understanding of the creative agency of people is at its apex. As 
Mbembe and Nuttall (2004: 360) put it, “a city is not only a string of infrastructures, 
technologies, and legal entities, however networked these are. It also comprises actual 
people, images and architectural forms, footprints and memories”. Similarly, Simone 
(2004a) argues that the city – in this case, Johannesburg – is formed by “complex 
combinations of objects, spaces, persons, and practices” (Ibid: 410). Thus in recent 
years, scholars have focused on the everyday practices of ordinary people, on the new 
coping strategies and social mechanisms at stake in the urban scene, and on the 
cosmopolitan imagination at work in the urban context (Simone 2004a, 2004b, De 
Boeck & Plissart 2004; Trefon 2004).  
Like the cities described by Ferguson (1999), Simone (2001, 2004a), Malaquais 
(2005), and Mbembe and Nuttall (2004; Nuttall & Mbembe 2008), Kinshasa is a 
cosmopolitan city. Colonialism, the trade economy, the channels of modern technology 
and globalisation have contributed to enrich the material and imaginary layout of the 
city. It is between modern commodities and customary prac tices, and between Western 
religions and local cosmologies that young people have built their daily lives. 
Moreover, we can say that it is thanks to their in-between existence that they have been 
able to respond to the mobulu of the state, creating original phenomena which are the 
result of the interplay of different worlds. In the next section, I shall illustrate some of 
the social phenomena which arose in Kinshasa, and which went hand in hand with the 
development of the city. These phenomena were directly linked to the mobulu which 
has become integrated within the fabric of the country, and transformed following the 
politico-economic development of the city.  
 
Leopoldville’s Development and Unexpected Turmoil: the  Bills 
 
The city of Kinshasa, called Leopoldville until 1971, was born during colonisation, 
under the rule of the King of Belgium Leopold II.  Henry Morton Stanley, an explorer 
who was appointed as King Leopold’s delegate in Congo, established Leopoldville in 
1881. The city’s ideal position on the Congo River enabled swift development and it 
soon became a pivotal trading post for the rubber and ivory collected in the interior. 
Workers were drawn from every region of the country, which served to create the basis 
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for the cosmopolitan character of the city. Barracks for the workers of the trade 
companies and for King Leopold's soldiers started to appear, together with the houses 
for the Belgian officials. Barracks were built for single men, as the city had been 
conceived as a working site, and neither family members nor women were allowed in.  
When King Leopold II, following international pressure over his turbulent 
rule14, handed control of the colony to the Belgian Government in 1908, the break-up of 
Leopold's trade monopoly gave a boost to the development of Leopoldville. From the 
1920s, the city witnessed an incredible economic boom, whereby Western factories and 
companies increased ten-fold (Gondola 2009). During this time the colonial 
government started to invest more on Congolese subjects in order to create a society 
ordered according to the Belgian vision, with healthy, fit-to-work men, obedient 
women and educated children (Hunt 1990).  
The state embarked on a ‘civilising mission’ and the colonial Government 
started to develop new juridical, legislative and public systems. Cooper (2002) points 
out that “Belgium was the most socially interventionist of colonisers: it established 
childbirth centres, midwife training, and orphanages, and tried to shape how Congolese 
women care for their children” (Ibid: 63). Colonial rule exerted control not only by 
reorganising the administration and public infrastructure, but also by imposing a 
number of other social and personal conditions such as education, leisure, a certain 
dress code and working timetables on the population (Gondola 1999b). Dressing in 
Western clothes soon became symbol of social status and of achievement, and by the 
1920s Congolese houseboys of Europeans and civil servants were engaged in a 
“clothing frenzy” (Gondola 1999a, see also Martin 1995) which further intensified 
following the rise of the second-hand clothes market (see also Hansen 2000).  
Despite its economic potential, Leopoldville could not accommodate the rapidly 
escalating population. From as early as the 1920s, the city became inhab ited by 
thousands of young men, many of whom were uneducated and unemployed. Young 
people started to pass their days on the street. The missionaries, charged with 
overseeing the physical and psychological welfare of the population, instituted the first 
youth groups, to channel young Congolese into spaces that were easier to control. The 
activities of these groups included watching Western movies such as cowboys and 
                                                 
14
 The atrocities of King Leopold II and his brutal exploitation during the ivory and rubber trade 
have already been analysed by several authors, including Hochschild (1998), Wrong (2000) and 
Marchal (1996). 
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spaghetti westerns, regional musical performances, theatre and sport. At the same time, 
however, numerous unorganised and spontaneous gatherings occurred on the streets 
and in squares, where young people played tam-tam and performed traditional dances 
(Gondola 1999b). 
During the Second World War, the fall of Belgium to the Germans and the 
readiness of the Congo to support United States and their allies led to a second 
economic boom (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; see also Buelens & Cassimon 2013). Several 
light industries were set up in Leopoldville, and thousands of Congolese moved from 
the countryside in order to look for a job in the city. The number of city-dwellers was 
also swollen by women, who were finally allowed in town in 1930 as a result of the 
government ‘civilisation mission’. In the light of the restless population’s growth, the 
state provided thousands immigrants with cheap and modest housing. The initial layout 
of the colonial city was defined according to race and class (De Boeck & Plissart 2004; 
Gondola 1996; La Fontaine 1970a; Pain 1979): White settlements were separated from 
the African Towns (les cités Africaines) by a cordon sanitaire which consisted of the 
zoo, the botanical garden, the market area, and a golf course. This cordon was designed 
to protect the White area from the spread of African disease (La Fontaine 1970a: 19). 
However, since the end of the 1940s, Leopoldville population grew at a very fast pace 
and the state was not able to keep the pace with the overpopulation of the city. Private 
housing without official permission (squatting), ‘satellite neighbourhoods’ (quartiers 
satellites) and ‘annexed areas’ (zones annexes) sprung up on the outskirts of the 
previously created African Towns. 
The increasing flows of migrants from the countryside contributed to 
differentiate the ethnic spectrum of Leopoldville, which was already an ethnically 
diverse city. Bakongo people, coming from the Bas-Congo region, were the most 
numerous15, followed by people coming from the regions of Bandundu and Western 
Kasai (from the ethnic groups Yaka, Mbala and Suku16), lower Kasai (mainly from the 
groups Yanzi and Sakata), the Equateur Province and the eastern Katanga-Kasai region 
(mainly Mongo and Luba). Together with these young men coming from rural areas, 
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 Pain (1979) for example speaks of the Bakongo as being 40% of the population at the end of the 
1960s. 
16
 Ethnic groups’ spelling can vary from author to author. In here I attained myself to Vansina's 
(1966) spelling.  
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during the years Leopoldville started to be inhabited by “neocitizens” (Nzuzi 2008: 20, 
my translation), young people who were born in the city.  
As the city found itself at the border with the Bas-Congo region, home to the 
Bakongo populations, the Bakongo belief system had a large influence on the social as 
well as religious context of Leopoldville. Central to the whole system was the notion of 
witchcraft (kindoki) and the witch (ndoki) who kills for private purposes such as the 
accumulation of wealth (MacGaffey W. 1970b, 1986). Influenced by missionaries, the 
Belgian colonial government banned the practice of kindoki and also the accusations of 
others as witches, considering these to be pagan superstition. Despite these efforts, 
witchcraft did not disappear from the city, and continued existing away from the 
official discourses of the state, in the African Towns (cités) of Leopoldville, before re-
emerging with vehemence after Independence, during Mobutu’s reign.  
Although the inhabitants of Leopoldville had different customary rules and 
descent systems (matrilineal and patrilineal), a new urban custom which cut across 
ethnic affiliation started to emerge. La Fontaine (1970a), in her study of Leopoldville in 
the years around Congolese Independence, called this process a “Leopoldville way of 
life”: 
Although intertribal marriage is not very common, there has been enough 
contact between people practising different types of marriage, with the 
concomitant rules about filiation of children, rights and duties of spouses, and 
inheritance to cause a new town pattern to emerge. [...] It is sufficient here 
simply to note the heterogeneity of the traditional cultures represented in 
Leopoldville and the emergence of a ‘Leopoldville way of life’ (Ibid: 44-45). 
The emergence of these common rules was influenced not only by the need to 
find a common ground between people from different regions, but also by the need to 
enlarge solidarity networks following the economic depression which followed the end 
of the Second World War. Congolese people in Leopoldville crossed ethnic divisions 
and started to gather in groups such as rotating credit associations, called moziki and 
likelemba (see chapter 3), and street gangs. 
The street gangs which emerged in Leopoldville since the end of the 1940s 
adopted the imagery of the Western movies that young men watched in the educational 
and leisure film-showings set up by the colonial authorities and the missionaries. 
Although the film showings were intent on pacifying the indigenous and “stymie the ir 
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resolve to emerge from the political torpor imposed by colonial rule” (Gondola 2009: 
78), instead, they stirred the disenfranchised and jobless youth of the city into action. 
Street gangs called themselves les bills (from Buffalo Bill) and gang members 
chose nicknames from the most renowned Wild West actors: Buffalo, Sinatra, John 
Wayne, and Pecos to mention a few (Gondola 2009: 83). The bills were organised into 
bands called ‘stables’ (écuries in French), a term which will continue to be used to 
denote groups of young people in the following decades17. In the streets, these gangs 
played out historical fights between Cowboys and Indians and adopted the aesthetic 
notions of violence shown in movies. The activities of the bills centred on fighting over 
territories against other groups of bills, wearing red scarves knotted around their neck 
and waistcoats which recalled the cowboy’s style. Other activities included stealing for 
living, applying their own system of taxation, smoking marijuana and gang-banging 
neighbourhood girls (De Boeck 2000a). They also created their own language, the 
Hindoubill, from the mix of the words Bill as in Buffalo Bill, and Hindou as Indians 
(La Fontaine 1970b). The language was a Kinshasa slang comprised of Lingala, French 
and Kikongo words, which was appropriated amongst the bills in order to distinguish 
them from the world of the adults and from other young men coming to the city from 
the outside. 
Gondola (2009: 82) highlights that when the colonial government started the 
film–showings, “they were so blinded by colonial racism that they brushed aside any 
thoughts that such images could impact these young audiences differently than they had 
anticipated”. Western movies were considered mere entertainment, in order to distract 
the population from the high unemployment rate and to doze off any malcontent. From 
this point of view, the colonial government expressed mobulu through subjugation, 
control and forced passivity. However, the inhabitants of Leopoldville, in an 
unexpected twist, transformed the mobulu of the colonial state into vernacular mobulu. 
The actors of Western movies, which embodied notions of moral justice, courage and 
dignity, soon became models of masculinity for these unemployed, disenchanted 
youngsters. Through fights in the streets, the bills reinterpreted Western movies to gain 
a political and social foothold of the colonial city.  
                                                 
17
 According to the Larousse dictionary, ‘écurie’ denotes a stable for horses or other animals, or also 
a group of horses. This can help in understanding the etymology of the word. I suggest that the use 
of the term was influenced by the Western movies so dear to the young people of the city, in which 
Cowboys and Indians would fight against each other on horses. References to ‘écuries’, the French 
translation for ‘stables’, were probably common during the movies. 
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The mobulu enacted by the bills, rather than being physical violence per se, 
became a powerful political and social tool to transform the society they inhabited. 
Through their aesthetics of violence, envisioned through the conceptual prism of 
mobulu, the bills acted as a wedge that prised open Leopoldville’s cités to the 
possibility of insurrection and accelerated the decolonisation process (Gondola 2009). 
 
Towards Independence: the Évolués and the First Sapeurs 
 
A critical juncture for the development of new social phenomena in Leopoldville came 
in the years following the end of the Second World War and in the lead up to 
Congolese Independence in 1960. In 1948, the Belgian government started a 
programme to educate a Congolese bourgeoisie, whom they prepared for self-
governance. This marked the emergence of modernizing elites known as the évolués18. 
These young Congolese, also called ‘the White with black skin’ (mindele ndombe in 
Lingala), modelled themselves on the colonial elite, and tried to mimic not only their 
dress code but also their lifestyle and body language. The Congolese historian Ndaywel 
E Nziem (1998: 452) writes of the évolués: “[S]ome of them also managed to walk like 
the White, talk like the White and even laugh like the White”. The status of évolués was 
cemented following the colonial administration’s introduction of official certificates, 
such as ‘social merit cards’ in 1948, and ‘matriculation certificates’ in 1952. Willame 
(1972: 26) explains that initially, although the évolués “knew very well that they could 
never cross the racial barrier established by their colonial benefactors [...] they did wish 
to be regarded as members of an elite group distinct from the Congolese masses”. They 
established parallel niches of social power by instituting clubs for évolués and 
associations19 organised along ethnic membership, in which they were able to voice 
their concerns as to the “pressing need [...] for new opportunities to demonstrate 
leadership potential” (Willame 1972: 26).  
                                                 
18
 The évolué is a figure that was born in the first decades after colonisation. However, it is only in 
the second half of the 1940s that such figure was officialised within the state and that “the group 
became numerous enough to start caring about their status in relation to the colony” (Ndaywel è 
Nziem 1998: 453). 
19
 Willame (1972: 26) writes that “by 1947, some 110 clubs with a total of 6,509 members had been 
organised in various Congolese cities”, and the number multiplied between 1952 and 1956. 
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These évolués, in the wake of the houseboys who wanted to emulate European 
officials, developed a true cult of elegance. The phenomenon of la Sape20, ‘The Society 
of Fun Lovers and Elegant People’ (la Société des Ambianceurs et Personnes 
Elégantes) was born. Not only sapeurs but also other employed and married Congolese 
men, who longed for the same socio-economic power of the government elite, started to 
identify themselves with the lifestyle and fashion in post-war Paris. By acquiring a 
wardrobe of designer clothes and whitening their skin through lotions while 
simultaneously fattening their stomachs, buttocks and cheeks through a special diet, 
these young people tried to achieve the title of a ‘big’ (grand in French) or Great Man 
(MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000). Having a large belly has always been a 
symbol of power and authority in the Postcolonial African state (Mbembe 1992), while 
acquiring clothes made in Europe was perceived as a way to get closer to the European 
colonial elite. As such, the sapeurs of the 1940s and 1950s saw in the clothing 
movement an imaginative dimension through which they could achieve a status which 
had previously been out of reach. 
At the end of the 1950s, Belgian hegemony was rendered increasingly fragile by 
the demands for Independence. In those years, the évolués realised that they would 
never be considered part of the elite, nor enter the government as the Belgian had 
promised. This is when the évolués allied themselves with the poor in the quest for 
Independence: the former were tired of seeing their rights to power and leadership 
denied, with the latter frustrated by precarious living and working conditions. It was the 
évolués who raised the prospect of Independence among the masses, gave voice to 
malcontent and organised protests. Again, it was the évolués who created the first 
political parties in 1954, when the government finally opened up the political scene to 
local parties, and who pushed the colonial government to grant Independence to the 
country on June 30 1960.  
The évolués are another example of the ability of the inhabitants of Leopoldville 
to turn the mobulu of the state to their own advantage. The social class of the évolués 
was created by the Belgians in order to keep a hold of the future Congolese elite. The 
évolués were meant to eventually supplant the Belgians, and play to their interests when 
Independence came. However, ironically they were the first challengers to colonial 
                                                 
20
 On the Sape and the sapeurs see Gandoulou (1989a, 1989b); Gondola (1999a); Trapido (2011); 
MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000). 
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order. Not only did they organise protests and revolts against the colonial order, but 
they were also able to awaken the political consciousness of the wider population, and 
lead them to Independence. Once again, the inhabitants of the city transformed mobulu 
into a positive means of change. 
The four years following Independence in Congo were punctuated with a series 
of political events hard to summarise adequately in this chapter. I refer here to the 
mutiny of the army only five days after the declaration of Independence, the secession 
of entire regions of the country from the central government and their violent 
repressions by the state, the assassination of Prime Minister Patrick Lumumba and 
another wave of secessions in 1963-64 21 . These events indicate that the newly 
independent Congo was divided and unstable, and the population was paying the higher 
price of this instability: the market economy was fluctuating, the job sector collapsed, 
and insecurity reigned across the country. This is why in 1964, the population in 
Leopoldville welcomed the coup of the chief of the army Joseph Mobutu, who 
dismissed the then president Joseph Kasavubu and proclaimed himself the president of 
Congo. After four years of political violence, the inhabitants of Leopoldville were 
hoping for some stability and wealth. No one could predict, however, the politics of 
pillage and self-enrichment that sank the country during Mobutu’s tyranny. At the same 
time, no one could predict how people in the city would react to the mobulu of the state, 
and how, once again, they would be able to turn state impositions and limitations in 
their favour. It was under Mobutu’s rule that the informal economy, which still is the 
main form of survival for the majority of the Kinois in contemporary Kinshasa, was 
born. An in-depth account of Mobutu’s rule is necessary if we are to understand the 
resilience of the inhabitants of Leopoldville, and their ability to take advantage of 
mobulu in surprisingly ways.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 For detailed accounts of the political events between 1960 and 1964, see Young (1966) and dia 
Mwembu (1999). For detailed historical and political accounts on the Democratic Republic of 
Congo from colonisation to present days, see also Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) and Ndaywel è Nziem 
(2008). 
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Mobutu’s Institutionalised Theft and ‘Making Do’ Strategies 
 
During the first years of government, Mobutu’s approach received very positive 
feedback. According to Cooper (2002: 166), “even opponents saw Zaire [...] as a unit to 
which aspire”. Mobutu was able to centralise power once again, bringing some stability 
after the insecurity. For thirty-two years, thanks to his foreign alliances, the annihilation 
of political opposition by the army through intimidation and co-optation, and absolute 
control over the population, Mobutu managed to rule a country as large as Western 
Europe owing much to his charismatic personality 22  and to his management of the 
army23. He imposed himself as a despotic figure, maintaining power through clever 
political choices and oppressive methods.  
At the beginning of the 1970s, Mobutu started his ‘authenticity’ programme 
(Devisch 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002), which advocated a return to traditional values 
to fight the imposition of Western ideology. He renamed the country Zaire 24 (and the 
river Congo became Zaire river), and changed the name of the capital from 
Leopoldville to Kinshasa in 1971. Part of Mobutu’s authenticity programme was the 
Zairianisation economic project of 1973, which entailed the confiscation of foreign-
owned enterprises for the benefit of Congolese25 politicians and administrators. Zaire 
became a dictatorship, with Mobutu as undisputed leader and members of his ethnic 
group as government administrators – all linked to him by marriages or alliances.  
The economy, which was still trying to recover from the political turmoil of the 
1960s, was rendered insular. Zairianisation allowed the president and his compères to 
have complete control over government funds, which jeopardised national recovery. 
Loans from Western organizations and governments ended up in the pockets of 
Congolese politicians, who spent them on lavish luxuries (Kabwit 1979). During his 
long reign, Mobutu spent millions of dollars from international aid on private mansions, 
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 Mobutu built a veritable cult of personality around himself. He liked to speak of himself as a 
“Bantu chief” (Callaghy 1984:183; MacGaffey W. 2000:74) and the “father of the nation” 
(Schatzberg 1988; Devisch 1998), while at the same time embodying “the bearer of all authority” 
like King Leopold (Devisch 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). 
23
 During his reign, Mobutu asserted sovereignty through violence and did not hesitate to use force 
to suppress revolts and demonstrations by military and civilian dissidents. This was dramatically 
demonstrated by the killing of hundreds of university students protesting against the government in 
1969 and 1971. At the same time, he dispatched para-military death squads, known by the name of 
Owls (hiboux in French), to commit nocturnal executions of political opponents across the capital.  
24
 The choice of the name came from the corruption of the word 'river' in Kongo language (nzadi). 
25
 The adjective Congolese will be used throughout the whole text for convenience, even though the 
country was called Zaire from 1971 until 1997 and the inhabitants of the country the Zair ians.  
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overseas villas, luxury cars and various other expenditures. His regime was pervaded 
by patrimonialism and authoritarianism, and christened as a ‘kleptocracy’ by its critics 
(Wrong 2000, Clark 2002).  
Crucially, Mobutu often personally endorsed certain forms of corruption. In 
1976, in a major stadium speech before 70,000 Congolese, Mobutu exhorted: 
If you want to steal, steal a little in a nice way, but if you steal too much to 
become rich overnight you will soon be caught. And if you have succeeded in 
stealing, please reinvest in our country the product of your theft. You become 
the Republic's enemy if you transfer this product overseas (Kabwit 1979: 397).  
Mobutu’s regime institutionalized corruption26. It was during this period that 
political actors coined the slogans ‘fend for yourselves’ (débrouillez-vous), ‘system D’ 
(systeme-D, from débrouille) and ‘cooperation’ (la coop). As the state was incapable of 
providing its citizens with a secure income, Mobutu’s associates focused upon 
sustaining themselves, and encouraging others to do so.  
Zairianisation put the country in a state of bankruptcy. Following the 
reallocation of industries from Western to Congolese ownership, and the subseque nt 
collapse of industrial production, the majority of the population was abruptly left 
without employment. However, whereas the formal economy failed, a second – or 
‘shadow’ (De Boeck & Plissart 2004) – economy flourished27. It is in those years that 
‘making do’ (la débrouille) started. Money no longer circulated in the offices and 
bureaus of colonial and postcolonial enterprises, but rather on the streets. Now that men 
were left without jobs in the market economy, women became the main breadwinners 
of the household. Women carrying baskets and a range of goods started walking the 
city, selling their merchandise from door to door. In the face of the absence of jobs, 
people started to invent occupations which could bring them quick money. There was 
encouragement from Mobutu’s words, as outlined above, leading people to fend for 
themselves (se débrouiller) outside of official channels, engaging in small jobs, 
scamming, cheating and smuggling. 
La débrouille allowed the Kinois a daily income – although in most cases very 
little. The informal economy of Kinshasa was not a casual sector at the mercy of 
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 On the moral economy of corruption in Africa see de Sardan (1999). 
27
 For a description of the second economy see MacGaffey J. (1987, 1991) and Trefon (2002a, 
2004). 
54 
improvisation, but rather so organised and institutionalised that the Kinois colloquially 
invented an article for it: ‘Article 15: fend for yourself’ (Article 15: débrouillez-vous), 
which is still popular many decades after the end of Mobutu’s reign. I shall explain this 
organised and efficient informal system in depth in chapter 3, and how the mechanisms 
of which recalled very much the mechanisms of formal market economy. For example, 
people would lend each other money applying a (very high) interest rate, whilst other 
people would function as banks, safeguarding people’s savings in their homes or 
boutiques for a small fee. The mobulu of political insecurity and economic impasse was 
transformed in everyday life into a very efficient and fruitful coping system.  
Kinshasa under Mobutu witnessed not only the creation of new coping 
strategies, but also the transformation of social phenomena born in previous epochs. 
Due to the creativity and constant inventiveness of people, phenomena like the bills and 
the sapeurs developed, to keep pace with politico-economic changes and their social 
implications – and the need of young people to cope with them.  
 
On Sapeurs, Kibills and Witch-Children 
 
During the economic crisis brought by Zaireanization, children started to appear on the 
streets of Kinshasa. With women in the streets looking for some income for their 
household through la débrouille, many children were left home alone. Many preferred 
to leave their households, where food and care were scarce, and tried their luck in the 
street. Since then, these street-children, generally called shegue 28  (plural bashegue), 
have increasingly dominated the urban spaces (see Geenen 2009). Many joined the 
bands of young men who were already roaming the streets, in search of protection and 
co-operation. This period of economic hardship and unemployment swelled the ranks 
of youth groups such as the bills and the sapeurs.  
After Independence and the Congo crisis, bills became known as kibills and 
yankees. The youth gangs were still influenced by Western movies, but also started to 
relate to the imagery of the military. De Boeck (2000a) highlighted how the political 
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 According to De Boeck (2004, 2006) and De Boeck and Plissart (2004), the term 'shegue' can 
derive from two different sources. On the one hand, the word was born when Kabila entered 
Kinshasa in 1997 with his kadogos (child soldiers), who were seen as little Che Guevaras. On the 
second, the word is an abbreviation from Shengen, where the Shengen agreement was signed in 
1985. People can freely travel around Europe as well as the shegues can 'freely' access all the 
resources of Kinshasa without restraints (De Boeck & Plissart 2004; De Boeck 2006). 
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unrest throughout the country in the 1960s had triggered a change in the imaginary of 
street gangs,  who now made use of the vocabulary of Western movies and also 
incorporated references to the military. For example the name of one of these post-
Independence gangs, the United Nations Blue Helmet, reflected the aforementioned 
context. Across the 1980s and the 1990s street gangs continued to reflect the wider 
world of movies with characters such the Ninja Turtles, Rambo, Zorro, Superman and 
Terminator becoming prominent figures in the new imaginary of the street gangs (De 
Boeck 2000a; Gondola 2009). These movie heroes were readily associated to the 
military and para-military forces which operated in Kinshasa and through the country at 
the time. Both figures – the movie hero and the soldier – worked together in the 
construction of a new figure of power in young people’s imaginary.  
Under Mobutu, Kinshasa witnessed the revival of the fashionable dressing 
phenomenon, la Sape, which emerged “among unemployed and young people who had 
been displaced politically and ideologically” (MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000) 
by the total crisis of the country, and who organized themselves into clubs (Gandoulou 
1989a). Through the cult of la Sape, these uneducated people found a way to 
appropriate and re-contextualise the power and prestige of the elites. These sapeurs 
were extremely different from their namesakes of pre-Independence, who used 
European clothes in order to merge with the colonial power. During the 1980s, la Sape 
was used rather as a subversion tool and the sapeurs used fashion as “a statement 
against economic deprivation” (Martin 1995:171).  
Sapeurs relied upon the informal economy, often engaging through illegal 
dealings to survive and also to get the fashionable clothes they desired. On one hand, in 
the words of MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000: 137), they: “[R]efuse[d] to 
accept passively the constraints imposed on their lives, actively engaging with them in 
activities outside the law, thus resisting their exclusion from the opportunity to fulfil 
their ambition or to better their life”. On the other, they inverted the values of the 
clothes themselves. Social status arose from the monetary value of the clothes rather 
than the clothes themselves. To put it with MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (Ibid: 
140): “This young people’s emphasis on the labels shows that they do not respect the 
Parisian or international rules which usually govern the wearing of designer clothes”.  
The sapeurs were able to create a counter-culture, “their own world with its own status 
and value system and its own scale of achievement and satisfaction” (MacGaffey & 
Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000: 137). As such, sapeurs spent their money on luxury clothes 
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rather than on a society that denigrated them. Through social movements and 
alternative forms of groupings, the Congolese shaped a whole “parallel society” 
(Cooper 2002: 167), in which they could express resistance to the state and political 
consciousness. This cultural dynamism also concerned the spiritual dimension of 
society, which became evident in the ways in which the Congolese incorporated 
Christianity within their belief systems, as I shall now explain. 
Since the 1970s, Protestantism and Kimbanguism (see chapter 1) started to 
develop relentlessly. This was due to the resentment that Mobutu felt against 
Christianity (the religion imposed by colonisation) and his will to challenge the 
monopoly of Western impositions. However in the 1980s, following the decline of the 
authenticity programme and the loosening of state control on the religious panorama, 
hundreds of independent Pentecostal churches started to develop in Kinshasa. Pastors 
and prophets started to organise cults, characterized by sermons, healing sessions and 
wakes. In their sermons, they preached the words of the Christian God and Holy Spirit, 
while combating malevolent spirits and witches. Witches were defeated with exorcisms 
(or délivrances), during which the preachers intimated the evil spirit to leave the body 
of its victim in the name of the Supreme God. Indeed, witches, evil spirits, demons and 
bad ancestors were all gathered under the name of ‘Devil’  (see Meyer 1992, 1999b and 
Anderson 2006). Through exorcisms, in their churches pastors re-enacted the eternal 
fight between God and the Devil.  
People in Kinshasa took possession of the Christian ideology and combined it 
with local belief systems. In particular, the similarities between the figures of the devil 
and the witch belied the opposition between these belief systems as vaunted by many 
young preachers (see Meyer 1992). The spirits and witches had returned to the centre 
stage of society after being forbidden by the colonial government and the missionaries. 
The rise of the idiosyncratic religion preached in Pentecostal churches once again 
represents the demonstration of the creativity of the Kinois in front of the mobulu of the 
state. 
The multiplication of Pentecostal churches in Kinshasa coincided with the 
development of a new kind of witchcraft. Since the 1990s in Kinshasa hundreds of 
children have been accused of spiritually killing members of their families or creating 
misfortunes through witchcraft. Accused children were taken to a Pentecostal church, 
where the pastor usually confirmed the suspicion. Children were then lead into church 
in order to be exorcised through the use of medicines such as laxatives and periods of 
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quarantine, in order to make sure witchcraft left the body of the child. The phenomenon 
of the witch-children29 (bana bandoki in Lingala) contributed to increase the number of 
street-children (bashegue), as many children took to the street to escape the abuses of 
family and pastors or were forcibly chased away by their families. There, they often 
organised themselves in street bands who competed among themselves for the control 
of territory. Their activities shifted between legality and illegality, and they lived in 
spots that they created and domesticated between buildings (Geenen 2009). 
Furthermore, these children demonstrated intimate knowledge of the growing concern 
of non-governmental organisations for the street-children of Kinshasa, and they have 
taken advantage of these Western sources of wealth (Ibid). From this point of view, we 
can say that through their interactions with western charities and NGOs, the bashegue 
also navigate social lives beyond the borders of the city, between the local and the 
West. 
The explosion of the phenomenon of Pentecostal churches and accusations of 
witchcraft against children are directly linked to politico-economic events during 
Mobutu’s epoch. Although many Pentecostal churches contributed to the mobulu of 
society through violent exorcism sessions, they had the merit to offer the Kinois an 
original space for solidarity and aggregation in the insecure socio-economic context of 
Kinshasa. At the same time, children were able to turn the mobulu of their families and 
pastors who accused them of witchcraft into a tool of empowerment in the streets, 
where they had more chances to appropriate wealth through the circuits of ‘making do’ 
(la débrouille), cheating and robbing. 
Although Mobutu sank the economy and left the population in abject poverty, 
he had kept the country united and without war for almost thirty years. Things were 
about to change during the last years of his of regime, as I sha ll explain in the next 
section. 
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 See De Boeck and Plissart (2004) and De Boeck (2004, 2005a, 2009). 
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From Mobutu to Joseph Kabila: the Kinois amidst Mobulu and Witchcraft 
 
The 1990s signalled the beginning of a period of political changes and war in Kinshasa 
and throughout Congo. In Kinshasa, Mobutu’s failed attempt to pass from a regime to a 
multi-party democracy and the economic impasse were the main causes of two huge 
waves of pillaging in 1991 and 1993 (Devisch 1995; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; White 
2005). Unpaid and poorly paid soldiers started to loot and were soon followed by 
civilians – mainly young men. Numerous businesses, throughout the country, were 
destroyed by the pillages. Thousands of workers were once again without jobs.  
On a broader level, the political turmoil which shook the country during the 
1990s and the following decades is hard to summarise. The two Congo Wars (1996-
1997, and 1998-2003) which took place in the east of the country against Rwanda and 
its allies are so complex, that several monographs have been written on the subject30. 
However, it is worth mentioning a few key events from those years. This will help the 
reader understanding the politics of violence which has affected Congo since the 1990s 
until the present day.  
Mobutu’s regime was ended by Laurent-Desirée Kabila, a Rwandan-backed 
militant who invaded Kinshasa in 1997 with his army of ‘little ones’ (kadogos in 
Swahili31) during the so-called First Congo War. Kabila installed his Government with 
a coup, while Mobutu fled the country. Starting from the following year, the Congo was 
involved in a Second War against Rwanda and Uganda because Kabila, as head of the 
country, failed to satisfy Rwanda’s  politico-economic interests in the Congo. The war 
soon became a “continental war” (Prunier 2009), with African and Western countries 
backing both sides. In 2001, three years into the war, Laurent Kabila was assassinated 
by one of his guards, and the lead of the country passed in the hands of his son and 
former military chief Joseph. Joseph Kabila was finally made head of a transitional 
government in 2003, and won the country’s first democratic elections in 2006, 
officially becoming the head of state. Despite the signing of numerous agreements and 
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 See Turner (2007), Prunier (2006, 2009) and Lemarchand (2009). 
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 The kadogos of Kabila were young soldiers aged between 12 to 20 years old. Many of them were 
recruited by force from their homes and schools, while others joined the ranks spontaneously, lured 
by ideas of power and booty attached to the figure of the armed soldier. A few ex-kadogos I 
interviewed mentioned how they joined the ranks of the AFDL spontaneously, lured by the 
possibility to earn a salary (see also Jourdan 2010). 
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peace deals to put an end to the Second Congo War, the first and second decades of the 
new millennium have seen the continuation of the massacres between Congolese 
Government forces and several armed groups in the east of the country32. Armed men 
from both sides have been observed attacking villages, abusing the population and 
imposing taxes in the mining-rich areas of the East, thus jeopardising the lives of 
thousands of civilians. 
The city of Kinshasa also served as a battlefield during recent armed clashes. In 
March 2007, a few months after the presidential elections which confirmed Joseph 
Kabila as president, the city centre was shaken by violent clashes between the personal 
army of the opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba and the military. Similarly, in the 
wake of the following presidential elections of 2011, military troops patrolled the city 
to avoid disorder – while actually causing it in first place. Kinshasa’s society became 
increasingly militarised, with soldiers carrying rifles, patrolling or wandering the 
streets, often drunk or high on marijuana. The two Congo Wars and the following 
armed clashes in the East were a heavy burden on the economy of the country, already 
devastated by Mobutu’s regime. Public structures collapsed further and the Kinois had 
to deal with a disastrous economic situation: many parts of the city were without water 
and electricity and the health system barely functioned. Life became dictated by “the 
violence of the ghost-state” (Bernault & Tonda 2000: 10). 
The Kinois confronted the absence of the state supervisory through 
‘villagisation’, defined as “the revaluation of the neighbourhood as a locus for social 
solidarity and protection in the struggle for survival” (Devisch 1995: 593). Following 
the economic crisis, people have gradually drawn back into the extended families and 
solidarity mechanisms proper of the village society. Informal activities also increased: 
since the 1990s, the population has literally occupied the street with food stalls and 
improvised open-air boutiques and shops (see chapter 3). The street became the major 
space of socialisation, where people made deals, worked and, more generally, lived.  
At the same time, the mobulu of the military and the figure of the soldier had a 
strong impact in the social context of Kinshasa. The social phenomena which 
developed in the new millennium were the result of the interplay between elements of 
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 Since the Congo Wars, the eastern regions of Congo have been besieged by entire battalions of 
deserters from the FARDC (the national army), Mayi Mayi rebels, Interhamwe Hutu, Tutsi-led 
factions, Raia Mukombozi and troops backed by Rwanda, like the CNDP (National Congress for the 
Defence of People) and the M23 movement. 
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pre-existent phenomena, and new forms of mobulu at the everyday level, which had 
been influenced by the figure of the soldier. 
Since 2000, street gangs in Kinshasa have been called ‘kulunas’, a term which 
derives from the French colonne or the Portuguese coluna, and which describes a 
cohort of soldiers advancing in the bush (see also De Boeck 2011b). Kulunas have 
drawn elements from the kibills of the past, organised by a politics of territorialisation, 
while adopting the ethos of the armed men whose deeds are told on the streets of 
Kinshasa: pillaging, raping and killings became increasingly frequent across the capital. 
Kulunas terrorised the population through violent robberies in which many victims lost 
their lives, and attacked en masse markets in order to pillage everything. Their actions 
were so brutal that at the end of 2013 the Congolese government launched the 
‘Operation Punch’ (Opération Likofi), in order to stop the violence caused by these 
youth gangs. As history teaches, the government confronted the kulunas with a 
technique which recalls the actions of military and paramilitary squads during 
Mobutu’s epoch: those who were caught red-handed were executed on the spot. This 
brutal countermeasure had the effect of stopping the kuluna phenomenon for a few 
months, until clashes between groups of kulunas over territories, and violent robberies 
started again. In 2014, the kulunas have returned and the state is reconsidering an 
‘Operation Punch 2’ to suppress the revolts. This potential move has received strong 
denunciations amongst the various humanitarian agencies in Kinshasa who argue such a 
move presents a number of human rights violations (see chapter 4). 
The militarisation of Kinshasa was also visible in the increasing use of military 
vocabulary in churches, where preachers referred to themselves as Generals and to 
church communities as garrisons of God or armies of salvation, launching 
evangelisation crusades (De Boeck & Plissart 2004: 119). Their churches were called 
Army of the Eternal, Army of God, Army of Victory, the Legionaries of Jesus, and so 
on. During exorcisms, pastors would brandishing the holy cross as if it was a sword, 
using it to pierce the bellies of supposed witches in order to exorcise them. On this 
subject, Pype (2006b: 306) highlights that non-baptised Christians were called ‘soldiers 
without uniform’ (basoda sans tenu) or ‘soldiers without weapons’ (basoda sans 
armes), and analyses how some dances resembled military marches (Ibid). In church, 
the mobulu of the military was transformed into a tool of transformation and 
regeneration. Through the violent and cathartic practices and discourses proper to the 
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church, the Kinois managed to turn the evil back on itself, allowing for the restoration 
of order and harmony among the family and the community – if only for a short time. 
Military metaphors have also entered the mystical world of witchcraft. Witch-
children in church were described (and described themselves – see chapter 7) as 
colonels, generals and even Prime Ministers. According to the Kinois I interviewed, 
children longed to become as powerful as generals, and in order to achieve this goal 
they behaved like dutiful soldiers who aspired to climb the military hierarchy. Military 
metaphors were a constant in the Kinois’ imaginary and they helped the Kinois give 
order to reality. Thus, kindoki presented an imagined state, much like the Congolese 
state, with army officials at the apex33. 
Ironically, the same witch-children who were accused of being generals and 
colonels in the world of witchcraft, would organise themselves according to military 
ranks once they ended up in stables of street-children. Children would give themselves 
grades, and would carry out their activities and share their small income according to 
their position in the hierarchy. Military ranks gave them the opportunity to integrate 
within a group, find their social niche and also find protection from external attacks. 
Once again, the Kinois (in this case, children) who were subjected to the mobulu of the 
state, have been able to appropriate and transform it into a positive tool for survival in 
everyday life. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have shown how the mobulu perpetrated by the state through wars, 
clashes, and politico-economic choices, has reflected in mobulu in the Kinois’ everyday 
lives. Nonetheless, many young men have been able to appropriate some elements of 
this mobulu, and create a number of empowering social phenomena in different epochs. 
The city which was built as the expression of the Belgian colonial power, and strictly 
administered through mores and rules, became the major site for the expression of the 
malcontent of  the youngest segment of the population. Bands of bills, sapeurs and 
évolués were able to canalise the mobulu upon them, in order to invent creative coping 
mechanisms and social phenomena. For example, the bills were born out of the 
economic insecurity which left hundreds of young men roaming on the streets of 
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 Lattas (1993) and Rowlands and Warnier (1988) have highlighted how also in different context, 
witchcraft is modelled on the structure of the state apparatus. 
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colonial Leopoldville. These young people were able to convert the Cowboy movies 
which were meant to render them servile subjects and to create a completely new 
phenomenon, drawing from Cowboys and their moral qualities a new idea l of 
masculinity. This has now re-emerged with the kulunas of recent years, who have 
appropriated the mobulu of the soldiers who fight at the borders of the country and re-
contextualised them in Kinshasa. If on the one hand, the mimesis of the actions of the 
soldiers (pillages and physical violence) resulted in more mobulu for the population of 
the city, it also allowed unemployed and uneducated young people to find other 
avenues for social empowerment and prestige. Likewise, the sapeurs were an 
interesting phenomenon, in that they were able to transform la Sape from a conforming 
colonial movement before Independence, to a subversive post-colonial one. 
The Kinois have also responded to the political violence of the state in 
surprising spiritual ways. Pentecostal awakening churches have become crucial sites of 
solidarity and compassion for the Kinois in the face of the different forms of mobulu – 
colonial oppression earlier, and post-colonial hardship later. Moreover, they have found 
in the mystical realm of witchcraft a site through which to take control over their own 
life by exorcising the evil of society. Although on the one hand witchcraft accusations 
and exorcisms have a therapeutic effect on many Kinois, on the other they result in an 
increasing number children being accused of witchcraft (see chapter 7). Children 
accused of being witches have to undergo psychological and physical violence, which 
culminate with them being on the streets. However, once in the street, children have 
been able to master this space, make it their own, and benefit from a number of 
activities, among which working in the informal economy, stealing, taking advantage of 
the care of non-governmental organisations, and enjoying a freedom they would have 
never been able to experience otherwise. It is not an exaggeration saying that many 
street-children, despite the traumas of witchcraft accusations and exorcism procedures, 
were able to create a better life for themselves on the street than many other children 
did at home with their families. 
The phenomena described above offer intimate insights into the emerging world 
of Kinshasa. These phenomena were the result of the interconnection of practices and 
imaginary coming from multiple directions. The example of the bills show how these 
street gangs were the result of the watching of Western American movies, shown by 
European missionaries, and re-appropriating the themes and characters in these films by 
the Congolese population. The kulunas were the product of war and martial art movies 
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which included characters such as Rambo or Bruce Lee, also the armed men fighting at 
the border of the country, and the re-contextualisation of each of these by the young 
people of Kinshasa. It was the same case for the sapeurs, who dressed in European 
designer clothes and whitened their skin to appropriate the power of the Whites. 
Kinshasa has become a cosmopolitan place, where local and translocal elements 
combine, giving shape to the most surprising phenomena. This process is not static, but 
has continued to change at incredible speed over the years, contributing to the 
development of old phenomena, and the creation of new ones.  
In the next chapter, I will show how the mobulu of the state influenced the 
development of informal economy in Kinshasa and I will analyse some of its major 
features. 
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- CHAPTER THREE - 
‘MAKING DO’: ECONOMIC INVENTIVENESS IN FACE OF MOBULU 
 
There was a time during my fieldwork whereby every time there was a knock on the 
door of our parcelle, Julia Wembi, Joseph Mutambu and I went to hide inside the 
house. Water supply in our home was so irregular that we had refused to pay the last 
few bills, which everyone in our neighbourhood considered too expensive (CDF 
18,000, around $20 per month)34 for the type of service we received. We knew that the 
agents of REGIDESO, the state company charged with water supply, were passing door 
to door collecting money. The last time they came, Joseph and Julia told them that they 
had no intention of paying. However, as soon as the two agents saw me, they started to 
threaten Joseph and Julia that they would immediately block the pump in the garden 
(our only source of water within the parcelle) if we refused to pay. As I was white 
(mundele), people thought that money was not a problem in our house.  
Joseph and Julia had to pay a bribe of CDF 3,000 (around $3) in order to be left 
alone, with the pump still working. Once they had agreed on the price of the bribe, I 
went to talk to the agents. Justin Nsenga was assistant professor at the University of 
Kinshasa (UNIKIN). His wages were so low that he had to search for a second source 
of income to bolster his salary. His cousin, who worked at REGIDESO, helped him 
find a second job. However, wages at the water company were also irregular and Justin 
had to resort to bribery to survive (although he did not admit this last point). Justin had 
two formal jobs and an informal one to ‘make do’ (se débrouiller). Despite that, he 
struggled to support his wife and children.  
In the months after this episode, we received weekly visits from different agents 
of REGIDESO each hoping to secure bribes. However, Julia had become blameless, 
and each time a REGIDESO agent knocked at the door, she would send one of the 
children to open, saying that nobody was at home. A few months later, we heard 
through the ‘pavement radio’ (radio trottoir) that three functionaries of REGIDESO 
had been arrested because they made up fictitious bills to extort money from citizens.  
The example I have illustrated here engages with the intricate processes 
apparent within the informal economy (la débrouille) across Kinshasa. Here we can see 
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 It is worth remembering that 70% of the population in Kinshasa lives on under a dollar a day 
(Lamb 2013), while the monthly salary of a civil servant is around $70. Thus in comparison, 
REGIDESO bills were considerably costly. 
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how people, such as Joseph and Julia, struggled to survive in the face of declining vital 
services such as a tentative water supply as well as rising financial costs. Inversely,  
those employed by the state institutions such as those within the water company were 
also involved in a struggle for survival. The agent I questioned here occupied two 
formal jobs yet still struggled to survive on the income from these. Here, se débrouiller 
emerges as a core aspect of life in Kinshasa, emerging particularly in the relations 
between the formal and the informal sectors of life.  
The mobulu of the state obliged the Kinois to resort to alternative coping 
strategies to contrast the inaccessibility of the economic and job sectors. Although 
many of the techniques of la débrouille involved a perpetration of mobulu through 
cheating and blackmailing, as in the case of the REGIDESO agent, they nonetheless 
provided the Kinois with an income generating system other than the fluctuating market 
economy. The Kinois were able to create a whole other-economy in parallel with the 
formal one. However, rather than being in antithesis with each other, la débrouille and 
the formal market economy shared many elements. On one hand,  loans at interest rates, 
saving accounts, percentage on profits and credit associations – all mechanisms from 
the formal economy – were all also parts of the informal one. On the other hand, la 
débrouille was so pervasive and successful among the Kinois, that it started to be 
employed also in the channels of state institutions, as the above example of 
REGIDESO clearly illustrates. Through the chapter I shall draw on several examples in 
order to explain how it was difficult to distinguish between formal and informal 
practices, as the two deeply influenced each other and shared similar mechanisms.  
In this chapter I contribute to discussions on la débrouille in Kinshasa by 
arguing that a categorisation of either formal or informal economy risks only 
overshadowing some very important aspects of this street economy. Rather than being a 
sub-product of formal economy, I argue that la débrouille is a distinct social practice, 
with its own mores, rules and social spaces. Moreover, by exploring some of its 
mechanisms in depth, we will be able to grasp some nuances which have been so far 
omitted within the scholarship on la débrouille in Kinshasa. In fact, despite ‘making 
do’ in Kinshasa being indistinctly referred to as ‘la débrouille’ and ‘la coop’35, I will 
show that la coop was a very particular branch of la débrouille. The Kinois used these 
terms differently, depending on the types of activity that people were engaged in. So, 
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 From the French word cooperation (Trefon 2002a, 2004; Nzeza 2004; Petit & Mulumbwa 2005). 
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on the one hand, buying or selling goods outside of the control of the state (for example 
on stalls or peddling in the traffic) was simply referred to as la débrouille. La 
débrouille can be considered the equivalent of ‘informal economy’, as it was comprised 
of the full range of activities which were done outside the control of the state. On the 
other hand, making do by striking deals through the mediation of middlemen was called 
la coop. This often involved purportedly illegal and criminal strategies such as 
smuggling, cheating and so on. Forms of la coop were more complex than direct 
débrouille, because illegal deals required careful negotiation between the parties and 
had to take place far from indiscreet eyes and ears.  
An understanding of the mechanisms of informal economic practices, their 
instability and the ‘cheating’ (tricherie in French) that surrounded it is necessary, if we 
are to understand the different forms of mobulu it created in everyday life. Indeed, 
although la débrouille had the advantage to make cash accessible to everyone on a 
daily basis, it was governed by unpredictability. Income was in a constant state of flux 
and the situation was worsened by the everyday cheating and scams. Without a regular 
income, many people could not afford to send their children to school. This resulted in 
young men roaming the streets of Kinshasa and becoming kulunas, thus contributing to 
the insecurity of the neighbourhood. At the same time, young people could not marry 
their beloved ones and start a family because they could not afford to pay for the 
bridewealth. When they did get together through unofficial unions, they often lacked 
the financial and familial support of their elders. This resulted in tensions within the 
family and in the rise of witchcraft accusations, which often involved children.  
Moreover, because of the inaccessibility of wealth for the majority of the 
population, there was resentment and jealousy against those who managed to enrich 
themselves. The sudden enrichment of people in face of the economic impasse stirred 
up rumours of witchcraft. Rich people were rumoured to be part of Masonic occult 
sects, in which they sacrificed members of their families through witchcraft in order to 
get even richer – a phenomenon called la magie. Thus, understanding the mechanisms 
of la débrouille means understanding the background to a whole range of social 
phenomena linked to mobulu in Kinshasa’s everyday life.  
I start the chapter with a brief excursus of the anthropology of informal 
economy, and I argue the importance of understanding la débrouille, not simply as a 
result of the failure of market economy, but rather as a per se phenomenon. The 
interplay between formal and informal practices has created a whole new system, which 
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has allowed the Kinois to build their lives in between laws and rules. In the following 
section, I analyse in depth the interrelation between formal and informal mechanisms 
by showing that also in public spaces, officers take advantage of the rules of informal 
economy to increase their profits.  
After an in-depth description of the ‘informality’ of the state, I describe the 
mechanisms of la débrouille in my neighbourhood. I draw from personal experiences 
and examples from my Congolese family and neighbours to explain how people 
resourcefully adapted to the changing needs of modern life. I then introduce a particular 
subset of la débrouille, called la coop, which entailed middlemen and different 
operational and remuneration mechanisms.  
I proceed to show how informal economy, like the formal one, suffered from the 
economic impasse of the country. As mistrust increased among the population, people 
were obliged to rely on other systems outside their close solidarity networks such as 
rotating credit association, informal micro-lending and saving systems. These systems, 
which functioned as ‘shadow banks’, relied upon formal economic mechanisms to 
work. Structural violence caused an economic hardship that could not easily be 
overcome through participation in the official system: to survive, people were obliged 
to cheat and display aggression in economic encounters. I conclude my chapter with a 
critique of usual distinctions made between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economic pursuit.  
Before I explore the practices within Kinshasa in greater ethnographic depth, I 
will first seek to contextualise my observations within a wider academic understanding 
of informal economic practices, both within the Congo and further afield. This context 
will permit me to illustrate how the arguments of this chapter fit within a wider 
academic field and also offer some shape to the direction of this chapter.  
 
An Introduction to Informal Economy 
 
‘Making do’ in Kinshasa took different names. ‘La débrouillardise’ or ‘la débrouille’, 
‘système D’, ‘article 15’, ‘la coop’ or ‘kobeta libanga36’ were terms utilised in daily 
interactions by the Congolese. Each of these terms describes the Congolese version of 
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 The expression means literally ‘breaking stones’ and is a reference to colonial time, during which 
the Congolese were forced to break stones to build the railway between Kinshasa and Matadi. 
During the operation many Congolese lost their life, and today kobeta libanga means “being 
fearless, daring to take any risk, doing the physically impossible and the morally unimaginable” 
(Nzeza 2004: 20; see also Petit & Mulumbwa 2005). 
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what in the social sciences has been termed ‘informal economy’  (Hibou 1999; Chabal 
2009; Little 2003), ‘second economy' (MacGaffey J. 1991) or ‘clandestine economy’ 
(Reno 2000), as a set of practices distinct from the official market economy 
promulgated by states. Janet MacGaffey (1987: 23) has conducted extensive research 
on the unrecorded trade of Zaire’s second economy:  
The second economy here refers to economic activities that are unmeasured and 
unrecorded. Some of its activities are illegal, others are not illegal in themselves 
but are carried out in a manner that avoids taxation or in some way deprives the 
state of revenue. These are activities supposedly controlled by the state but 
which in fact either evade this control or involve illegal use of state position.  
Although MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (MacGaffey, J. 1991; MacGaffey 
& Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000) have demonstrated that this type of second economy can 
extend itself beyond national borders and can involve the circulation of huge quantity 
of money37, la débrouille described in this chapter consists of the daily activities of the 
Kinois, activities which usually allow them to feed their family once a day. On this 
same note, Trefon (2002a) in his article on “The Political Economy of Sacrifice” in 
Kinshasa affirms: “For the vast majority of the Kinois, ‘work’ is any small job, activity 
or opportunity that provides enough Francs to buy food or pay for collective taxi fare” 
(p. 487; see also Nzeza 2004: 20).  
Political scientist William Reno (1995, 1998, 2000) argues that informal 
economies are more common in “shadow states” (Reno 1995, 1998) where a 
government is unable to provide citizens with access to employment and basic 
facilities. “The shadow state”, he argues, “is founded on rulers' abilities to manipulate 
external actors' access to markets, both formal and clandestine, in such a way as to 
enhance their power” (2000: 434). Through a strict control of people’s access to 
resources, rulers make sure to control economic markets and ensure their own 
enrichment. Moreover, rulers of shadow states “promote disorders and uncertainty, and 
apply economic regulations in a selective fashion, to force even those who find this 
strategy repugnant to appeal to their favour or flee the country to improve their lot” 
(Ibid: 446). This pushes ordinary people to find ways to ‘make do’ out of the 
legitimated channels of market economy, into criminality and traffic.  
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Africa, see Reno (1995), Ellis and MacGaffey (1996), Chabal and Daloz (1999), Hibou (1999) and 
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Rulers and the elite not only promote disorders and violent modes of 
accumulation among their subjects, but they are also the first to make use of illegal 
channels, including within the government sphere. Mobutu’s ‘kleptocratic’ regime and 
the fact that he incited his people into stealing “a little in a nice way” (Kabwit 1979: 
397) during a public ceremony, stands as evidence of this trend. In addition to the 
public functionaries, politicians and military officials making the most out of corruption 
and criminality, there was also a discourse promoting resourcefulness, and toning down 
the immorality of corruption and cheating (Petit & Mulumbwa 2005). This discourse 
not only legitimated extortion and swindling as a necessity in a context of ‘every man 
for himself’ (and God for all) but also promoted dirty tricks as an expression of 
astuteness (Rubbers 2009a: 630). As Nzeza (2004: 21) explains: “The new (a)morality 
in Kinshasa dictates that it is better to sell your soul to the devil than to be scrupulous. 
The cunning required to meet immediate needs has replaced the respect of any 
righteous moral code”. Trickery and cheating to survive became normal events in life in 
Kinshasa, and gossip was filled with stories of betrayals and scamming, including 
between members of the same family.  
Scholars who have focused their research on Africa have also analysed how in 
politically and/or economically unstable countries, informal and formal economies co-
exist (MacGaffey J. 1991; Chabal 2009; Hibou 1999; Little 2003). In fact, informality 
is a key element in the Government sphere: public servants use illicit means to extort 
money from the population; others use the state and its services as a shield beneath 
which to operate their illegal deals; and others appropriate state funds for personal use. 
In the malfunctioning of the state, public sector workers have found additional sources 
of income. As Chabal (2009: 132) writes: 
My argument is not that the state is failing everywhere in Africa but that it is 
failing enough to make possible an informal political economy of this type, 
which itself contributes significantly to the further informalisation of the 
economy. 
On the same subject of informal economy, Janet Roitman (2006) analysed the 
way in which the criminal activities of road bandits in the Chad basin were necessary to 
the urban economy and financed local administrations through bribes and other 
informal remunerations. The bandits who smuggled goods and attacked cargos and 
other vehicles in the border region could be considered as trying to “participate in 
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prevailing modes of accumulation and prevailing methods of governing the economy, 
which are typical to most states in the world (custom frauds and granting no-bid 
contracts to well-connected businesses are not particularly African affairs)” (Ibid: 249-
250). As informal taxation and banditry, which lay between illegality and legitimacy, 
seemed to be shared by the police and the regional elites (Roitman 2005, 2006), they 
were considered legitimate and rational forms of remuneration by the bandits and by 
the population. These bandits considered their actions like a formal occupation rather 
than theft or fraud, described as “rational or reasonable behaviour” ( Ibid). Thus, 
Roitman (2006: 259) concluded, bandits “steal or traffic as a way of entering into the 
labour market and participating in a particular political economy. In that sense [...] 
bandits, smugglers and traffickers seek a certain mode of integration by partaking in 
recognised modes of governing the economy”.  
However, in the scholarship on informality, the informal economy, or second 
economy, is often described as shadows of the formal, or as a result of it, rather than a 
per se phenomenon. What these discussions fail to conceptualise is that the informal 
economy has found, in formal mechanisms of production and exchange a useful tool, to 
develop as a distinct phenomenon. In this sense, my argument is supported by Ferguson 
(2007) in his article about the new rationalities of poverty, who asks the reader:  
 Are they [the poor] using the space that democratization has opened up to 
create new and potentially promising forms of political struggle - not 
acquiescing in an overarching neoliberal design for society, but rather taking up 
and creatively redeploying neoliberal concepts and discursive moves in the 
service of a fundamentally different political end? (Ibid: 84) 
Although la débrouille has appropriated mechanisms of market economy, the 
two need not be viewed in an evolutionary perspective, or even in opposition to one 
another. This chapter argues that in the dialectic relation between the formal econo my 
of the state and the everyday informal practices of the Kinois, la débrouille emerges as 
a distinct social framework which informs economic practices across the spectrum of 
Congolese life. 
The Kinois’ need to fend for themselves and the unreliability of market 
economy has pushed them to create a new system and conceptualise their economy in a 
distinct fashion. In the next section, I shall analyse how la débrouille, far from being a 
phenomenon which is relegated to the suburbs of Kinshasa, has provided also many 
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public functionaries with new (illicit) channels of enrichment, in the face of the 
inefficiency of the government to provide them with salaries and benefits. The public 
sector and la débrouille merge to such an extent that it is impossible to speak of a 
formal or informal economy in Kinshasa. La débrouille is a new economic modus 
operandi, which cuts across the whole social spectrum and involves the most disparate 
social actors. 
 
La Débrouille within the Public Sector 
 
During my fieldwork in Kinshasa, it was extremely difficult to discern between formal 
and informal or between legal and illegal activities even within the formal channels of 
the state. The public sector was involved in illegal activities disguised by a veil of 
official mechanisms, as functionaries applied extra fees for their services and issued 
unauthorised fines, like the REGIDESO agent example above. To give another 
example, police officers could issue a fine to a driver because he was not wearing a 
safety belt, and would ask for immediate payment, although they were not officially 
allowed to collect money. In this blurred domain, where legality and illegality 
constantly overlapped, the Kinois longed for formal employment but not for the secure 
income it offered, as one may think. In Kinshasa, in fact, wages were extremely low 
thus people had other reasons to covet jobs in the public sector. Let me illustrate this 
with an example from my fieldwork data.  
Alain Bilolo worked as a functionary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
lived in a neighbourhood around Pompage. His salary was around CDF 150,000 ($160) 
per month. In order to get to work, from Monday to Saturday, he spent between CDF 
25,000 and CDF 36,000 ($30 and $40) per month. Moreover, Alain was the father of 
six children (three of whom went to school) while his wife was selling home-made 
cakes in front of their house for CDF 200 each ($0.20). La débrouille by his wife 
earned her around CDF 40,000 ($40) per month – if she worked constantly every day.  
When I asked him why his wife did not look for a more remunerative occupation, he 
replied that he did not have the money to help her start a small business (meaning to 
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invest in buying goods so that she could resell them at a higher price). On top of an 
already difficult situation, Alain had not been paid for the last four months38. 
Civil servants like Alain Bilolo could not rely on wages in order to make a 
living for themselves and their families. A state job was attractive for different reasons. 
First, a formal job provided an employee with social capital and respect within his 
community and kin circle (MacGaffey 1991; Hibou 1999). Second, it offered the 
opportunity of extortion and favouritism in dealings with the state. The inadequate 
wages of their full-time employment meant civil servants did not have the time to 
cultivate the relationships that would help them fend for themselves  (se débrouiller) 
outside their official job. This meant that they were obliged to fend for themselves 
within the formal apparatus of their office.  
This becomes clearer through the example of Jeff Mumbela who was a major in 
the military. I met Jeff through Joseph Mutambu, the man I lived with. The two had 
lived in the same neighbourhood before Joseph moved to Maman Yemo. Once, during 
a walk in Joseph’s old neighbourhood, we knocked at Jeff’s house so that we could 
greet him. Jeff invited us in and the three of us started to talk about the hardship of the 
job market in Kinshasa. Such hardship affected not only civilians, but also officials 
within the ranks of the military, like Jeff: 
Jeff: If we had to wait for the money of the state only... CDF 60,000 
[$65]... What am I going to do with that? Nothing! 
 
Joseph: The water bill alone is more than $20...  
 
Jeff: If you also have a post [fonction] that brings money in, that gives 
us the means to find some money, then it’s ok... As you see me 
now, we're waiting. If they give us the money for the operating 
costs [frais de fonctionnement], heh! We do everything! [Nous 
bougeons tout!]...They give us the money for the operating costs, 
they say “Voila, come and pick up your operating costs” [...] 
 
Silvia:  What is ‘operating costs'? 
 
Jeff: It's the money to make the office work.... Buying the ink for the 
printer, buying some paper, buy some highlighters and pens, 
toilet paper, etc... In order to make the office function. The 
                                                 
38
 If we consider that school fees were around CDF 30,000 ($30) per trimester for primary school, 
and a 25Kg bag of rice, enough for five people for a month, cost CDF 25,000 ($25) at the time of 
my fieldwork, we can better understand the sacrifices the Kinois had to endure everyday in order to 
survive. 
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computers' maintenance... So every month there's that money 
that comes in. You have to maintain all those things. If you have 
to move something, some instruments... Sometimes at the end of 
the month they give you $2,000 dollars. $2,000 in order to 
service those things. You have to service them, it's mandatory. If 
you do not do that, after a while the computer stops working, [...] 
that's no good... Even in the toilet, when we go there, toilet paper 
[you have to provide for toilet paper]... And the detergents to 
disinfect the toilet, you see, all these things are money... And 
when we do the calculation for all those things, the colonel asks 
me “leave it for now [tikka liboso], is this all that is left? Ah, just 
leave it. $1,000 [is enough] for those things... How much is it 
left? $1,000...Give me $500...”[Laughs] 
 
Joseph: And what can you do... 
 
Jeff: When he takes $500 and put it in the pocket, he says “Bon [well], 
you are the chief of the office, take, do whatever you want [with 
the rest]”. And when I am left with this $500, I've got my people 
as well! I've got a captain, and another one, and then there is the 
man in the office who works at the computer... So with the $500 
left, I have to do something with that...First I take out $300 
[laughs], I say “Ok, this is for me... There's $200 left”. I give $50 
to one, $60 to another one...when there's a $30 or $50 left, I tell 
to the others “Ok I’ve got a car, you don't have one you take the 
transport, with that money I’m going to buy the fuel for my 
car...” They tell me “No major we don't believe you...” So I say 
“I'll show you”, we go to the petrol station together, I put some 
fuel in the car and I tell the guy “You see?”, “Ah yes now I 
believe you”...Et voilá... Then I arrive home and we need to buy 
food, etc... There is always money to spend...  
The money for the operating costs came from the State and was meant to be 
used in order to service the office: repairing machinery, replacing missing material and 
so on. Instead, half of it was spent on this official purpose, while the other half ended 
up in the pockets of the public functionaries. The colonel appropriated half of the whole 
amount for himself, and gave the rest to the major. The major took half of the money 
left (plus the cost of the carburant), as he was the chief of the office, and shared the rest 
among the other functionaries. Public money was not invested into the infrastructures: 
it became a pyramid scheme according to which the higher the office, the higher the 
compensation 39 . This is why, despite the fact that many positions were often not 
                                                 
39
 It is worth noting that the street gangs of young people in Kinshasa also share the booty of their 
robberies according to same pyramidal mechanism used at the Governmental sphere (see chapter 5). 
74 
remunerated for months, many people dreamt of an office job. They hoped to enter the 
system of illicit remuneration within government circles.  
As a result of the rampant corruption of the state system, money seldom reached 
lower levels of state bureaucracies. These excluded officials had to resort to informal 
taxation for their services, while others were believed to use the skills learnt through 
employment to cheat the population. For example, when thieves stole a thirty-meter 
electricity cable in our street, some of my neighbours accused the workers of the 
National Society of Electricity (SNEL) of the theft, reasoning that the copper within the 
cable yielded more than their monthly wages. Events such as these were so frequent 
that some Kinois nicknamed this company ‘National Society of the Enemies of Light’ 
(Société Nationale des Ennemis de la Lumière).  
Thus, a whole informal system has emerged in parallel to the official one. 
Often, together with the official fees, one was obliged to pay administrative expenses 
(frais administratifs) at the discretion of the officer in order to have the job done 
'smoothly' (Petit & Mulumbwa 2005). At the same time, public officials used the 
channels of the state to practice smuggling as a secondary form of revenue. In these 
cases, informal economies worked in a very structured and hierarchical way, often with 
the support of the state and its legalised channels such as international trading 
companies, which in many cases turned a blind eye as long as they maintained their 
profit (Ellis & MacGaffey 1996). For example during my stay, a wealthy member of 
the Government I met through friends, often took advantage of her work trips to the 
east of the country to collect dozens of kilos of potatoes (a luxury item in Kinshasa), 
dried fish, ‘Brazilian hair’ wigs and other clothing items that she resold once back in 
Kinshasa in the informal market.  
As Bayart (2009) explains, the predator- like nature of the State has been 
reproduced at the level of informal economy. Corruption is routinised within state 
circles, as illustrated above, and thus becomes legitimised in the eyes of the population. 
If political leaders and military members were 'allowed' to make the most out of illicit 
means, why should Kinois not do the same? On this subject, some of my informants 
recounted to me the story of an acclaimed thief (one of my informants believed his 
name was Angualima 40) who robbed the residence of Mobutu but after his capture he 
                                                 
40
 Angoualima, although with a different spelling, figures as a notorious bandit also in the novel 
“African Psycho” by Alain Mabanckou (2003), a writer from Congo-Brazzaville. 
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was made vice director (directeur adjoint) of a notorious prison. This story, whether it 
was true or not, indicated precisely the popular opinion of the informality and illegality 
of the government, perpetuating a myth of sorts that they recruited criminals into their 
ranks. Moreover, as criminality has been adopted and incorporated in the Congolese 
state, so many Congolese legitimized practices of criminality themselves. Through 
informal economy and illicit means of production and accumulation of wealth, the 
Kinois appropriated the mechanisms of mobulu of the state and transformed them into 
an original and distinct economic system.  
The governmental sphere was the realm of those adults and elders who 
successfully managed to cultivate clientelistic networks with those in power. Posts were 
very limited, and only the best-connected managed to make their way into the halls of 
governmental buildings, populated by large-bellied men impeccably dressed in their 
European attire. The state was saturated with these old figures of power, and symbols 
of the political and economic impasse of the country.  Thus, only a limited part of the 
population had access to the public sector and to salaries. Moreover, wages were so low 
that workers could not count only on them for their survival and the job title itself was 
coveted more for the social capital it facilitated. In fact, wages constituted only one of 
multiple sources of income for the majority of the families in Kinshasa. This leads us to 
depart from the bureaucratic centre of la ville and to focus instead on the streets of la 
cité, which is where mostly young men and women have found a fertile soil to fend for 
themselves. Here I will explore how young people, and particularly women, have found 
a fruitful economic strategy in la débrouille which has provided them with income on a 
daily basis. 
 
Making Do in Maman Yemo between 2010 and 2011 
 
During colonialism and the first decades of Independence, la ville functioned as a 
bureaucratic and working hub. Following the deterioration of the public infrastructures 
and the lack of employment, people have started turning to the streets of la cité to carry 
out every sort of activity. During my fieldwork, the streets o f la cité were full of stalls 
where women sold all kinds of goods, money changers called cambistes (most of whom 
were women) exchanged Congolese francs for American dollars, young children, 
known as khadafis after the former Libyan leader, sold fuel and preachers prayed at 
every corner, square and even on buses in la cité. Other young boys, sat in front of 
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small wooden stalls protected from the sun by huge coloured umbrellas, acted as 
phone-box operators (the so-called cabines). Landlines did not exist in Kinshasa and 
only part of the population owned mobile phones. These young phone operators thus 
lent their mobiles to people who needed to make calls. Young men and children 
polished shoes on the streets, or carried heavy loads for women at the market. Strong 
men moved things by transporting them on their push-carts. Barbershops and tailors 
worked not only in concrete rooms but also in the open air, fixing their mirrors on tree 
trunks or along walls, thus installing their open-air salons (see fig 3). These were only 
some of the occupations that made the streets of Kinshasa busy, loud, smelly and 
colourful. 
People and businesses also flooded the streets of Maman Yemo and the 
surrounding areas, and stalls and small boutiques literally invaded public spaces. 
Wooden stalls were positioned on secondary streets as well as in the main square of the 
neighbourhood. The stalls and the kiosks provided the neighbourhood not only with 
bread and powdered milk, but also with various goods for the house and for the school. 
One of the best stocked was the boutique of Jacques Kinyongo 41, a small wooden cabin 
with a grated window in order to prevent petty thieveries. Some mornings I would help 
Jacques and his wife Carine to sell bread. The procedure was always the same: she 
bought the bread at the closest available depository and resold it for CDF 50 ($0.05) 
more. Bread prices varied according to the quality of flour and the producer, but they 
were always between CDF 50 and CDF 300 ($0.05 and $0.30). During one of our chats, 
Carine told me that they managed to earn around CDF 35,000 ($40) per month through 
the sale of bread.  
 
                                                 
41
 In Jacques Kinyongo’s boutique one could find bread, peanuts, pop-corn, small cakes, hot tea, 
biscuits, omelettes and eggs, sugar, milk, coffee, razorblades, shoes and hair strings, A4 papers, 
envelopes, pens, rubbers, beauty creams for both women and men, talc powder, blue and yellow 
washing soap, washing powder in fifty gram package, shoes polish, candies, chewing gums, and 
much more. The banquets scattered along the road sold cigarettes, chikwangues (manioc paste 
wrapped onto leaves), tomatoes, manioc flour, mango, avocado or oranges (according to the 
season), cakes, manioc fries, biscuits, pens and pencils, small toys and used shoes. 
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FIGURE 3: Street barbershop 
 
 
FIGURE 4: In case of electricity cuts, young people recharged    
mobile phones on the streets with the help of a generator 
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FIGURE 5: Food stalls in Maman Yemo 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6: Selling bread at the stall of Jacques Kinyongo and Carine 
Monssengo. Picture taken by Carine 
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Earning a living was also difficult for the family I lived with. Both Joseph 
Mutambu and Julia Wembi were unemployed and survived through la débrouille. As 
our neighbourhood hosted a number of primary and secondary schools, vendors (mostly 
women) gathered outside the schools' entrances each day to sell home-made juice to the 
children. When Joseph's refrigerator was working, Julia Wembi and I would prepare 
some monkey-bread ice lollies at home and sell them at one of the schools. Each iced 
juice was CDF 50 and at the end of the day Julia was able to make around CDF 6,000-
7,000 ($6-7). After deducting the money to buy the monkey bread, sugar, ice lollies 
bags, and the colorant, we were left with roughly CDF 2,000 ($2). However, we were 
forced to abandon our endeavours soon after my arrival, when our street was left 
without electricity. The refrigerator was reduced to use as a cupboard to save cooked 
food from cockroaches.  
In our parcelle, the income came from my research allowance and Joseph’s 
making-do activity. Thanks to a system of money lending between the two of us, 
Joseph bought large stones and gave them to some women who smashed them 
manually. Joseph resold the small stones to be used to decorate houses and courtyards, 
for a higher price. However, this only yielded $100 US per month, and the job 
depended very much on the weather. During the rainy season it was impossible for 
women to work and the house-building market slowed down substantially42. 
A five-minute bus ride from Maman Yemo led to the busy locality of Pompage 
on one side, and the locality of D.G.C. on the other. Around these very busy areas, 
children yelled “mayi” or “mela mayi” (“water”, “drink water”) and sold water in small 
plastic bags for CDF 100 ($0.10), cakes for CDF 200 ($0.20) and home-made chips for 
CDF 100 ($0.10). Women sold oranges, mangos or avocados accord ing to the season, 
and again, children zigzagged through cars and buses in the traffic to sell paper 
handkerchiefs.  
Men usually fended for themselves in the transport sector. At the time of my 
fieldwork, virtually everyone with a car, a Volkswagen van (the minibus, informally 
called ‘spirit of death’, esprit de mort, because of frequent accidents) or a motorcycle 
                                                 
42
 It is important also to note that Joseph would have never been able to start such business if it was 
not for my research allowance. The Kinois were often blocked by the lack of funds they needed to 
start up any kind of small activity.  
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(called wewa), worked as a taxi driver43. During rush hour, traffic could be terrible, and 
finding transport - and getting on it – could be an odyssey. But in this chaotic situation 
young men found a means of profit by yelling out the destinations of buses to the 
public, so that people could easily find their vehicle. These figures in the transport 
network were called atalaku (literally ‘he who yells’), a Lingala term borrowed from 
the Congolese music scene44. When the buses were full and ready to go, these atalaku 
received CDF 50 ($0.05) by the driver for their service. Their yelling allowed the driver 
to work more rapidly and make more money. During rush hours, when it was extremely 
difficult to find a seat on a bus or a taxi, other young men functioned as ‘booking 
agents’. One just had to tell them the destination and they would run towards the car or 
bus even before it had stopped, jump on it and reserve the seat. The cost of this service 
varied between CDF 50 and CDF 100 ($0.05 and $0.10).  
Rather than being a simple space of transit from one place to another, the street 
became a destination in its own right and, more importantly, a productive space. 
Through stalls and other informal activities, the Kinois have constantly transformed the 
space they inhabit, giving birth to what De Boeck and Plissart (2004: 235) have called 
an “invisible architecture” of the city. Every kind of monetary transaction was made in 
the street, in contrast with the impersonal money exchange of formal employment 
where transactions were made in offices or via bank transfers.  
Formal employment was dominated by elderly men and women, whereas the 
informal economy was very much differentiated according to the type of activity. For 
example, ‘concrete’ boutiques, pharmacies, and small activities were run by both men 
and women, on the streets, markets and stalls were the favourite loci of women and 
children and the transport sector, crossroads and bus terminals were the most visible 
spots of the informal strategies of young men.  
All the activities mentioned above were carried out by people who would keep 
all the profit for themselves. A woman who sold vegetables at the market did not have 
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 However, the transport sector was not hassle free. Cars and vans were in very deplorable 
conditions, and often without the permits or insurance to drive. As such, traffic police and car 
insurance agents were the worst nightmare for taxi drivers, and used any excuse to extort money. 
This is why some taxi drivers preferred to drive at night, as there was no control by such agents. 
However, at night they risked more to be harassed by thieves and armed soldiers, equally extorting 
money.  
44
 Atalaku denoted that person that yelled slogans and warmed up the audience before the band 
started playing, or during the fast-paced dancing parts of the songs (White 1999, 2008). The atalaku 
figures have invaded not only the streets, but also the spiritual environment of Pentecostal churches 
(Pype 2006b), that often made use of music bands during their prayer sessions. 
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to share her earning with partners or middlemen. All the money she made was for her to 
keep. Within this la débrouille we have just analysed, there is a distinct form of 
transaction known as la coop, which I will now elaborate on. La coop entailed the 
transaction of money between two or more actors and involved negotiators who would 
broker transactions and gain a percentage of the profits for their efforts. The 
phenomenon of la coop shows further dimensions of how the Kinois were engaged in 
the act of ‘getting by’.  
 
La Coop: of Skimming Money and Commissioning Agents 
 
La coop denoted a deal outside the legal mechanisms of state regulation, which 
involved two or more actors and the mediation of a broker known as a ‘commissioning 
agent’ (commissionaire). In Kinshasa, anyone could be a buyer, a seller or a 
commissioning agent. For example, in our neighbourhood people used to bring 
avocados from their trees to Jacques Kinyongo's boutique. They would sell them to 
Jacques for CDF 300, while Jacques – who operated as a middleman – would sell them 
for CDF 400 in order to profit for the transaction. The same could happen with any kind 
of items: vegetable oil, second-hand shoes, etc. Moreover, these types of transaction 
often took place on the street, outside of the space of the boutique or the shop. Thus, 
literally anyone could try to sell an item on behalf of a seller for a higher price, in order 
to make some extra cash. 
Commissioning agents facilitated encounters between people who pursued the 
same interest (selling or buying a house, food, or clothes) and were able to construct 
social networks through which interested people could buy and sell their products. 
Sellers demanded these agents whenever they wanted to strike a deal that required 
acquaintances outside the close network of their families and acquaintances. At the 
same time, commissioning agents gave sellers an opportunity to save time and do other 
informal activities, rather than trying to strike a deal by themselves.  
The world of la coop and commissioning agents was not scam free. 
Commissioning agents pursued their own personal interests and they would not hesitate 
to cheat their clients. Although people knew that doing business with these agents was 
very risky, they were left with no choice, as the state did not offer a valid alternative. 
Services for the poor were non-existent and people were left to cope among themselves. 
The buyer had to resort to the commissioning agent with reluctant trust.  
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I shall now explain the role of these agents through some examples of la coop. 
In Kinshasa, commissioning agents were key figures in the real estate business. Around 
la cité one could find hundreds of cardboard signs saying ‘estate agent’ (agence 
immobiliere). Such signs were placed along busy streets so that people could easily spot 
them. Next to the signs, men sat on chairs waiting for customers. Any potential 
customers who might be interested in selling or in renting homes would seek out these 
‘estate agents’. At the end of the transaction, home owners would give a percentage of 
the profits, between 5% and 10%, to the commissioning agent if the house was sold or 
one month’s rent if rented. This example shows that, although la coop was described as 
part of the informal economy of Kinshasa, it was organised through very formal 
mechanisms and rules which reminded official estate agencies. However, as I have 
anticipated, la coop was not scam-free, and cheating in the housing sector was very 
fruitful. Often, fake commissioning agents would try to sell houses which were not on 
sale, or which had already been sold to another customer. This is why, on the walls of 
many houses of la cité, one could read “this house is not on sale” (cette maison n’est 
pas a vendre) to prevent fraud45. 
La coop could also be done to find a partner. A wealthy patron could ask an 
agent to procure him a mistress. The agent acting as a middleman, would seek out a 
suitable girl, and if this person met the approval of the patron, the agent would 
introduce the girl to him. If the woman became his mistress, which involved lavish gifts 
of money, luxury items and clothes, she would give a small amount to the middleman 
for having introduced her to the patron instead of introducing another woman. 
Beside these examples, la coop was utilised to sell everyday goods such as food 
and clothes. The money involved in these informal transactions depended on the value 
of the good involved. I should stress here that although la coop seemed to be 
completely independent from the market economy, as people bought and sold items out 
of the control of the state, it is worth noting that this is not the case. On the contrary, the 
mechanisms through which the Kinois engaged in all aspects of la débrouille were 
intimately linked to wider shifts across the politico-economic terrain of Kinshasa, as the 
following example explains. 
 
                                                 
45
 On a similar phenomenon in Nigeria, see Smith (2007: 22). 
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Estelle Swanga was a girl in her thirties who lived in the neighbourhood with 
her mom. She had contracted poliomyelitis and as a result had a malformed leg which 
made her dependant on her elderly mother. The state, of course, did not provide any 
assistance for her condition, and working in the formal sector was out of question, as 
she could not move easily and was socially stigmatised for her disability. As a result, 
Estelle had always worked in the informal market, sewing clothes for the people of the 
neighbourhood, and working occasionally as a commissioning agent thanks to a small 
stall on the street in front of her parcelle. When I asked her about la coop and how that 
worked for her, she explained: 
Estelle: During the Mobutu epoch, there was the circulation of money. 
Someone could stay home all day long, then in the evening, she 
would go out...When she was back she must have earned 
something. We lived off coop eh, as we say, cooperation. 
 
Silvia:  And what did you do to 'coop'? 
 
Estelle: We did some commissions... Cooperation means that I have got 
something to sell and I tell Joseph to sell this pair of scissors for 
CDF 1,000 ($1). Joseph takes them and he goes and sells them 
for CDF 1,500 ($1.5), and the 500 francs ($0.50)...  
 
Silvia:  It's for him. 
 
Estelle: Yes, it's for him... The surplus... This is what we call 
cooperation. 
This interview suggests that the crisis of the formal sector had deep ly shaped the 
informal activities it generated. The economic crisis that effected Kinshasa was so 
pervasive that it also affected the sphere of la débrouille. Many adults I interviewed 
were nostalgic for the first years46 of Mobutu’s reign, which they considered a more 
fruitful period than the present. While in the past la coop was seen as more profitable 
because it was used as a supplement to the wages of those working in the industries, 
this did not seem to be the case during my fieldwork, when the majority of men were 
left looking for occasional jobs in the street. Moreover, because of the monetary crisis 
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 Many people I met were fond of the first decade of Mobutu’s reign. The country was at peace, 
and the market economy seemed to work enough to allow people to have decent lives and “eat three 
times a day”, in the words of one of my informants. However, things changed with Zair ianisation in 
1973, when Mobutu put foreign-owned industries in the hand of his Congolese affiliates. Corruption 
and misrule soon led to the bankruptcy of most industries, and thousands of workers were suddenly 
left without jobs. 
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and constant inflation, it has become difficult for people to maintain these cycles of 
money exchange. The following is an interview that I conducted with Marie and Elodie 
Kalala, two women living in my neighbourhood, who sold the typical coloured wax-
printed fabrics (called pagne) through la coop: 
Marie: Despite the fact that Mobutu was a dictator, there was coop 
[coop ezalaki] [...] At that time it was good because our 
husbands, the functionaries, after work they went looking for 
extra money, or we did some informal job. It was good because 
money [gained informally] was easy, and that money, together 
with the official money of the functionaries, was good. Now, a 
functionary earns maybe $50, but the school fees of the child are 
$200. So how are they going to pay the school fees, with the 
salary of the functionary..? 
 
Silvia:   But one has to keep doing coop, right? 
 
Elodie: La coop works now but it doesn't pay well. This is why I want to 
go to Angola and from there to send the money to allow the kid 
to study. 
The informal circuits of la coop seemed to be fruitful only if the formal circuits 
of employment worked as well. The two circuits interpenetrated each other in such a 
deep way, that without one, the other atrophied. As such, la coop suffered from the 
fluctuation of the market, and the economic crisis slowed down the informal economy. 
Even though it may seem that la coop was an annexe, a surplus of the formal economy, 
in reality the two were part of the same system of la débrouille: it is in the intersection 
between formal and informal that la débrouille was able to develop as an independent 
phenomenon.  
In this economically insecure environment, the role of the commissioning agent 
had become even more central to la coop, as striking deals had become more and more 
difficult. In order to succeed in la coop, one needed a persuasive and clever 
intermediary agent 47 , able to strike the deal at the seller’s conditions, and to make 
                                                 
47
 The role of the commissioning agents recalled that of the middlemen hired by Portuguese traders 
during pre-colonial times. At that time, the middlemen were chosen because of their power to 
construct social networks. Middlemen were village chiefs, local traders or hunters who knew the 
correct people and places. Known to the Portuguese as pombeiros, these local itinerant peddlers 
brought Europeans’ goods to African producers, who would exchange them for commodities and 
slaves (Miller 1988: 190; see also Austen 1983, and Austen & Ralph 1999). Such middlemen 
received rewards for their services, and earned additional goods by blackmailing the families of 
enslaved young people to liberate them (Miller 1988). As such, they could be considered as 
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enough profit for himself. Usually, these two factors come at the expense of the buyer, 
who would probably be cheated or tricked into paying more than he should. This is 
exactly what happened when Joseph Mutambu and I decided to buy one of those taxis 
one could see in the streets of Kinshasa. This would have allowed me to move faster in 
different neighbourhoods for my fieldwork, and it would have benefited Joseph by 
working as a taxi when I did not need the car.  
In order to strike a deal, Joseph asked the advice of Baudouin, an old friend who 
worked as a driver for the missionaries with whom Joseph had spent twelve years. After 
seeing several cars, Baudouin finally convinced us to buy a red 1993 Toyota Corolla 
which did not look very good. However, to Joseph and me those cars all looked the 
same: we trusted Joseph’s friend’s advice. A few weeks after we had bought the car, we 
realised how bad Baudouin had cheated us. The car was falling into pieces, and we 
were spending hundreds of dollars in repairs. Joseph told me that clearly Baudouin had 
acted as a commissioning agent for the men who sold us the car. The two men 
apparently offered him a higher share of the profits than the other sellers. This is why 
Baudouin was so excited about the car, even though some of the others we saw before 
were in better condition. This episode illustrates the climate of trickery, fraud and illicit 
dealings that took place every day in Kinshasa. As the economy was very bleak, those 
who had the occasion resorted to the illicit and subversive mechanisms of la coop to 
make do.  
For the majority of the inhabitants of Kinshasa, la débrouille allowed them to 
earn just enough to get by. Often money was not enough to cure sick children, or for 
other types of emergency. People did not manage to save anything, because as soon as 
some money appeared in the household, it was immediately spent in food or other basic 
items. In order to survive to such hardship, the Kinois resorted to a whole series of 
exchange mechanisms, and informal saving systems within their local community. In 
the next section, I shall analyse in depth the most common survival strategies in the  
cités of Kinshasa which further demonstrates the relationships between aspects of 
formal market economic practices and the world of la débrouille. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
tricksters, who sometimes deceived both parties and seized illicit opportunities for amassing 
personal wealth (Austen 1983: 14). 
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Credit Mechanisms: Paper Credit Cards and Shadow Banks 
 
As I have already analysed through several examples above, la débrouille has many 
complex dimensions in la cité of Kinshasa. Despite the scale of the phenomenon, the 
earnings of la débrouille were not enough to sustain people. This resulted not only in an 
increase in criminal activities and trickeries, but also in the development of the so-
called ‘SOPEKA mentality’, from the union of the expressions ‘buy me [something]’ 
(sombela ngai), ‘give me [something]’ (pesa ngai), and ‘give me something as a 
present’ (kabela ngai)48. I often heard Julia address her friends (including me on a daily 
basis) with one of these expressions. I had not witnessed the circulation of small 
amounts of money, even only a few hundred Francs, among friends and relatives 
anywhere else with such frequency. People often loaned each other CDF 500 ($ 0.5), 
CDF 1,000 ($1), and regularly exchanged manioc leaves (pondu) and other small 
quantities of food supplies. Among friends and kin, there was a mutual agreement that 
money or any present would be reciprocated with another present of similar value in a 
future that could be protracted for a very long time. Among non-kin relations, lending, 
borrowing, debt and repayments varied according to the degree of trust and 
acquaintance. Part of the income of every family in my neighbourhood was constituted 
of these informal agreements and every family had some sort of debts with multiple 
people – family members and others. Like a chain, the impossibility of satisfying one's 
own primary needs led to borrowing money from someone else and so on. Often, 
people found it difficult to sustain such circles of debt, and this pushed them into 
trickeries to relieve the burden of these payments. For example, in our family, Julia 
Wembi used to give CDF 20,000 ($20) to our neighbour Elisée Mugele at the beginning 
of each month for the oil that we needed for the petrol lamps at home. One day a young 
girl of Elisée’s family arrived, asking Julia for extra money. When Julia asked why, the 
girl explained that Elisée had bought ‘her things’ (biloko na ye) with the money, and 
they could not buy wholesale oil. As a result, they were le ft without oil to sell. Julia 
became agitated with Elisée and the girl, but the money was gone.  
At this point, one might ask why many Kinois did not try to get out of these 
cycles of debt. As it was impossible for them to make a living according to the 
mechanisms of the formal market economy, they had to rely more and more on social 
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and kinship networks to survive. Through reciprocity, the Kinois had found a 
precarious way of coping with adversities. Extricating oneself from these circles of gifts 
and debts would mean becoming socially and economically isolated. According to 
Chabal (2009: 112): 
People’s labour is best invested in cultivating the conditions that will sustain the 
informal economy on which they depend. This involves committing substantial 
time and resources to ostensibly non-economic activities. For example, it may 
be more important for some people to propitiate the dead in the village, or to 
support financially a vast array of distant relatives, than to invest the profits 
from a shop in town into expanding their business. 
In this respect the circulation of money constructed money lending systems and 
solidarity networks, like those described in the next sections.  
 
 Rotating Credit Associations: Likelemba and Moziki 
 
Since the 1930s, in front of the necessity of dealing with the depression that hit the 
Congo as well as the Western world, women organised themselves in systems of 
financial support (De Boeck & Plissart 2004). Likelemba and Moziki49 (or Muziki) were 
rotating credit associations in which all members paid a deposit on fixed dates, the total 
of which was given to a particular member on a rotating basis. This allowed members 
to receive the money they donated little by little, all in lump sum, when it was their turn 
to receive the kitty. Members generally used the money for small investments and 
exceptional expenses, such as organising a trip, or buying a stock of clothes or food at 
the central market ‘Zando’, which they would then resell at a higher price in the distant 
cités. There was a slight difference in the case of moziki which possessed a more festive 
and recreational character than likelemba. Participants in these associations often added 
a small sum which was used to organise a buffet at the place of the person receiving the 
kitty. 
Many different actors engaged in likelembas and mozikis. For example, pupils 
organized their likelembas on a smaller scale to purchase fancy clothes, while teachers, 
policemen, women at the market and office workers made larger investments. Although 
these associations were born out of the cult of fashion and dressing well, which started 
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to develop in town from the 1930s (Comhaire-Sylvain 1968, De Boeck & Plissart 
2004), they gradually took on a different purpose. In contemporary Kinshasa, members 
of the associations supported each other by contributing to the expenses of mourning, 
weddings and other ceremonies50. Even though these associations did not generate any 
surplus for their members, they allowed people to strengthen bonds and relationships. 
Likelembas and mozikis worked on communitarian basis, and in order to be 
successful they required all members to pay a previously agreed amount. The amount 
during my fieldwork varied between CDF 200 ($0.20) for students’ likelemba to CDF 
10,000 ($10) for business women, and their frequency could be daily, weekly or 
monthly. The amount of the donation varied according to how often members met, so 
for example women meeting on a monthly basis could pay CDF 10,000 ($10), on a 
weekly basis could deposit CDF 2,000/ 3,000 ($2, $3) and women and young people 
meeting on a daily basis would usually deposit up to CDF 300 ($0.30) or 500 ($0.50). 
However, as Bähre (2007a) also highlighted in relation to South African financial self-
help groups, cheating in these associations frequently occurred. Sometimes people did 
not pay, other times the money-collector disappeared with the kitty.  
Despite the insecurity of these informal credit associations, people preferred to 
run the risks associated with them rather than resorting to banks. Banks were not a 
popular choice among the poor of Kinshasa for a number of reasons. First, in order to 
open a bank account, people needed a passport or a national identity card, which most 
of them did not have. Many Kinois were dissuaded from applying for an identity card 
by the slow and complex bureaucracy, high fees and the further informal taxation 
which formed part of the process. However, also those Kinois in possession of the 
document were suspicious of banks. In the eyes of the Kinois I spoke to, banks were 
part of that state and bureaucratic system which has cheated them several times, leaving 
them to fend for themselves and denying them their most basic rights. As such, people 
did not trust them, and believed their money would disappear in a way (bankruptcy) or 
another (theft by the very same functionaries who work in the bank). Rather than taking 
risks with banks, those people who wanted to save their little savings preferred to turn 
to other members of their community who worked as a sort of ‘informal bank’.  
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 A Saving System: ‘Throwing the Card’ 
 
An individual saving system in use during my fieldwork was called ‘throwing the card’ 
(kobwakisa carte). This system did not involve many participants, namely a card holder 
(the card simply being a piece of paper by which transactions are recorded), and a 
second person who would usually be an owner of a small boutique would store the card 
in a safe place, acting like a bank, or a commissioning agent. It was in the boutique that 
s/he stored the money of the creditor. This process had a duplex effect. On one hand, it 
allowed people to save money in what was deemed to be a safe place, as the boutique 
owner was unlikely to disappear without anybody noticing. On the other hand, it 
allowed the owner of the boutique to have some extra money in case of emergencies – 
money that he or she was required to replace before the end of the month, when the 
creditor would collect the money. Although shop owners could always create trouble by 
misusing the cash of their creditors, it was in their interest to keep the clients happy, or 
they would lose their clientele and the income they brought.  
The card worked like a savings account. Following a fixed schedule, the owner 
of the card went to the shop and regularly added an amount to his or her ‘account’, 
which would be recorded on the card. The amount was usually the same every day, and 
varied from CDF 200 to CDF 1,000 ($0.20, $1). I never saw anyone in my 
neighbourhood exceed CDF 2,000 ($2). At the end of the month, the owner would 
receive the money back all in a lump sum, minus what the commissioning agent 
deduced as a payment for his services (usually the equivalent of one day). Like 
likelemba and moziki, this system did not generate any surplus. However, it enabled 
people to store money which would otherwise be spent for family needs. Women 
comprised the vast majority of ‘throwing the card’. They visited stores for grocery 
shopping, and used this system to save money behind the counter. The system allowed 
them, at the end of the month, to buy some stock or to pay some bills.  
 
 Micro Lending through Loan Sharks: Banque Lambert 
 
The above mentioned saving systems did not really assist those in financial crisis. Most 
of the Kinois simply could not resort to banks, as they had neither jobs nor capital to 
secure loan repayments. As such, they found a way to cope with emergencies in the 
informal channels of la cité. When money was needed, people usually asked trusted 
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members of their kin groups. However, kin seldom had sufficient money to support 
those in need – or they simply pretended not to have, in order to avoid late repayments. 
This is why in extreme situations people in need were obliged to resort to non-kin. This 
gave birth to the phenomenon of the Banque Lambert (named after a renowned Belgian 
bank). 
Rather than denoting a place to store and save money (as in the case of banks), 
Banque Lambert denoted a person who functioned as a bank. Anyone who had 
sufficient cash to loan out could act as a Banque Lambert. The amount of money could 
vary from five to hundreds of American dollars51. As people were aware that those who 
resorted to the Banque Lambert system were in urgent need, the person functioning as 
the bank took advantage of the situation by demanding extremely high interest rates.  
Banque Lamberts were a very common loan system in our neighbourhood and 
several people had already resorted to them. Joseph Mutambu had to ask for a loan in 
order to pay the deposit of the parcelle in which we were living all together. In order to 
avoid the interest, we repaid immediately after my arrival, although many people need 
some time before putting together the sum they borrowed.  
In order to better situate these Banque Lamberts within the Kinois social world, 
I shall offer the example of Albert Kayembe, a barber in my neighbourhood, who 
outlines how the formal system failed to provide a living for the Kinois, and how 
people had to resort to the Banque Lambert. Once, while Joseph and I were visiting 
Albert’s barbershop for Joseph’s haircut, he explained why he became a barber: 
Albert: There are many young people that do not work. And because of 
that, they have to find other methods to gain something. In here, 
the situation is serious! We [in my family] are good because...I 
was a teacher. I saw that teaching was no good, so I asked myself 
what am I going to do? As I had already studied aesthetics, I 
tried to find a way to make the teaching and the barber fit 
together, but I saw that did not work as well... Within private 
schools in here, they pay badly, so I left.  
 
Silvia:  How much do they pay? 
[...] 
Joseph:  They pay you $100 per month, you pay for the rent...  
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Albert: With $100 it cannot work... [...] How can I raise my children? 
Meanwhile I started to indebt myself... Do you know the debts of 
today, that if they give you $10 you have to reimburse $15? 
 
Silvia:  Is it? Are interest rates so high? 
 
Albert:  Yes, with a rate of 50%... In here it’s like that.  
 
Silvia:  Even among the family? 
 
Albert: Nooo within the family it’s another thing... As I know my 
relatives, between us there is no problem, he’s my brother... You 
give me $10, you know well that I am going to reimburse you 
without interest rates. But apart from them, if someone comes to 
me [asking to borrow money]... If I give him $10, he gives me 
$15 the following month...  
 
Silvia:  $10, $15... And what if you give him 50 dollars? [...] 
 
Albert: Well, 50%... He gives me $75. They give you $50 and you give 
back $75. 
 
Joseph: There are people that do business only with that, they are called 
‘Banque Lambert’. 
 
Silvia:  Banque Lambert? And what does Lambert mean...? 
 
Albert:  I don’t know, it’s only the term that they use...  
 
Silvia:  This is very interesting... And where are these banks...?  
 
Albert:  Everywhere! 
 
Silvia:  Everywhere? Even in our neighbourhood? 
 
Albert: Yes everywhere, me too, if you come and visit me... You too, if 
you do it, you become Banque Lambert. If there’s someone who 
does it, they call him Banque Lambert. Often you say “I’m going 
to visit that woman who will lend me 5 dollars”, and the person 
you say it to, s/he already knows that you are going to a Banque 
Lambert, and that later you will have to give back more money...  
In here it’s serious! [Ici c’est grave!] 
 
Joseph: Often, as he said, people finish the money before getting the 
payslip... Let’s say that you have $100: often someone can finish 
that $100 even before receiving his salary. He finds himself with 
nothing to eat. So he gets indebted, he goes to the Banque 
Lambert, children cannot stay like that [without anything to 
eat]... “Give me only $5, I’ll give it back to you at the end of the 
month”...and for two days he is ok. Then he sees that it’s not 
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enough, so he goes looking [for other money] somewhere else. 
The day that he gets paid, the money it’s not for food for his 
family, but to pay his debts! 
 
Albert: You’ve got $100, the landlord is harassing you: “It’s already the 
5th of the month, the 10th, where is the rent?” So you go to the 
Banque Lambert and you borrow $50. Every end of the month 
you get $100. You borrow $50 and you know already that at the 
end of the month you have to give back $75. If you think about 
your salary, in the end you are left with $25. You pay $50 for the 
rent. In food, in food you spend every day at least $5. Do the 
math... In a month, or even a week, you see that with that $100... 
[You will not survive]. 
Banque Lambert functioned as a shadow bank. While it took its name from a 
Western institution, it worked outside the network of the state, embedded within the 
informal dealings in la cité. However, the people of la cité who resorted to this type of 
loan struggled to repay their debts. Paradoxically, many Congolese subsequently turned 
to their family members asking for help to repay the high interest rate. Many of them 
thought that their families would not deny them monetary support. Often, however, 
families could not – or simply refused to – help their members. If this occurred, the 
debtor still had a few options. Either he or she could repay the creditor by giving him 
valuables of an amount equivalent to the debt – such as a television or video recorder – 
or they could resort to yet another Banque Lambert to settle their first debts. In some 
cases, the debtor delayed repayments for as long as possible, which prompted the 
creditor to take action by sending the police to the debtor’s home.  
Although Banque Lambert, as an informal agreement, did not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the state, people turned to the police because of their coercive power. By 
paying a little compensation, police would put pressure on the creditor and threaten 
future harassment. If the debtor repaid the debt following the police’s threats, the 
creditor would give a percentage of the repaid money to the police, who had thus 
assumed the work of a commissioning agent. The police, although working for the 
state, often resorted to these types of informal activities in order to supplement their 
salary. Police harassment of the population and punitive expeditions to debtors were 
another clear example of how the public sector and la débrouille cohabited in Kinshasa. 
More and more frequently, the Kinois had to rely on people outside their family 
circles if they wanted to make a living. Villagisation was not always possible in the 
context of Kinshasa, thus people resorted to individual transactions based on the model 
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of bank lending schemes. However, the price to pay for extra-familial assistance was 
high, as a 50% interest rate applied to loans between non-family members. Once again, 
this is evidence of the mistrust that reigned in Kinshasa. Such a high rate seemed to be 
a cautious strategy in this precarious context. The lender was never certain that the 
borrower could return the money in the required time-period. By asking for a 50% 
interest rate to every customer, Banque Lambert was able to cover some of the unpaid 
loans. The more modernised and individualised the debt system, the more exploitative 
and hostile it was. The formalisation of the informal economy was an expensive 
process. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have described some of the mechanisms of la débrouille as they took 
place in the governmental sphere and in everyday life in the suburbs of Kinshasa. This 
analysis helps us understand how structural violence and everyday violence were 
connected, and how they influenced and depended from each other. Although the 
Kinois I interviewed all agreed that the informal economy was unstable and insecure, 
they also agreed that it was a very fruitful income generating system – for many of 
them, the only one they could access. By orally transmitting rules and mores through 
pavement radio, they were able to give a structure to a whole system, la débrouille. Far 
from being a backup in case of temporary crisis of the market economy, la débrouille 
became a phenomenon per se, with its own rules and mechanisms. Once again, the 
Kinois used the mobulu of the state as a catalyst to create an economic system which 
they could master and benefit from. 
At the government level, la débrouille has become a means through which the 
powerful assert their patronage to those below them in a pyramid scheme, while taking 
advantage of the curtain of legality which surrounded the state in order to continue their 
illegal activities undisturbed. Rather than toning down criminality and illegality, 
democratisation and economic liberalisation have created new spaces of privilege.  
At the same time, also among the poor of la cité, the strategies adopted for 
survival were identical to the ones adopted by the leaders to accumulate wealth and 
power. Although ordinary people saw the state as the perpetrator of injustices and 
economic inequalities through its corruption and illegal dealings, they adopted the very 
same strategies to attain success. As the market economy was not able to provide the 
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Congolese with the means of making a living, they sought to exploit leaks in the system 
and constantly renegotiated official rules ‘on the ground’ to earn profit. As such, to put 
it with Petit and Mulumbwa (2005: 483): “[T]rickery allows the little man – or, more 
broadly speaking, ordinary people – to rebalance the situation more favourably for 
themselves: they are simply retrieving what they have lost with the crisis, whose origins 
are attributed to the state and the economic elite, both accused of immoral 
accumulation”. Strategies for survival were products of economic hardship but also 
attempts to impose order from below. 
The boundaries between the formal sector of the State and the informal sector of 
la cité were extremely malleable and porous. Throughout the chapter I have given 
examples of the interpenetration of the two sectors, demonstrating how public servants 
and ordinary people used the same forms of débrouille. The story of Justin Nsenga, the 
assistant professor and REGIDESO employee who used his office in order to collect 
bribes, exemplifies this interpenetration. The informal economy worked according to 
precise rules and mechanisms, as evident in likelemba rotating credit associations and 
in Banque Lambert interest rates. In this sense, the informal economy operated with 
certain mechanisms relative to the formal economy.  
Another example of the interpenetration of legal and illegal in la débrouille can 
be found in one of its nicknames: ‘Article 15: fend for yourselves’ (Article 15: 
débrouillez-vous). Informality and formality, criminality and legality are so intertwined, 
that la débrouille found space in an imaginary Congolese constitution. In Kinshasa the 
distinction between legal and illegal, and formal and informal, was a misleading one, as 
actors easily shifted between those realms according to the situation. Therefore we can 
analyse la débrouille as an ensemble of formal and informal practices which created a 
very distinct activity, rather than simply as a mirror of official economy.  
La débrouille has allowed the population to make do in the face of the hardship 
of everyday life. The majority were trying to do just get by and make it to the next day. 
But what of those few individuals who managed to succeed and become rich? People’s 
success stirred a lot of jealousy within the community abound with rumours of 
accumulation through deeds of witchcraft. This will be developed in depth in chapter 5, 
where I analyse the phenomenon of la magie – the use of witchcraft in order to get rich. 
Before doing this, let us explore another manifestation of mobulu linked to economic 
insecurity: the rise of street gangs called kulunas. 
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- CHAPTER FOUR - 
KULUNAS: VIOLENCE AND INS ECURITY IN THE STREETS OF KINSHASA 
 
One of the greatest anxieties in Kinshasa during my fieldwork concerned the position of 
young men. Through the mobulu of the state, these youths were unable to get formal 
jobs and attain economic independence, and subsequently unable to afford the 
bridewealth required for marriage. Thus, these young men were unable to achieve the 
level of status required to achieve adulthood in Congolese society52. This confined them 
into the liminal position of youth and a status of “prolonged immaturity” (Masquelier 
2005a: 60) which prevented them from progressing up the social hierarchy. In different 
parts of Africa, this “lost generation” (O’Brien 1996) has faced marginalisation and 
unfulfilled adulthood in conditions of instability and deprivation53. As a result, in many 
cases, these disenchanted young people have entered the political space as “saboteurs” 
whom Durham (2000: 118) describes “as political actors whose politics is to open up 
discourses on the nature of society in its broadest and most specific terms”. According 
to Durham (Ibid: 113), the potential of these youths as saboteurs comes from “their 
incomplete subjugation to contexts and co-opters, and to their own power for action, 
response and subversion in contexts of political definition”. However, as I am about to 
explain, young people in Kinshasa did not merely subvert political power, but rather 
appropriated it and transformed it into something else, creating new social practices 
able to lead them into manhood through other avenues.  
Here I draw attention to those disenfranchised young men in Kinshasa who 
would become members of street gangs known as kulunas, engaging in physical 
violence on the streets. Kulunas were one of the main manifestations of mobulu in 
Kinshasa’s everyday scene. Through violence and pillaging, the young men of the 
kuluna street gangs challenged the gerontocratic power hierarchy of society and 
instituted a different path to attain manhood in society. This new model of manhood 
was no longer dependent upon economic independence and marriage, but rather 
through the display of force and the achievement of respect through fights and violence. 
For many of them, violence and criminality became a way not only to se débrouiller, 
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but also to appropriate some of the wealth they believed they were entitled to. Indeed, 
because of economic insecurity, many young people chose to resort to violent criminal 
activities as a means of survival. Thus, insecurity at the economic level resulted in 
mobulu among the population, created by the very same victims of the mobulu of the 
state. Through violence and pillages, the kulunas denounced the socio-economic 
inequalities to which they were subjected and which had marginalised them from the 
social scene, re-entering the stage boldly and aggressively.  
Kuluna gangs were organised on a territorial basis. Members of these gangs 
came from the same neighbourhood – or part of it, such as a section of the area or a 
square. Many young people within the neighbourhood were attracted to join such street 
gangs to attain social prestige among their peers and also for protection: being a 
member of a street gang gave them reassurance that if someone attacked them, 
members of their group would sooner or later take revenge. Being a member of a 
powerful, violent gang implied being feared and respected by the population and 
avoiding hassle from police and even by soldiers, who were often afraid of such gangs.  
The kulunas in many ways mirrored the figure of the soldier. On the one hand, 
they organised themselves according to an internal hierarchy that mimicked military 
ranks. On the other, the population interpreted the actions of kulunas using the 
vocabulary they used to describe raids by armed groups and the military.  
In this chapter I explain how kulunas drew elements from the military to 
empower themselves. In the past decades, military coups, political assassination and 
armed conflict have shaken Kinshasa and the Congo as a who le (as I demonstrated in 
chapters 1 and 2). In the east of the country, thousands of rebel groups and army 
battalions fought for the control of the Kivus, two areas rich in raw minerals. Often it 
was civilians who paid the higher price for these conflicts and rumours of pillaged 
villages, rapes of women and children, and casualties were common knowledge among 
the population of Kinshasa. The military violence which affects the country has highly 
influenced the imaginary of the Kinois in everyday life and many young people have 
found rapid pathways to respect and social status through the figure of the soldier and 
the use of violence. The mobulu of street gangs can be seen as an appropriation and 
transformation of the mobulu of the military against the population. Once again, social 
phenomena at the everyday level and the mobulu that is perpetrated through them 
cannot be understood separately from events at the macro-economic level of structural 
violence. In order to understand the relationship between the kulunas and the soldiers 
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they appeared to mimic, I will now offer a brief summation of anthropological 
discussions of mimicry and mimesis to provide some context for my own contribution 
to this milieu. 
The topic of mimicry and mimesis has provoked interesting debates in recent 
decades. Ferguson, in “Global Shadows” (2006) discusses Jean Rouch’s “Les Maitres 
Fous” (1954), a documentary which illustrated a Hauka dance movement in Niger, in 
which members became possessed by spirits of colonial figures, such as ‘go vernor’, 
‘caporal’s guard’, and ‘lieutenant of the Red Sea’. Ferguson notes that some 
anthropologists interpreted this mimesis as “some combination of parody and 
appropriation” of colonial features, which was part of a broader “resistance to 
colonialism” (Ferguson 2006: 159) and to state power. For example Taussig, he 
continues, described the Hauka movement as “a powerful form of resistance, a veritable 
subversion of the colonial order” (Ferguson 2006: 162).  Ferguson denounced this 
interpretation arguing instead that members of the Hauka movement did not want to 
mock the Whites, nor resist the colonial authority but rather, they wanted to be 
acknowledged as members of the “world society” (Ibid: 164), and to be considered 
worthy of respect and rights like the whites. Hence, according to Ferguson, acts of 
mimesis do not merely amount to appropriation: they also signify denunciation54.  
In my opinion, Ferguson’s approach risks underestimating the power of mimesis 
and displaying a narrow view of people involved in such mimetic appropriation. The 
Congolese did not only mimic the whites – or the postcolonial state – to denounce their 
status as passive subjects in the face of the powerful. I find myself agreeing with a 
number of anthropologists55 who view mimesis as a central aspect of transformation. 
As Argenti (1998: 774) argues: “The ultimate aim of mimetic activity is paradoxically 
the transformation of the object of mimesis. Mimesis marks the addition of an extra 
element – a supplement – to the exemplar; it signals a process of change”. Argenti 
(Ibid) explains this transformation with reference to a youth dance group from the 
Grassfield of Cameroon known as ‘Air Youth’. In their performances, members of Air 
Youth appropriated styles of movement, gesture and clothing proper of the colonial 
Gendarmes. However, these young people did not openly acknowledge the link 
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between the figure of the Gendarme and the uniforms of their performances. They 
simply used the habitus of their oppressors in their bodily practices, without making 
any rational connection to their terrifying actions. To quote Argenti (1998: 774): “Air 
Youth representations might be, however, more subversive precisely because their 
exemplar is not immediately discernible in the representation, and because new images 
arise out of the embodiment of the primary images of state power and violence”. Old 
images can thus be used to produce new social phenomena. 
Moore (2011) picks up on Argenti’s (2007: 28) analysis of mimesis as 
something that “is not imitative, it is new”. In an example, she explains how students in 
Nairobi found ‘lessons for living’ in some television series and film. These ‘lessons’, 
rather than speaking of appropriation, affirmation or mimicry, provided: “[N]ew 
languages of self-description, ways of imagining and handling intimate relations (often 
through examples of how not to do it), additional images of self-representation, 
mechanisms for resolving moral puzzlement [...] and how to create and live a life of 
value” (Moore 2011, ch. 3, section 4, para 2). In an analogue example, she analyses 
Lisa Rofel’s (2007) description of how people used the media, public discourses and 
images of modern commodities in order to reframe aspects of self and the world. Also 
in this case, Moore (Ibid) observed that people who learned lessons of living through 
the media, do not appropriate nor simply mimic certain behaviours. She explains: “The 
protagonists are not trying to be the same as the images or individuals they see or hear 
or read about; rather they are trying to see themselves in them, exploring affective 
dispositions, thinking through the potentialities they are offered” (Moore 2011, ch. 3, 
section 4, para 2). The media, images of other realities and other worlds allow young 
people to transform themselves in something different, and build their selves and their 
worlds in between the local and the global.  
Kuluna gangs drew a clear link with the military world. Yet by appropriating 
the language and ethics of the military, they did not merely reproduce the subject of 
their mimesis, but rather produced a whole new symbolic world which allowed them to 
reposition themselves in the streets of la cité. In fact, kulunas were originally born out 
of the attempts of young men to defend their territory and women from external attacks. 
However, like the Congolese military which was originally established for protection 
but soon became a perpetrator of mobulu, the kulunas transformed themselves from 
protectors into predators. Among kuluna groups, who first mimicked the military and 
subsequently its negligence, a transformation within the transformation occurred, that 
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we can term a “mimetic excess”, to use Taussig’s (1993: 252) definition. This mimetic 
excess allowed them to “double yet double endlessly, to become any Other and engage 
the[ir] image with the reality thus imagined” (Ibid: 255). In this manner, kulunas 
created a new figure which could fit in the local social context of la cité. 
The chapter is divided in three parts. The first introduces the context of crime 
and insecurity of la cité. In this section I also introduce the figure of the ‘fake soldier’, 
who were armed thieves dressed in military uniforms, who terrorised the population at 
night. In this violent context, young people living in the same neighbourhood joined 
forces, creating local gangs to protect their territory from bandit attacks. The second 
part analyses how kulunas initially played the role of protectors of local neighbourhood. 
However, like the military, kuluna groups eventually created insecurity among those 
whom they sought to protect. The third part analyses perpetration of crimes by kulunas 
in depth. Not only were kulunas described as violent bandits who destabilised entire 
neighbourhoods, but they were also believed to cooperate with the military and the 
police in securing bribes. In conclusion, the kulunas’ mimicry of military mobulu 
created new spaces for social life and coping strategies.  
 
The Local Context of Crime 
 
There was an unofficial curfew in Maman Yemo. By 8.30pm most people were at 
home, with the gates of the parcelles locked, and their doors shut.  The frequent 
electricity black outs and cable robberies that often left the entire neighbourhood in the 
dark meant that the neighbourhood of Maman Yemo was a recurrent target for thieves 
(moyibi sg., miyibi pl. in Lingala). Some of them were opportunistic thieves, pushed to 
theft by hunger or desperation. Such thieves would break into homes to take whatever 
they could resell on the black market – curtains, televisions, plastic chairs, and so on. A 
barber shop in our neighbourhood was robbed twice. The first time, thieves stole a 
small television and the curtains, while the second time they took five plastic chairs.  
Alpha Mumbela, hired as our sentinel to keep watch over our parcelle, also 
became victim of a robbery. Alpha lived in a nearby neighbourhood called DGC, with 
his pregnant wife and a two-year old child. One night, he left home around 10pm to 
come to our parcelle. Someone had studied his movements because soon after he left, 
four young men broke down the rear wall of the house with hammers – their 
hammering drowned out by the loud music from a nearby bar. They entered directly 
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into Alpha’s room, taking his television and video player. However, improvised thieves 
such as these, often argued over their share of the booty and inequalities in the 
distribution created tensions within these groups. The bandits who received the worst 
deal eventually vented their frustration by moaning among friends, and rumours of the 
robbery spread. 
A week later, an old friend of Alpha’s knocked at his door and told him that he 
had heard rumours about who the thieves might be. Following this encounter, Alpha 
visited a ‘recreation room’ 56  (esika ya kosakana, or esika ya masano) not far from 
DGC. Alpha looked around and recognised his television which he had previously 
marked with a knife on one side. After a long discussion with the young man in charge 
of the recreation room, Alpha demanded that his television and video-player be 
returned that evening or he would report him to the police. Alpha retrieved his 
possessions but was left to pay to repair his wall.  
Stories like Alpha’s illustrate that often those who conducted such robberies 
were related in some way to their victims. Often, thieves relied on information of spies 
who knew the habits of their victims, contributing to a significant lack of trust among 
the Kinois57. 
 In addition to the opportunistic thieves, there were more organised armed 
thieves roaming the streets at night. These thieves dressed in military uniforms and 
carried rifles or shotguns, mimicking the weapons used by the Congolese security 
forces and the police. As such, it was difficult to distinguish them from real soldiers. 
Once they had chosen their targets, these thieves entered people’s homes, threatening to 
kill anyone who did not co-operate58. Such thieves were called ‘fake soldiers’ (faux 
militaries or basoda ya lukuta) by the population of la cité. This phenomenon was 
particularly common in the neighbourhood of Maman Yemo, as the next examples 
illustrate. 
In an episode on 2 June 2011, six men in uniforms forced their way into the 
house of Jacques Kinyongo, the owner of a bread stall, who lived just next to Maman 
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 A store where young people could play video games. 
57
 This concept of the thief as a ‘betrayer’, as someone close enough to you to know your moves and 
attack you accordingly, is an interesting parallel with the world of witchcraft. As I will explain in 
the next chapter, according to the Kinois, the witch made use of other subordinated witches, a sort 
of ‘witch-commissionaires’, in order to infiltrate a family and ‘eat’ its members. In both cases, the 
danger came from someone very close to you. 
58
 People were often beaten or killed as a result of resistance against thieves, although I never heard 
about rapes occurring in the houses the thieves visited. 
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Yemo’s square, a few parcelles from ours. That night, Jacques was guarding another 
parcelle to make some extra money, while his wife, Carine Monssengo, was left at 
home alone with the children. It was 11pm, and the streets were still populated by a few 
dwellers. However, nobody dared to stop six men when they entered the house, waking 
up Carine with the accusation that she was hiding bandits. After some time it became 
clear that the men were after money rather than criminals. However, Carine had no cash 
on her and the soldiers left empty-handed and angry. Four of them returned a few 
nights later, threatening to cut her feet59 if she did not confess about hiding bandits (or 
pay a bribe). Carine was unshakable and refused to pay, hence putting her life, and 
those of her children, at risk. This time the men in uniform also left without inflicting 
harm. On both occasions, Carine called the police, urging them to do something, but 
they replied they could not leave the police station or they would get killed. The 
situation worsened toward the end of my stay when there were two separate cases 
within a month of each other, of armed men killing a teenager in a street close to 
Maman Yemo’s square because they refused to hand over their mobile phone and 
pocket money. 
‘Fake soldiers’ is a nickname that denoted both bandits who dressed up like 
soldiers to carried out robberies, and also soldiers who perpetrated violence against the 
population. All the civilians I interviewed perceived soldiers as perpetrators of violence 
rather than protectors. This had been caused in part by the economic crisis leading to 
the insecurity of wages and the inability of the government to keep a hold on its 
security forces. Many soldiers took advantage of their uniforms and their weapons to 
instil fear among the population and engage in la débrouille through threats, robberies 
and beatings. Thus, rather than protecting the citizens from thieves and criminals, 
soldiers were the first cause of insecurity in town. “Fake soldiers are mobulu” (faux 
militaries baza mobulu), some Kinois would tell after recalling episodes of violence at 
their hands. The mobulu of fake soldiers was not only the physical threats they posed to 
the population but also the psychological burden and the atmosphere of insecurity they 
had to bear on a daily basis. People would be careful to avoid crossing paths with 
soldiers at night, because they knew that, in most cases, they would be stopped and 
harassed.  
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 Mobility was essential to young people’s survival and débrouille, therefore cutting off feet was 
possible the worst threat for the people of la cité. 
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The refusals of the police and security forces in general to intervene, left the 
Kinois with limited options to address mobulu in the neighbourhood – often caused by 
the same people in charge of protecting them. Their only recourse became young 
people’s gangs, which kept away thieves and fake soldiers through intimidation and 
further mobulu. Thus in the next section I shall explain how kuluna gangs arose from 
the need of young men to defend their territories from external attacks, as well as from 
the possibility to earn wealth through punishing other gangs by pillaging their territory. 
In this sense, kulunas’ attacks were yet another aspect of la débrouille of Kinshasa. 
 
The Origins of Kulunas  
 
Street banditry was not a new phenomenon in Kinshasa. During the 1950s, street gangs 
called the bills, who I explored in chapter 2, influenced by the Cowboy movies60 , 
roamed the streets. Many of the gang’s members also practiced martial arts which 
enabled them to physically compete over territory and girls (Gondola 2009). 
According to Eric Bakaji, a friend of mine who was a member of one of these 
gangs thirty years ago, the term yankee replaced the word kibill in denoting street 
banditry at the end of the 1970s. This appellation was still fresh in people’s minds at the 
time of my stay. While I was talking with my friend Joseph about the term yankee, he 
stressed that it was still used today as a synonym for kuluna: 
Silvia:  So... There are kulunas. And who are these yankees then? 
 
Joseph: The yankees are kulunas, yankees have no fear. They take drugs 
openly. They put their hands in your pocket... It’s not as if it’s 
the two of us and I take you and I abuse you. You are all 
chatting, the three, four of you, I come and I take you by force. 
Or I put my hand in your pocket. Openly! And if you try to 
complain, I wound you or also I kill you.  
Since the turn of the 21st Century, the term kuluna (plural bakuluna but also les 
kulunas or kuluneurs) has been used to refer to a recent form of banditry on the streets 
of Kinshasa. Despite the variations in the stories of those I interviewed, there were a 
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 On the role of the media in influencing young people’s imaginary see also Bazenguissa-Ganga 
(1999). 
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few patterns that characterised the kulunas. Kulunas were young people 61  who 
organised themselves in stables (écuries 62) or ‘battalions’, formed on the basis of 
territory, loyalty and common objectives. The size of these stables varied from small 
groups of ten to larger groups of fifty or sixty. The more renowned a group, the more 
likely it would attract young people of different ages – many in their early teens, who 
sought social recognition inside the neighbourhood, and protection from the harassment 
of other gangs. From this brief description we can see that the kuluna gangs inherited 
many traits of the bills and yankees.  
Many of my informants said that at the beginning of the phenomenon, kulunas 
behaved according to the same code of the bills, who emulate[d] the moral high ground 
of Western actors displaying heroism, bravery, and defence of the weak. As such, 
kuluna gangs also served as protectors of the weak in their neighbourhoods. Kulunas 
were ‘strong men’ (batu pomba63) who trained themselves through sports like boxing 
and martial arts. As one of my neighbours explained to me: 
All kulunas started as sportsmen [sportifs]. They made themselves able to 
defend themselves. Not all the sportsmen are kulunas, but all kulunas are 
sportsmen. 
In the gyms of la cité (called dojos, Japanese for martial art training centres) 
young people trained their body to become strong men (batu pomba), influenced 
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 Although none of the Kinois I interviewed mentioned gangs of girls, Elongo & Lofoso (2008) in 
their article mention two écuries of kuluna-girls in Barumbu: the Red Ants (Fourmis Rouge) and the 
Baby Bottle (Biberon). Furthermore, La Fontaine (1970b:203) points out that although Bill street-
gangs were formed mainly by boys, some girls of the neighbourhood were considered in all respects 
members of the gang. During my fieldwork, although the girlfriends of some kulunas were 
considered members of the gang, they did not take part in fights and pillaging activities.  Thus, this 
chapter will be mainly focussed on young men.  
62
 During my fieldwork, écurie was used to signify groups of young people with a common purpose. 
So kulunas were not the only ones to be organised in stables. There were also stables of street-
children, while De Boeck (1999) highlights that also the diamond diggers who worked in group in 
mine sites were organised in écuries.  
63
 Pomba (strong) is the adjective used for people who instil fear and respect because of their 
physical aspect. Some of my research participants traced the term pomba back to the Portuguese 
word pombeiro, which denotes those local peddlers who exchanged European goods for slaves 
during pre-colonial times (see ch. 3, footnote 47). We could thus compare the fights against batu 
pomba to a memory of the slave trade, during which pombeiros were in competition with each other 
to bring slaves to the colonialists, and increase their social status. It seems that, as Argenti writes, 
“the appropriation of the state in its various forms represents the continuation of a long-standing 
process” (1998:772). As for the commissioning agents described in chapter 3, the batu pomba are 
not a phenomenon born in opposition to the state. Rather, these men have appropriated a figure of 
power typical of the early colonial state and they use to subvert socially accepted rules of behaviour.  
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largely by American Wrestling matches on TV and action movies featuring Jackie 
Chan, Sylvester Stallone, Arnold Schwarzenegger and Bruce Lee. Martial Arts and 
boxing were not seen merely as a sport activity per se, but rather as one of the most 
successful means of gaining respect in the neighbourhood. Rather than trying to 
explicitly recreate the imagery of masculinity showed in the action movies, kulunas 
aimed to create different forms of sociality and prestige through emulating these 
images. 
Kulunas had strong territorial identity. All members of a given group would be 
from the same neighbourhood and discouraged others from venturing into their territory 
and causing trouble. As such, kulunas were first conceived as defence squads that 
protected their areas from thieves and other kuluna groups. Pablo Bashala, a sixteen-
year old ex-kuluna who managed to quit the group by joining a Non-Governmental 
Organisation education programme with some friends, explained to me the logic of 
violence and protection behind kuluna groups in his neighbourhood: 
Pablo: Here in Kauka there are several stables. The strongest are the 
‘Soviets’ [‘Sovietiques]’. They’re like a group of people very 
clean, very well dressed, they were like a staff [staff64] of young 
people who dressed well... Inside that group there were good 
players, they did good matches... [...] When they went to do 
competitions, matches, starting from there, brawling broke out... 
For example someone had loved a girl of another team... And 
they would start like that. In the group there was an old man, 
very old, they called him ‘the founder of the Soviets’ [‘Fondá 
Sovietiques’], who started to recruit the boys. These boys then 
became both staff and stable. He started to convert the children 
and to say: “Those who will harass us, we will beat them”. They 
created their base on the other side of Kauka. All passers-by, 
some young guys, would be called, they would be asked where 
they live... If you are not from the neighbourhood but from 
another one, they take your clothes, your watch, they take 
everything away from you. Most of the times, when they collect 
money from young people, they start to buy white weapons, like 
knives, etc. When the victim goes back to his/her neighbourhood, 
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 In 2007, Pype described the staffeurs (members of a staff) as the descendants of the sapeurs, the 
well-dressing people of the 1970s and 1980s. Although the staffeurs did not wear European designer 
clothes like the sapeurs, they too used to go out and party with expensive girls, displaying their 
wealth, fine clothes and lavish accessories in clubs and bars. Staffeurs as such saw themselves in 
contrast with sportsmen and young people who engaged in fights, as they incarnated two different 
models of masculinity (Pype 2007). However, as Pablo’s interview shows, at the time of my 
research, groups of staffeurs and kulunas’ stables influenced each other’s masculinity: staffeurs 
started to perpetrate a masculinity based on bodily capital typical of the street gangs, while some 
kulunas adopted a cult of clothes and ostentation typical of the staffeurs. 
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s/he informs that in Kauka they did this this and that... And the 
others prepare themselves [for the fight]. How does the group 
become bigger? The young people of a neighbourhood, when 
they see that their stable  [of their neighbourhood] becomes 
bigger, they are pleased with that, and they can also come 
spontaneously, also students, to give money in order to buy 
‘white weapons’.  
 
Silvia:  Why? 
 
Pablo: It’s to protect themselves. If there’s someone who wants to attack 
[you], they will come and help you out, as you gave them some 
money. It’s for protection.  
In a style reminiscent of the Sicilian mafia (Gambetta 1996), kulunas were 
described primarily as protectors, with members of the neighbourhood being required 
to pay money not only for protection against other gangs, but also to avoid being 
robbed by the gangs of their own neighbourhood. Local residents had no choice. 
Security would have come whether they wanted it or not, and it came at a price.  
Many informants described kulunas as representing and standing up for their 
neighbourhoods. Thérèse Kabasele, a young woman who worked for a Non-
Governmental Organisation that takes care of street-children, told me that at the 
beginning, the kulunas were only encountered in a few areas. Kulunas were not thieves, 
but they were strong men (batu pomba) who practiced sports such as martial arts or 
boxing and who demonstrated their force in organised matches. She told me that some 
of the first strong men to develop into violent kulunas lived around Yolo, a 
neighbourhood in the commune of Kalamu. At some point, a bridge was built to allow 
people to cross the stream which separated Yolo from the adjacent neighbourhood. 
People who wanted to cross the bridge had to pay a toll, either to the inhabitants of 
Yolo or to the inhabitants of the other neighbourhood – and often to both of them. It 
was conflict over the ownership of the toll money which eventually triggered a fight 
between ‘strong men’ (batu pomba) of the two neighbourhoods. The war between the 
strong men extended to their families and friends, and spread like wildfire to other ‘hot 
spots’ of the city. Thérèse concluded by saying that the kulunas were now considered to 
be as dangerous as thieves and witches (bandoki). 
Analysing the words of Pablo and Thérèse above, we can say that the kulunas 
were born as a new social phenomenon, which united young people’s quest for social 
recognition obtained through the strategy of la débrouille. Defending their property was 
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important not only to affirm themselves in the neighbourhood but also to ensure tha t no 
other kuluna stables got ahead of them in accumulating wealth – let alone by robbing 
their own territory. Indeed, gangs acquired power with territory: the more territory they 
controlled, the more members they attracted.  
Although kulunas were conceived as groups of young people fighting to defend 
their territory, they soon became known for the violence of their fights and attacks 
against civilians. In the next section I shall highlight the rationale behind young 
people’s violence and their quest for manhood through the (mis)use of force.  
 
Violence, Bodily Capital and Masculinity 
 
On one hand kulunas were responsible for protecting their neighbourhoods from the 
attacks of rival gangs, on the other, they were engaged in fights with rival gangs for 
territorial supremacy and therefore responsible for bringing violence into the 
neighbourhood in the first instance. In order to increase their influence, gangs often 
engaged in fights which took place at night in public spaces – such as football fields, 
school courtyards, squares and so on. Gangs also clashed when one of their members 
ventured into enemy territory. Clashes in such cases happened in spontaneous ways, 
such as on the streets next to commercial enterprises or people’s homes. When these 
spontaneous clashes occurred, kulunas took advantage of the frenzy to pillage shops 
(boutiques), small stalls and even people’s homes. According to local women, the 
arrival of kulunas sounded like the arrival of an armed force. They systematically 
passed through a street or a market and took whatever they found. They confiscated 
mobile phones, jewellery, bags, and might even kill if someone refused to give them 
what they wanted. During their raids, members of these gangs were armed with ‘white 
weapons’ (armes blanches, meaning knives, broken bottles, razorblades and sticks) and 
did not hesitate to use them against other kulunas or against civilians. The population 
was terrorised by the actions of these gangs: rumours and gossip of their deeds were 
told at every corner of the street, with new, atrocious elements added to the plot every 
time. Stories of kulunas were so violent that it is worthy reproducing one of them. The 
following story of a kuluna fight was told to me by a police officer in Limete, who was 
investigating the case. 
I met Thibault Mukwaya following one of my fieldtrips around Kinshasa’s 
cités. Joseph and I were in Masina, a neighbourhood in eastern Kinshasa, and I had just 
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finished an interview with some relatives of a child accused of witchcraft. It was 6 in 
the afternoon, and it was getting dark. The father of the child insisted on taking me and 
Joseph to catch the bus, and admonished us to be careful while walking around town at 
night. He had witnessed kuluna attacks in his neighbourhood but always managed to 
escape before they could attack him. He explained that the situation was getting worse 
day by day. He knew a police officer in the neighbourhood of Limete (a distant 
relative) who used to update him on the latest cases he investigated. After begging him, 
he agreed to introduce us to the officer the following day. Joseph and I travelled to 
Matonge, where Officer Thibault Mukwaya lived, and were invited to sit under a tree in 
his courtyard, where he began the story. 
On September 2010, members of the gang Nkunda65 in Masina abducted and 
raped the girlfriend of one member of the gang New Jack 66  of the neighbouring 
Kingabwa. A few days later the girl escaped and managed to return to her 
neighbourhood alive, although members of Nkunda had cut off one of her ears. She was 
taken to a private clinic in la cité of Kingabwa, and started her slow recovery. The 
kulunas of New Jack  in Kingabwa were furious. It was not a good time for the gang. 
They already had enough problems with the new head of the police, whom the people 
of Kingabwa had nicknamed Bothersome (Mal à l'aise) for his violent reprisals against 
kulunas. Due to the actions of Bothersome New Jack had already lost two of its fiercest 
members, who had been captured while they returned to the gang’s headquarter with 
their booty. New Jack had to fight to avenge their loss.  
In order to buy more ‘white weapons’ for the fight against Nkunda, they started 
to harass the people of their own neighbourhood, robbing them and applying taxation to 
those who passed through ‘their’ street. One night, they finally ventured into Masina 
with machetes and broken bottles. They went to the central market, called ‘the Market 
of Freedom’ (Marché de la Liberté) where they knew they would find some members 
of Nkunda. The fight did not last long. They managed to injure many Nkunda members, 
some of them quite seriously, and dispersed before more of them could gather. They 
even managed to capture two street girls, believed to be linked to Nkunda, and 
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 This name was inspired by a former General of the Congolese national army Laurent Nkunda, 
who later became a rebel and warlord in the Kivus area, in the east of the country. In 2008, Nkunda 
was deemed responsible for atrocious violence against civilians in the Kivus. In 2009, the Rwandese 
government decided to arrest Nkunda, to calm rumours that suggested any involvement of the 
Rwandan government with the warlord operations in Eastern Congo. 
66
 This gang were named after a famous American wrestler. 
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repeatedly raped them before leaving them unconscious in a quiet area between the two 
neighbourhoods. Both New Jack and Nkunda pillaged around the market – considering 
the booty as a contribution to support their fights to protect the neighbourhood. In 
response, Nkunda invaded Kingabwa a few weeks later to revenge the offence, 
pillaging shops and small boutiques on the streets.  
Here we can see how the kulunas spread mobulu in the streets of Kinshasa. 
These street gangs shared many attributes with the kibills and yankees of previous 
decades, and with the sportsmen (sportifs) who trained their bodies in the gym. With 
the former they shared a masculinity of delinquency and territorialism, informed by the 
media, and with the latter they shared a masculinity of physical force and bodily 
capital. In fact, it is through the body that kulunas, like sportsmen in other parts of 
Africa67, achieved personal recognition. This was also stressed by Bernard Vangu, a 
fifty-year old carpenter that I met while I was looking for some furniture for my home 
in Maman Yemo: 
Kuluna is banditry, it is the failure of the Congolese state. The state is 
responsible, it does not educate. A boy who wants to feel like a man, he is not 
educated... Even the surroundings have some influence on the person... The 
boys, to feel big, start to beat people up. They take people’s things by force.  
As the social status of unemployed and uneducated young people could not be 
affirmed through the same parameters as that of adults (economic independence and 
household creation), or through success at school, they relied on the only resources they 
could utilise: the control over their personal attributes and actions. The body and its 
surface has become the most prominent vehicle of manhood and self- fashioning among 
the kulunas 68 . Following Diouf’s (2003) discussion on the symbolic value of the 
masculine sexual organ, we can say that physical strength “seem[s] to bear (in the 
literal and figurative sense) the economic and social dream of success and the 
nightmares of failure” (p.10).  
In Kinshasa, adults resented the elements that defined kulunas (heavily 
drinking, smoking cannnabis, raping girls). As Diouf (2003: 9) highlights, “sex and 
violence become rites of passage and initiation which [...] produce a historic ity of 
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 See for example Havard (2001). 
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 On the subject of body modification and on the re-fashioning of the self through the body, see 
Featherstone (2000, 2010); Masquelier (2005b). 
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dissidence and dissent”. Within kuluna gangs, the display of physical force and the use 
of violence became an avenue for affirming social prestige out of the forms of manhood 
and adulthood imposed by society, which expected adults to be wage earners, married 
and pater familias69. Violence and anti-social behaviour seemed to split the continuum 
between youth and adulthood and also to distinguish between different kinds of youths 
– uneducated and unemployed boys from successful students and young working men.  
The street was a melting pot of different kinds of young people, such as street 
children, gang members, students, and so on. Thus, kuluna gangs, as groups based on 
territorial membership, were able to gather boys and girls with different backgrounds 
and occupations. Despite this, and although categorising risks crystallizing young 
people into categories without acknowledging their fluidity, there was a pervasive 
distinction between kuluna gangs and street children (bashegues). Street children, who 
were also organised in stables, sometimes became involved when kuluna fought against 
each other, but their ethics differed and was not characterised by a systematic use of 
violence. Some street-children I spoke to in the municipality of Bandal highlighted that 
kulunas, unlike the bashegue, often were ‘children of the home’ (belesi70), youngsters 
who regularly slept at home and had a family to support them.  
Kuluna gangs drew on elements from both previous manifestations of street 
gangs and from the masculinity of the sportsmen. But they have also mimicked 
elements of the military groups. When talking about the kulunas, the Kinois drew many 
parallels between the street gangs and the military. The figure of the soldier featured 
prominently in the imaginary both of kulunas and other Kinois. Kulunas appropriated 
military languages and codes, often collaborating with state officials and security forces 
through the exchange of gifts and bribes. This interplay has been so profound that some 
Kinois – both in the street as well as in the local medias, during discussion forums at 
the radio – used the word kuluna to describe some members of the Congolese state, as I 
shall explain in the next sections. 
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 On the same note, see Masquelier (2005a) and O’Brien (1996). 
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 De Boeck (2005a) explains how belesi derives from Belgique (Belgium), the name of one 
neighbourhood of la cité during colonial times, and denotes today la cité more in general. 
Furthermore, he explains how the Kinois also used belesi to refer to the colonial modern housing 
constructions, made of bricks and corrugated irons (Ibid: 200). From this point of view, we can see 
how the development of the word has followed a precise pattern of domesticity, from the wider idea 
of la cité to the single inhabitant of the house. 
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Kulunas: in Need of Military Metaphors 
 
Already in the 1960s, the kibills were inspired by political and military events which 
occurred across the Congo (Gondola 2009: 91). Names of the gangs (such as ONU, 
URSS, Ambassade de Juifs – the Embassy of Jews, Okinawa) reflected the international 
attention that was directed towards the Congo in the years after Independence. The 
language used among the kibills included a number of military terms such as “‘curfew’ 
in their ‘republics’, their creation of ‘township governments’ and ‘local militias’” (Ibid: 
92). Argenti (1998) also noted how in the Grassfields of Cameroon, “attempts [...] to 
appropriate and thereby re-invent foreign sources of power have often had a belligerent 
dimension” (Ibid: 769). My aim in this section is to illustrate how the appropriation of 
the symbolic power of the military by young people has developed and how even the 
population started to link together the kulunas with the military. 
Kulunas chose their names according to several parameters, each of which were 
connected to the notion of ‘power’. As such, many stables drew their names from 
notions of violence and war: the Machetes-Machetes (Mbeli-Mbeli), the Cut-Cut (Kata-
kata), the Red Army (Armée Rouge), the Black Army (Armée Noir), the Rebels 
(Barebel), the Integrated (Baintégrés), the FARDC (Congolese army) and the Zulus (les 
Zoulous). As we can see, many of these names are drawn from military figures and 
elements that recall the violent clashes happening at the borders of the Congo. On the 
same note, other kuluna gangs drew their names from the realm of the forest, where 
armed groups fought over the control of the territory, for example the Red Ants ( les 
Fourmis Rouges) and the Provoking Lions (Provoquer Lions) (Elongo & Lofoso 2008). 
The nicknames that some street youth chose for themselves also showed an acute 
awareness of local and global notions of political power. During fieldwork, I met young 
men called Issa (from USA), Zulu, Reghen (Reagan), Enoch Kabila, and Bemba.  
The adoption of a military ideology was not only present in the names of 
stables, or the nicknames of their members. The hierarchical internal organisation of the 
stables recalled the structure of the military and government, as Heritier Mbiye, a 
young kuluna, highlighted: 
Silvia: Is there only one who is in charge or are there more than one 
[within the stable]? 
Heritier: A big one! A big one, the strongest. It’s like in our country, there 
is the head...the head, then for example there is the prime 
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minister... Those who have the technique go to pillage, they are 
the strongest usually. The weakest go to pick up the makala 
(charcoal) in order to resell it, things like that.  
On the same note, a couple of brothers living in Camp Munganga during my 
stay, Etienne and Tati Misutidi, used military ranks to show off and brag about 
themselves: 
Silvia: So do you like fighting? Or are you scared? I bet it’s very 
dangerous... 
 
Etienne: Of course I’m not, look at me [showing off his muscles]. Touch! 
Touch! 
 
Tati: He’ s strong! [Aza pomba!] If you make him angry... Eh..! He is 
the supreme chief [chef major] of the kulunas! [laughing] 
Street gangs were organised with a chief at the head of the structure, who had 
gained his place by virtue of his physical supremacy and victories in fights against 
other members. Below the chief there were usually one or more deputies who were 
charged with different responsibilities such as collecting revenues, organising events, 
and controlling groups. Gang members gave their revenues to the chief on a regular 
basis, who kept an amount for himself and then redistributed a small amount to the rest 
of the gang. This recalled the procedure of redistribution within armed groups in the 
East as described by Jourdan (2004), who did research in the Kivu region among Ma yi 
Mayi combatants. As he explains: “In most of the cases, the commanders lead their 
young combatants on to pillage and then the booty is shared out according to rank 
hierarchy and age” (Jourdan 2004: 164). Moreover, as I have showed in chapter 3, 
clientelistic networks within the government worked according to a similar logic. Just 
as the colonel who distributed the money assigned for the office maintenance among 
his staff, kuluna gangs distributed money down from the chief to ordinary members in 
an analogous way. Again, mechanisms of redistribution connected the leaders of the 
kulunas with the elites of the government, and the armed groups fighting in the forest.  
Furthermore, the fights among different stables over territories, the relationship 
of terror which they established with populations and the techniques they used, recalled 
the operations of military groups at the borders of the country. Bands of criminals 
engaged in an “economy of pillage” (Willame 1984: 84, my translation from French), 
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similar not only to armed groups in the forest but also to that of soldiers who pillaged 
government offices and private shops to protest against irregular and low wages in 
Kinshasa in 1991 and 1993.  
One afternoon I went to visit Céline Kimbelekete, a mother of five who lived in 
the neighbourhood of Selembao. Celine had a stall in a street of his neighbourhood, 
where she sold vegetables, charcoal and other goods necessary for people’s everyday 
survival in la cité. Unfortunately, her business was not going too well, as she was 
attacked twice by a kuluna band and was obliged to flee not to be hurt. However, the 
phenomenon of kulunas and the mobulu they cause was so normal for people in la cité, 
that she considered it only another daily struggle, to add to the economic insecurity and 
daily sacrifices. Curiously, to describe their actions, Céline used a language which 
recalled the infamous actions of the army in the east of the country: 
Céline: You know kulunas? They are damaged children [enfants 
abîmés]... Children when they see something on the street, they 
take everything and then leave. 
Silvia:  Are there kulunas also in this neighbourhood? 
Céline: There are! They can fight and fight and when you go to watch, 
they come inside the house, they run together on the street, they 
pillage everything and then leave.  
On the same note, an old man living in Masina whom I was interviewing in 
relation to the phenomenon of the street-children, started to complain about the 
insecurity of everyday life in his neighbourhood – one of the most populated and 
turbulent of Kinshasa. When he mentioned the kulunas and I asked him who they were, 
he replied: 
Kulunas do combat between gangs among themselves in the neighbourhoods... 
Others stay in the corners and steal bags or mobile phones to people... It’s like 
an armed pillage... 
And even a twelve-year old girl, Adèle Mobimba, who was abandoned by her 
family because of witchcraft allegations, used the same language to describe the 
kulunas: 
Kulunas... They like violence. They come at night and fight. They can come to 
your home, take the money of the school fees [minerval], rape women...like 
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Bemba71’s soldiers! Bemba’s soldiers used to rape and grind children like pondu 
[manioc leaf stew]... 
In the eyes of the population, kulunas operated similarly to armed groups, 
advancing in the field like an army and pillaging whatever they found on their way. 
According to one of my participants, the word kuluna itself derives from the Portuguese 
coluna (column in English), which recalls a military platoon, advancing in the forest 
before engaging in combat. The same man was of the opinion that the children of 
Lunda (bana Lunda), young men who travelled to a diamond-rich province in Angola 
in search of success72, brought the expression to Kinshasa. These men and women who 
had to cross the border with Angola, often encountered columns of Angolan soldiers 
who searched, raped and tortured them in search of diamonds to be smuggled into 
Congo.  
If on one hand, kulunas drew from the world of the military in order to 
empower themselves, on the other hand, security forces and members of the 
government drew from kuluna gangs in order to secure bribes and increase their 
political power. Again, relationships between the two seemed to work through mutual 
cooperation, as I shall explain in the next section.  
 
Security Forces and Kulunas: a Profitable Co-operation 
 
During my research, I was struck by the accounts of some Congolese, who detailed 
stories of how some kuluna stables ceased to exist because some members got married 
and found a job which earned them money, while others found roles within the army. I 
wondered how could those once perceived as bandits be accepted among soldiers, 
among those who fought against them? This political technique dates back to the 
regime of Mobutu, who sought to gain better control of the population by employing 
the actors deemed responsible for disruption to his regime (among which were some 
former bills) and integrating them in his own patronage networks. Having a well-known 
                                                 
71
 Bemba, the leader of the opposition in the presidential elections of 2007, is now held in custody 
by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in La Hague for crimes against humanity committed 
against 2002 and 2003. 
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 De Boeck (2011a; 2011b) agrees that the term kuluna references the column of soldiers forming a 
line and penetrating new territories through the forests of Northern Angola. However, he also adds 
that the term “derives from the Lingala verb kolona, which means: to plant, to sow, to cultivate”, the 
verb itself being a derivative of the French word ‘colonne’ (2011a: 82). 
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bandit within army lines could provide crucial information on the activity of other 
gangs. Writing about the bills of the 1950s, Gondola (2009: footnote 82) noted that: 
Many older bills, such as Vieux Billy, were co-opted within Mobutu’s incipient 
regime. They made up the backbone of Mobutu’s CVR [Voluntary Corps of the 
Republic], the precursor to Zaire’s youth party (JMPR) [the official party youth 
movement]. According to Paul Kabaidi (interview, Brussels, April 6, 2006), a 
former bill himself who was appointed governor of Kinshasa in the 1980s, 
Mobutu recruited a large cohort of former bills in several key positions in the 
armed forces and cabinet; Mobutu’s longtime chief of staff, Nimy Mayidika, 
was a bill and so was General Mahele Lyoko Bokungu, Mobutu’s army chief of 
staff. 
When Laurent Kabila set up his government in Kinshasa in 1997 following a 
coup, he could not enlist the kibills like Mobutu did. He had come from the East and 
was therefore unaccustomed with Kinshasa’s social and political scene. However, 
throughout the years his son Joseph Kabila has tried several times to recruit ex-rebels 
and other war criminals in order to reduce the threats posed from the outside. Following 
the peace agreements of 2002-2003, which ended the Second Congo War between 
Rwanda and the Congo, the government launched a programme to merge the fighting 
forces of belligerent armed groups in the East with Kabila’s forces to create a national 
army (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen 2013). This project was implemented in 2005, when 
the Government launched the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Reintegration (CONADER) (Robinson 2012). This initiative sought to disarm 
child-soldiers and integrate rebels in the national army. The program provided 
assistance for the reintegration of ex-combatants by offering food, medicines, civilian 
clothes and last but not least, a monetary compensation in exchange for weapons. This 
strategy seemed successful in the short term, but in the long term it de graded 
perceptions of the reliability and professionalism of the army: soldiers and ex-rebels 
offered their services to the highest bidder, and once their compensation expired, they 
started to rely on civilians to satisfy their needs.  
Programs of reintegration of rebels and ex-combatants were implemented by the 
Congolese government on a regular basis. However, the poor organisation of such 
programs had few or no results at all. On the contrary, Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 
(2013) suggest that such programmes contributed to the fuelling of militarisation in 
eastern Congo. This further undermined the precarious situation of the Congolese 
security sector, viewed by the Congolese as an opportunity for personal enrichment for 
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ex-rebels, mercenaries and child-soldiers who joined military at the expense of the 
population thanks to reintegration programmes.  
At the same time, in Kinshasa the government launched several programmes of 
‘supervision and reintegration’ (encadrement et réinsertion social) for the kulunas. 
Reintegration programmes for street gangs were not a new phenomena in Kinshasa (see 
Geenen 2009). During my stay, posters stating that the presidential party (PPRD - the 
People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy) would take care of kulunas and re-
educate them, were displayed along the Boulevard 30 Juin, the central avenue which 
connects la ville with the neighbourhood of Kintambo. On the same note, an article of 
the Groupe L’avenir dated 30 March 2011 read: “Fighting the phenomenon kuluna: the 
CJK [the Club of Young Kabilists] launches a social reinsertion programme”. Despite 
their good intentions, the reintegration programmes for rebel soldiers and kulunas 
created confusion. There were rumours circulating in la cité positing that there was 
some sort of co-operation between street gangs and politicians73.  
During one of my interviews I met two women, Agathe Betoko and Élodie 
Tshumbu, who worked as social workers and who were repeatedly attacked by kulunas. 
Agathe recalled a time when she was shopping at the market when she heard shouts, 
“Kulunas! Kulunas!” She started to run but fell on top of other women who were 
running in front of her. Before she knew it, three men were running towards her with 
machetes. She started to yell and begged them to take everything she had, but ‘leave her 
the life’. Luckily enough, the men only took her bag and continued with their pillage. 
Agathe and Élodie both found it suspicious that kulunas would be caught red-handed 
but would still be set free soon after. They explained: 
Agathe: Yankees and kulunas do their things out in the open [en plain 
air], because the State is not able to handle them. Police can also 
take them to Makala prison, but they know the guards, and 
corrupt them, or they get out somehow, and become even more  
arrogant. 
Élodie: We have the impression that there is a political group behind 
them that support them. Otherwise how could they not fear the 
state and soldiers? 
                                                 
73
 This recalls the masquerade secret societies of Free Town, Sierra Leone, described by Nunley 
(1987). Such societies had a very strong connection with the political elite of the city. Politic ians 
were well aware of the influence of youth societies among the population, and supported either one 
or the other society in order to gain votes and increase their popularity. As a result, some politic ians 
even became patrons or honorary members of these societies (Ibid).  
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Many Kinois believed that kulunas were integrated into the military machine 
and informally collaborated with the government. Informants explained how politicians 
hired kulunas to create chaos at the rallies of competing political parties. Geenen (2009) 
confirms these rumours in her article about street gangs. She writes that after the 2006 
presidential elections, Jean-Pierre Bemba, the defeated leader of the opposition:  
[W]as said to be planning to call in bashege to disturb public order and 
participate in manifestations in his favour. For bashege, attending 
demonstrations, applauding at political events, or enthusiastically welcoming 
politicians at the airport, are jobs just like any other (2009: 353).  
In the same way as they were believed to collaborate with the military and the 
political elite, street-gangs were believed to collaborate with the local police at the 
neighbourhood level. I interviewed some teaching assistants at the University of 
Kinshasa on the subject of kulunas. They explained to me how the co-operation 
between gangs and police worked in the neighbourhoods they inhabited:  
In Masina and Lemba, facing Matete, now there are the kulunas... If policemen 
capture someone of their stable... When the kulunas yell ‘supervision’ 
[encadrement] to the policemen, it is to protect their friend. When they say 
‘supervision’, the policemen hear tha t and they know that they will soon have 
their share, and they don’t arrest him [the kuluna]. When they don’t hear that, 
they arrest him [the kuluna]... 
Everyone in Kinshasa seemed to share the view that if bribed, every policeman 
would be willing to co-operate with bandits. The ‘supervision’ that kulunas shouted at 
the police in the example above, bears a sinister resemblance to the governmental 
programmes of ‘supervision and reintegration’ (encadrement et réinsertion). In the 
recuperation programmes sponsored by the government, kulunas were supposedly re-
introduced into society through training in the agricultural sector and apprenticeships. 
In la cité, by contrast, the police were introduced into the kuluna’s world of criminality 
and corruption. Kulunas supervised the police according to their own laws, and in the 
process taught them how to abide by the rules of the street.  
Many rumours circulated in Kinshasa about the co-operation between kulunas, 
bandits and the security forces. The same teaching assistants, who told me about the 
‘supervision’ of the kulunas, explained how a thief had helped a police superintendent 
‘make do’. The wife of the superintendent was giving birth to a baby at the hospital, but 
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she could not afford the hospital fees. The thief then gave some cotton fabrics (pagnes), 
which he had just stolen, to the superintendent, who used them to pay hospital fees. The 
thief was released soon after.  
Another story that circulated during my fieldwork described the adventures of a 
stable of nineteen members called Moziki (interestingly, like the mutual help 
association described in chapter 3) whose members lived in Masina. On New Year’s 
Eve, the members of Moziki stole $1,850 from a party in town. At around 1am, they 
started to celebrate in their neighbourhood. When they saw the police superintendent 
passing by, they told him: “Boss, your beer tomorrow” (Mokonzi, masanga nayo lobi), 
meaning a monetary compensation. The day after, Moziki gave the chief $250. In 
contrast, the government had paid the superintendent CDF 50,000 ($55) as a monthly 
wage, plus one kilo of rice and a quarter of chicken as Christmas bonus.  
Stories like the ones above show the disenchantment of citizens towards the 
state. People felt that not only ordinary policemen, but also members of government 
were enriching themselves to the detriment of the population. During Mobutu’s regime, 
the Kinois called corrupt Government elites ‘dinosaurs’ which Devisch (1998: 236) 
describes as “self-appointed and often quite uncultured male leaders” who preached the 
return to a non-existent past of ‘authenticity’. During my stay in Kinshasa, some Kinois 
I interviewed referred to the elites as ‘kulunas in ties’ (kulunas en cravate). I learnt this 
during a conversation with my friend Joseph and Pastor Joël Lwango, a man whom I 
interviewed one evening about witch-children. Attacks from kulunas were such a 
recurrent and worrying phenomenon for the Kinois, that whomever I interviewed, even 
on the most disparate topics, always wanted to share some gossip on the phenomenon: 
Joseph: The term kuluna does not only refer to young people... There are 
also some kulunas-in-ties [kulunas en cravate]...  
 
Pastor Joël: Yes there are also the kulunas-in-ties... 
 
Silvia:  What is kulunas- in-ties? 
 
Pastor Joël: Big men who have been destroying the enterprises for years!  
 
Joseph: The politicians who are there [at the government] and who 
steal... 
 
Pastor Joël: We call them kulunas- in-ties... 
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Joseph:  They are pillaging the country...  
 
Silvia:  So people speak about kulunas of the state? 
 
Pastor Joël:  Yes, the Ministers... Because what the little kulunas do, they 
steal bags... The kulunas-in-ties destroy big enterprises!  
The term ‘kulunas in ties’ illustrates how people conceived of the flows and the 
exchange of modus operandi between kuluna stables and ruling elites. It was difficult to 
identify who imitated who – whether it was the kulunas imitating the political violence 
of the Congolese government, such as assassinations and torture – or whether 
politicians were influenced by the violence of the streets. It seems as if kulunas and 
kulunas-in-ties always informed each other, creating perceptions across the Kinois of 
how mobulu flows back and forth between the gangs in the streets and the corrupt 
officials of the state.  
In the eyes of the population, the mobulu they had to bear on a daily basis came 
from multiple directions and several actors: they had to cope with kulunas and their 
violent attacks; they had to be careful not to cross paths with police officers or soldiers, 
who would harass them as soon as they saw the possibility of quick cash; and they had 
to pay the consequences of the ineptitude of the state and its institutions, which worked 
very poorly and only through the channels of corruption and favouritism. Mobulu 
flowed between these different contexts, making it difficult to speak distinctly of ‘state 
violence’ or ‘local, everyday violence’. Violence in Kinshasa was something which 
came from every direction and from which it was impossible to escape. In the face of 
this situation, some people – for example, kulunas and police officers on the street, as 
well as civil officers and kulunas-in-ties at state level – would ride the wave of mobulu, 
appropriating it and transforming it into a mechanism of ‘making do’ from which they 
could profit. 
 
Moral Geographies and Figures of Power: the Forest and the Soldier 
 
In this chapter I have placed the phenomenon kuluna within the context of mobulu of 
Kinshasa. The kulunas were born out of the impossibility for young men to find a job 
and become independent. In the face of the limitations caused by the state through 
unemployment and economic hardship, these people created their own social niches for 
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manhood and social recognition in the street. The mobulu of the state was transformed 
by young people into a new social phenomenon, through which they asserted their 
presence and agency within society through violence.  
Furthermore, I have analysed here how structural violence and the everyday 
violence of kuluna gangs interplayed and informed each other. For example, political 
events like military interventions have influenced the imaginary of street gangs in 
Kinshasa. The violence of soldiers, their actions and ethics were appropriated and 
transformed by some young men who pillaged the population, raped girls and fought 
against different gangs in the street. Inversely, kulunas cooperated informally with 
politicians and the security forces by creating chaos at political rallies, or bribing police 
men at the neighbourhood level. The explicit co-operation between the state and 
kulunas increased the atmosphere of mistrust and fear within the neighbourhood, as 
people had to watch out for both bandits, and security forces.  
Some scholars of political studies and anthropology in Africa have all 
highlighted how the continent has seen an increase in criminal organised activity 
following the rise of liberalisation – both political and economic (Reno 1998, 2000; 
Bayart, Ellis & Hibou 1999; Comaroff & Comaroff 2006). Just as Reno (2000) 
describes many postcolonial states in Africa as “shadow states”, Bayart, Ellis and 
Hibou (1999) have highlighted how in several African society, the “felonious” state and 
all its members uses its institutions and apparatuses for criminal scopes. Smuggling, 
frauds, corruption and all kinds of illegal dealings are all perpetrated through the formal 
channels of the state, making it difficult to understand where legality gives way to 
illegality, and formality to informality. To put it with Hibou (1999: 75-76):  
The weakening of regulatory mechanisms and the disappearance of the need to 
provide any economic justification for money transfers [...] have all created new 
opportunities for company fraud. [...] Financial liberalisation has a lso blurred 
the frontiers between what is and is not legal by facilitating the transfer of 
capital and property from the illegal to the legal sector and vice versa.  
While scholars’ attention has been focused on the “criminalisation of the state” 
(Bayart et al. 1999), this chapter has shown how a ‘statalisation of criminality’ has 
taken place on the streets of la cité. Kulunas draw on models of military and state 
hierarchy to organise their ranks, and collaborate with the security forces. In this 
context of mobulu, the image of the soldier deeply influenced the ideology of banditry 
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in Kinshasa. The soldier embodied notions of wealth, booty and notoriety. In this sense, 
people saw warfare and pillage as a career opportunity. Unable to gain access to wealth 
through conventional channels such as the job market, young men saw pillaging as a 
rapid means of enrichment. Moreover, action movies depicting heroes such as Rambo 
as models of masculinity, courage and strength, contributed to the glamorisation of the 
figure of the soldier, rendering it even more attractive for the young people of 
Kinshasa74. 
 
 
FIGURE 7: Figures of success in young people’s imaginary: a commando 
soldier, Obama, and white people. On the table there are several types of home-
made distillates, the action movie Delta Force and a Bible.  
 
Kulunas reproduced the actions of armed groups who fought on in the mystical 
realm of the forest, on the country’s borders. Some names of kuluna gangs such as the 
Red Ants or the Provoking Lions can be read as signs of the desire of young people to 
master the powerful and obscure forces of the forest. In many pre-colonial African 
societies, the forest was the locus of occult powers par excellence. However, following 
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 On this subject see also Richards (1996). 
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large scale migration to towns, and urbanisation throughout Africa, it is no longer only 
the forest that scares the population; several scholars have highlighted how the city has 
gradually acquired the same character of dangerousness, death, mystery and witchcraft 
as the forest (De Boeck & Plissart 2004; Argenti 2007; Devisch 1995; Richards 1996). 
Argenti (2007: 212) writes: “The city is subsumed within the imaginary space of the 
forest and the night, playing the role of a surrogate hunting ground for those who 
venture into its chaotic and undomesticated spaces”. While for most elders, the street 
and the forest were both spaces of the wild and of evil (see also Pype 2007: 263), for 
many young city dwellers they represented a locus of possibilities and of uncanny 
enrichment. This “call of the city” (Devisch 1995: 602) resulted in an increasing 
number of young people trying their luck in the streets of Kinshasa.  
In the streets, kuluna gangs mimicked the military as a means of carving out a 
unique social space for themselves which they invested with their own meanings, 
hierarchies and norms. Argenti (1998, 2007) and Moore (2011) highlight how young 
people do not want to become the same as the figures they mimic – be it the gendarmes 
in the case of the Air Youth masquerade in Cameroon, or the characters and 
personalities in the media in the case of young students in Nairobi. Rather, young 
people draw from them in order to explore different possibilities for their lives, in o rder 
to transform themselves. As the economic insecurity in Kinshasa has deprived young 
men of any formal means of acquiring adulthood, they have been able to create a 
unique social space, in which they used images of the soldier and of the forest to 
transform themselves into something different – into men, or to better say it, ‘strong 
men’, batu pomba. 
The hierarchy, norms and meanings of kuluna groups were distinct from other 
forms of affiliation such as the family or ethnic ties. In the situation of economic 
hardship which engulfed Kinshasa, in which customary obligations based on ethnic 
affiliation were faltering, the kulunas were able to create another form of identity, based 
on territoriality. Once again, territorial identity closely recalled that of armed groups. 
As Bayart (et al. 1999) observed, within armed movements “the degree of ethnic  
cohesiveness is often exaggerated” (p. 41), because young people are recruited from a 
great variety of social backgrounds.  
By mimicking soldiers, kulunas transformed and manipulated reality, creating a 
new social niche in which they could give shape to their own persona. This recalls the 
sapeurs of post-Independence, who created a reality within a reality with its proper 
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rules, based on social recognition through fashion. However, in the same way that the 
sapeurs dressed eccentrically to break with colonial impositions and with the dressing 
style of the ruling elite (Gandoulou 1989a), the kulunas pushed their mimesis to excess. 
Kulunas were protectors who became perpetrators like the military, and who found in 
pillaging and violent fights a way to re-design reality according to their bodily capital. 
In a world of mobulu and violent competition, they could aspire to be someone.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the second half of November 2013, the Congolese state started an operation to put an 
end to the phenomenon of the kulunas in Kinshasa. The ‘Operation Punch’ (Opération 
Likofi or Opération Coup de Poing in French) aimed at taking all the perpetrators of 
disorder of the city before justice. The operation, which lasted until 15 February 2014, 
was brutally carried out: the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and UNICEF denounced the 
disappearance and the assassination of many young people and children following the 
beginning of the operation (see Bangré 2013; RDC 2013). According to the Congolese 
press and to my informants in Kinshasa, many young people were shot on the spot 
rather than imprisoned, their bodies carried away and later thrown into the Congo 
River. Although these rumours and indirect accusations have not being confirmed by 
the government, they were powerful vectors of fear and terror, especially among the 
youngest segment of the population. The government, once again, was trying to keep its 
population under control through mobulu, literally by punching away any counter-
platform of power in town. 
Operation Punch seemed to have a near instant impact. At the beginning of 
2014, people could walk safely around la cité during the day and by night. However, a 
few weeks after the official end of the operation, some Kinois started to complain about 
a re-insurgence of the phenomenon: kulunas were still in circulation and they had 
started to loot in some neighbourhoods of the city. The kulunas- in-ties at the 
government level started to collect complaints and rumours suggest a second Operation 
Punch is being considered. 
Many among the Kinois praised the effort of the government to re-establish 
order and peace (kimia in Lingala) in Kinshasa – even though through further mobulu. 
However, many others did not fail to note with irony how the fate of the elderly 
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kulunas-in-ties was once again linked very much to that of the young kulunas. The 
kulunas-in-ties used the kulunas as scapegoats for the mobulu of the city, while they 
continued undisturbed to jeopardise the political and economic stability of the country 
through their politics of mobulu. 
Despite violent state intervention and governmental re-education programmes, 
the kuluna gangs still persist. Their persistence suggests that they are not merely a 
resistance or a denunciation to state failing but, as Argenti (1998, 2007) and Moore 
(2011) argue, a distinct opportunity for young men to plot a new route to manhood and 
a new approach to life in the city. This route is not only a means of ‘making do’ in face 
of economic hardship but is actually becoming a desirable option for young boys. 
Young people feel that the customary prerequisites to reach adulthood (economic 
independence and customary marriage) no longer represent them in the cosmopolitan 
social arena of Kinshasa. Disentangled from the social rules imposed by the elders, 
kuluna gangs offer a unique social space for the disenfranchised young men, who have 
been able to turn the mobulu of everyday life to their own benefit.  
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- CHAPTER FIVE - 
LA MAGIE: UNDERSTANDING WEALTH THROUGH THE LENSES OF THE OCCULT 
 
This chapter illustrates how the mobulu of everyday life and the volatility of wealth in 
Kinshasa have resulted in rumours of occult dealings, according to which people who 
wanted to become rich had to sacrifice their relatives in the world of witchcraft 
(sorcellerie in French, kindoki in Lingala). The Kinois baptised this particular use of 
witchcraft with the aim of enriching oneself as magic (la magie). People described la 
magie75 as another manifestation of mobulu: those who entered its mechanisms would 
become involved in spiritual killings, sacrifices, lies and betrayals at the expenses of 
their family members.  
The invisible mobulu of la magie was directly linked to the visible mobulu of 
everyday life, and to the elusiveness of wealth. Wealth in Kinshasa was a chimera, a 
mirage which most of the Kinois would witness from a distance without ever being able 
to reach it. As a consequence, those able to attain it were treated with suspicion and all 
rumoured to be involved in occult dealings. These rumours represented a means for 
those Kinois ‘making do’ on the streets of Kinshasa to make sense of the inequalities of 
everyday life, and thus ‘make do’ within their own lives. This chapter thus is dedicated 
to rumours of la magie, the use of witchcraft for lucrative purposes.  
Kinshasa is a cosmopolitan city in a constant process of becoming. Its urban 
layout is developing according to a model of progress and future which compares this 
big metropolis with those across the rest of the world. Huge shopping malls, functional 
hospitals, skyscrapers and luxurious resorts were advertised across Kinshasa during my 
fieldwork, with their architectural plans shown on huge panels disseminated around the 
city. The Kinois I interviewed looked at these images with a mix of admiration and 
scepticism: these buildings were so elaborate and ostentatious that they seemed to 
belong to another place or another time. And yet, despite the huge wealth inequality 
between the elite and the poor and the economic crisis that affected the vast majority of 
the population, the city layout was developing rapidly with construction sites a common 
sight in many neighbourhoods of Kinshasa like la Gombe, Limete, Kintambo and so on. 
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 As introduced in chapter 1 (footnote 5), I prefer to remain faithful to the original term ‘ la magie,’ 
which is used by the Kinois in their gossiping.  
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Buildings and architectural operas were not the only things advertised around 
the city. Mobile phones and over such electronic devices, cars, offers for airlines, 
supermarkets, and all other kinds of western goods were part of the imaginary of the 
Kinois, some of whom were able to go about in expensive cars, to dress impeccably and 
live a life of comfort. 
Wealth was visible to everyone in Kinshasa. It was changing the city, its layout 
and the dreams of its population. Despite that, the majority of the Kinois, those that 
survived through la débrouille and la coop, were not able to benefit from this wealth76. 
The majority of the population lived on less than one US dollar per day (De Boeck 
2011a; Lamb 2013; Ouayoro 2013) and had no clear idea of how the market economy 
worked. Modern means of communicating and circulating wealth such as the internet 
rendered one’s possibilities of enrichment more varied but also more invisible. Capital 
itself (a new economic term) was a form of wealth that was invisible to the inhabitants 
of the city. Furthermore, wealth in Kinshasa was rendered fleeting by the multiple 
economic crises, the inflation, the corruption, the cheating and the clientelism that still 
characterised the politico-economic context of the country.  
The mechanisms of the formal market economy were obscure, unpredictable 
and dangerous. As such, people who mysteriously managed to tame the mechanisms of 
that elusive market and experienced sudden enrichments were believed to resort to the 
occult powers of witchcraft (kindoki). In this case, however, such powers were no 
longer employed with the express purpose of killing other people for jealousy or 
revenge, or to make them fail in life, but rather in order for someone to become 
successful and rich77. The Kinois called this particular phenomenon la magie or else 
franc-maçonnerie (Freemasonry), the two terms being interchangeable. Indeed, people 
who wanted to get wealthy were believed to have joined occult Masonic sects in which 
they were asked to sacrifice a member of their family to Satan. Following this sacrifice, 
the person would start to gain incredible wealth.  
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 Comaroff and Comaroff (1999: 293), alluded to the contradictions of the market economy w hen 
they described it as: “[A] world in which ends far outstrip means, in which the will to consume is 
not matched by the opportunity to earn, in which there is a high velocity of exchange and a 
relatively low volume of production. And yet, we repeat, it is a world in which the possibility of 
rapid enrichment, of amassing a fortune by largely invis ible methods, is always palpably present”.  
77
 This “witchcraft of the wealth” (Geschiere 1997) was also common in other African contexts, and 
can be traced back to the changes that the economic environment witnessed following colonisation. 
On this subject in Cameroon, see Ardener (1970), de Rosny (1985), Pool (1994), Geschiere (1997) 
and Argenti (2007). 
126 
Rumours of magical riches affected also those people who joined one of the 
new Japanese spiritual movements that became fashionable in Kinshasa since the 
1980s, such as the Mahikari 78  and the Church of World Messianity 79  (Église 
Messianique Mondiale, EMM). Although all the people I interviewed had claimed to 
have never set foot in such churches, they were all convinced that their members 
worshipped Satan and pursued wealth through mystical means. I mentioned several 
times to my Congolese family that I was interested in understanding how la magie 
worked, and that in order to do so I wanted to visit some of the sects in which it was 
said to be practised. However, Joseph always clarified, quite imperatively, that whilst I 
was living with him and his family, I could not approach any of those sects, for reasons 
that will become clear in the course of this chapter.  
The cosmology of the Kinois is very varied and complex, and gathers together a 
number of witchcraft and anti-witchcraft agents: kindoki is the vessel of witchcraft in 
order to harm others for jealousy, revenge or hatred. In order to understand the identity 
of the witch who committed the killing, members of the deceased’s family resort to 
diviners (ngangas) or, increasingly more, to one of the thousands of Pentecostal pastors 
which heal people from witchcraft in the name of Jesus in Kinshasa. In addition to this, 
in the last two decades, a few people seem to have found a distinct way to enrich 
themselves through la magie. The Kinois I spoke to described la magie as a nuance of 
kindoki, a specific branch of witchcraft employed in order to become rich. At the same 
time, in fact, they still acknowledged that people who enriched themselves in the 
Masonic sects resorted to the mechanisms of kindoki in order to do so. Only this time 
kindoki is used for a different purpose; accumulating wealth. 
Writing about witchcraft has always raised terminological problems, as many of 
the nuances are lost in translation. Throughout the years, terms for witchcraft have 
evolved, as some have fallen into disuse and been replaced by new trends. Fetishism, 
sorcellerie, sorcery, magic, witchcraft: in some cases, sorcery has been described in 
contrast to witchcraft – the two differing in scope and actors (see Evans-Pritchard 
1937); other times, old-fashioned terms charged with colonial ethnocentrism were 
replaced by what were perceived to be more accurate definitions 80; and more recently 
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 www.mahikari.org 
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 http://www.johreiafrica.com/Default.aspx?idioma=en-us# 
80
 On the decline of the notion of the ‘fetish’ for ‘sorcellerie’ or ‘witchcraft’ see Bernault (2013) 
and MacGaffey W. (1977). 
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some of these terms have been used as synonyms of the same concept (see Meyer & 
Pels 2003). 
In his recent publication “Witchcraft, Intimacy and Trust” (2013), Peter 
Geschiere explores the dangers that the term ‘witchcraft’ poses to academic studies on 
this topic. In his words: 
[T]he very term threatens to suck academic studies into all the inconsistencies 
and shifts that seem to be characteristic of this field. The solution might not be 
to try to impose an analytical delimitation of notions that have acquired such 
presence in everyday life – this might lead to a quixotic struggle to control a 
notion that is so powerful because of its slipperiness. An ethnographical 
approach might be more useful (Ibid: ch. 1, section 1, para 4). 
As Geschiere (2013: ch. 1, section 3, para 4) suggests, the power of witchcraft 
lies in its fluidity and in its “deep subversive tendency diffusing and confusing any 
conceptual distinction”. Witchcraft is embedded within the social world around it. In 
the modern ever-changing society, in which new forms of wealth and power are 
generated at a constant pace, witchcraft transforms in order to keep the pace with the 
changes. As Geschiere affirms, “[w]itchcraft, both as a notion and as a set of practices, 
certainly has a history, but it clearly has to be seen as an event that constantly produces 
new forms” (2013: ch. 1, section 5, para 7). In Kinshasa, the term kindoki has grown 
and developed through gossip throughout the years. The changing nature of kindoki – 
which now can be used to become rich – and its adaptation to new situations which, to 
recall Pritchard’s famous saying (1937: 513), demanded new magic, made it normal for 
people to speak about witchcraft with different terms such as la magie. 
We can now better understand why I have felt the need to analyse the notion of 
la magie in depth, how it differs from kindoki and what it means for the Kinois. Rather 
than categorising and classifying witchcraft, it is my intent to give voice to the Kinois 
and use my ethnographic material to show how they themselves used this term in 
interviews and informal chats. The challenge in these situations is, as Geschiere puts it 
(2013: ch. 1, section 3, para 12), “following people’s struggle for clarity in a minefield 
of ambiguities and slippages”. Let us not forget that kindoki and la magie are present in 
Kinshasa in the form of rumours and gossip (see chapter 1). Informants do not hesitate 
to change small – but significant – details within their stories in order to make them 
make sense according to the different context and the different time they are recalling 
the event, and to whom they are telling it. Sometimes, terms are intercha nged and 
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mechanisms of the two phenomena overlapped, making it difficult to draw a clear 
distinction between the two. This is due to the strong link between la magie and 
kindoki, which can be seen as the two sides of the same coin. Thus a detailed analysis 
of both terms is necessary if we are to understand the multiple forms of mobulu in 
Kinshasa’s everyday life.  
The chapter starts with a brief overview over the cosmology of Kinshasa, in 
order to highlight the subtle nuances between the different manifestations of witchcraft. 
This will lead us into the world of la magie. The analysis of la magie starts with a case 
study, in order to better introduce the reader to its mechanisms with an example from 
Kinshasa’s everyday life. I then take the discussion further by elucidating how 
associations which have come from the West such as Freemasonry and Japanese 
spiritual practices have influenced ideas of wealth consumption and of the occult. 
Furthermore, I will delineate the role of Pentecostal pastors in influencing the attitude 
of the rest of the population  towards these new Japanese churches, described as the 
work of Satan. 
I continue the exploration of la magie by analysing how it is not only linked to 
personal wealth, but also to notions of technological progress and socio-economic 
development. However, in order to work and make someone rich, la magie requires 
sacrifices. Through several examples and a case study, I describe the side effects of la 
magie and how it prompted rumours of wealth but also sudden deaths, disease and 
sacrifices. I conclude the chapter by going back to the power of kindoki to transform in 
keeping up with the world around it and with the socio-economic changes which affects 
the metropolis of Kinshasa. Rumours on la magie are ways for the Kinois to make 
sense of the inequalities brought by market economy.  
 
The World of Witchcraft in Kinshasa: Kindoki, the Nganga and Magie 
 
Kindoki marks a central tenet of the cosmological world which surrounds the social 
worlds of the Kinois in Kinshasa. To use Niehaus’ definition (2010), kindoki in 
Kinshasa is “deep-knowledge”: it is a subtext to all social encounters, which did not 
need to be verbally acknowledged to exist (Ibid: 66). During my stay, whenever I spoke 
to people, kindoki would take the shape of a heavy silence following the explication of 
some extraordinary event regarding the sudden death of a young man, the loss of a job 
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or the physical or mental deterioration of someone. Kindoki was the untold reasoning 
heard after the official explication. People would say: “a truck hit him while he was 
crossing... The others with him were not even injured, whilst he died”, or “we went to 
the hospital but he is still sick...” However, once people opened up and delved beneath 
the facade of initial explanations, they revealed an entire universe of rumours and 
gossip (basongi-songi), rich in mystical details, suspicions, and accusations of 
witchcraft. Kindoki was part of the Kinois’ life and was inseparable from it. One way or 
the other, the Kinois had to engage with kindoki. In the event of a strong sickness, for 
example, even those people who tried to consider other reasons (low immune system, 
inefficiency of the medicines) other than kindoki, at last were drawn into kindoki 
suspicions by the rumours of other people, who would comment maliciously: “how is it 
possible that s/he is always sick when that other person is around...?” Kindoki was a 
universe which was impossible to avoid.  
Since colonial times81, witches (ndoki singular, bandoki plural) were believed to 
use kindoki in order to harm or kill those who they envied or hated, or to avenge some 
wrong. From this point of view, kindoki is a weapon of vengeance, death and 
destruction. Most often in the last decades, accusations of kindoki have taken place 
between family members across different generations. The development of market 
economy, and the western education and lifestyles of the last decades, have all been 
targeted at a young public. This shifted the power within society, which for a long time 
was based on gerontocracy and was thus unquestionably bestowed upon the elders. This 
shift of power, together with the economic crisis, gave rise to intergenerational tensions 
between the elders and the youngsters of the family 82, which have resulted in kindoki 
accusation between the two (see chapter 7). 
However, in recent years, kindoki in Kinshasa has started to be used also against 
non-kin members. For example, many Kinois whom I interviewed often accused their 
neighbours of trying to kill them through kindoki because they were jealous of the 
                                                 
81
 On kindoki in rural milieu during colonial times see MacGaffey (1970a, 1970b, 1986). 
82
 Argenti (2007) highlights how during colonialism, the elders of the family would sell their 
children to slavery. In the same way, people involved in the witchcraft of the w ealth in Cameroon 
were required to sacrifice members of their kin. This time, however, it was children and social 
cadets who were believed to sell elderly relatives in order to become rich. The discourse of the 
witchcraft of the wealth has thus become the site of a “struggle for appropriation by both opposing 
factions” (Ibid: 116), in which elders portrayed young people as traders in human people as they 
were in the past. Also in Cameroon, witchcraft was pictures like a site of ongoing struggle between 
generations. 
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success of their business, or family. Thus, any disease, accident, sudden death or 
misfortunes in Kinshasa were traced back to the actions of witches, who were believed 
to try to impede the other person to be happy and successful through witchcraft. The 
mechanisms of la débrouille in Kinshasa were so unstable that it was hard to keep up a 
business regularly, and periods of unemployment or sudden bankruptcy were a frequent 
occurrence. When this happened, rumours were always blaming witches for wanting to 
harm others. Getting by was a daily fight not only against the fluctuations of la 
débrouille, but also against witches’ ordeals.  
Witches were believed to fly naked at night through ‘mystical’ airplanes, and to 
go spiritually killing their victims during their sleep. People who died suddenly and 
inexplicably, who felt increasingly tired or grew sick for no  apparent reason, were all 
rumoured to be victims of witchcraft ordeals. The more victims the witches killed, the 
more power and influence they acquired in the world of kindoki. 
Often, witches did not operate directly against their enemies but used emissar ies 
who killed on their behalf. Indeed although kindoki could also be passed outside the kin 
circle, the harm could only come from someone very close to the victim. In order to get 
close to the victims and kill them, witches would first bewitch the victim’s children. So 
for example, in order to kill a woman, the witch needed first to bewitch one of her 
family’s children (her son/daughter, nephew, small brother/sister), who would in turn 
kill her at night through kindoki. As such, bewitched-children functioned as emissaries 
of another witch. 
Witches were thought to lure children into kindoki through gifts of food, such as 
bread and small cakes, considered as the medium par excellence of the transmission of 
kindoki. According to the Kinois I interviewed across the city, the food that witches 
gave children would transform into a piece of human meat at night. After the child had 
accepted and eaten the food, at night the witch was believed to visit the child spiritually 
while s/he was sleeping, and ask him or her to sacrifice a family member or family 
members in order to repay the debt s/he had accumulated with the witch: the human 
meat the child had eaten needed to be repaid through another human life (see also Pool 
1994). This has given rise to the phenomenon of the so-called ‘witch-children’ (bana 
bandoki), children who were believed to have been lured into witchcraft by senior 
witches, and who later ‘ate’ the spirits (ésprits) of their family members in order to 
donate them to their superiors.  
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Fighting witches and neutralising witchcraft ordeals was the duty of a few 
specialised agents in Kinshasa. In some neighbours in the eastern area of Kinshasa, and 
knowingly mostly among the Yaka populations from the Bandundu region, witchcraft 
was counteracted by the diviner (nganga) and his charms (minkisi)83. The nganga, like 
the witch (ndoki), was a figure inherited from the pre-colonial rural milieu, where 
diviners would be consulted in order to understand one’s affliction, illness or death, and 
to find a solution to it. The client never went to the diviner himself, but rather it was 
members of the matrilineal and patrilineal family to go in his or her place. Because the 
diviner had to divine on the present causes of affliction of the client by looking at his or 
her past through divination practice, often the client’s family would seek out a 
specialist far from their neighbourhood, so that the diviner’s clairvoyance could not be 
polluted by acquaintance.  
The diviner would enter a state of trance and, through the help of a slit drum and 
a divination basket, would start consulting the oracle. The divination basket included 
pieces of fabric or other personal items from the client (including also modern items 
such as mobile phones), and a set of figures and substances of animal and vegetable 
origin. These objects were tossed up by the diviner in changing configurations in order 
to search for the causes and reasons of the client’s affliction (De Boeck & Devisch 
1994). The divinatory séance concluded with a verdict, for example the identification of 
a culprit, and a prescription. Often however, divination sessions, rather than solving 
conflicts, brought more dissent within the extended family, as the culprit was most of 
the times a kin member. This is why often people preferred to avoid the diviner, and 
pushed the suspect to confess and repay the wrong through a compensation for the 
victim of witchcraft84. 
During my fieldwork, the Kinois I interviewed rumoured that people turned to 
ngangas not only to detect witches, but also to reach personal goals in an illicit way. 
For example, some among the Kulunas and sportsmen described in the previous chapter 
were believed to use charms (minkisi) during their fights, and to visit ngangas in order 
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 On divination practices in Kinshasa as well as in the rural milieu see Devisch (1985, 1991, 1993), 
Devisch and Brodeur (1999) and De Boeck & Devisch (1994). 
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 There is a similar rhetoric here to the ways in which the kulunas collected 'protection' money. 
Whereas the neighbourhood paid the kulunas to protect them but also not to rob their houses, the 
suspect of witchcraft dealings had to pay the relatives of the victim in order not to be pursued by the 
diviner. Kindoki – like kuluna briberies, offered both a loss and a gain: both were double-edged 
swords but negotiated by the Kinois who needed to 'make do'. 
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to become unbeatable in combat. In the same way, politicians allegedly consulted 
ngangas to gain political influence and votes during the elections. Other people might 
consult ngangas to make someone fall in love against their will, or to acquire the skills 
necessary to cheat someone and steal his or her wealth. According to all the Kinois I 
spoke with, ngangas were consulted for amoral reasons, and it was considered amoral 
to consult ngangas. 
In Kinshasa, divination had lost much of its primary positive role. Indeed, the 
term the Kinois used to describe divination was fetishisme, which held a rather negative 
connotation. This was the same for the nganga himself, who was often addressed as 
fetisheur. These terms, a derived of the Portuguese word feitiço (‘the thing made’, 
‘effect’) and feiticeiro (‘the expert’), had been assigned by the missionaries and the 
colonists to describe the cosmology of the local population. Notably, in the eyes of the 
missionaries and colonists, this cosmology held the characteris tics of irrationality, 
paganism, occultism and ignorance. Thus in Kinshasa, as Bernault (2013) claimed, 
“Congolese speakers largely appropriated the French colonial repertoire of the fetish 
and internalised its derogatory and incapacitating undertones” (p.62). The term was 
readily adopted by the new prophets and pastors of the Pentecostal movements, who 
described the nganga-fetisheur as a dangerous and destructive agent of tradition, in 
contrast to the constructive healing power of the pastor, summoned up d irectly by God 
(Devisch 1996a, 1996b; Pype 2006b). Fetisheurs in Kinshasa were believed to handle 
witchcraft through the power of tradition. As such, fetishisme recalled notions of the 
occult linked to a rural past from whom many city-dwellers were estranged. 
Whereas ngangas were described by the majority of the Kinois I spoke with as 
customary agents who fought kindoki with kindoki, other figures which counteract 
witchcraft with new weapons have emerged since the 1980s. The thousands of pastors 
and prophets which have dotted Kinshasa with their independent churches were 
described by the population as the most legitimate fighters of witchcraft. Their power 
was believed to come directly from God, and they fought kindoki through the power of 
the Holy Spirit, the Bible and the holy cross. As explained in chapter 2, the Kinois have 
been able to rework the Christianity brought by the missionaries and have translated the 
ancestors, spirits and witches of the past in the language of the Bible. The fight against 
witches has become the fight of God against the Devil. Thus, it was only through God 
and his word that witches could be successfully defeated. Exorcisms, quarantine 
treatments for witch-children and long prayer wakes were believed to be the only 
133 
means to expel witches and evil spirits from one’s life, and to allow the person to go 
back to his or her everyday life with renewed strength.  
Unlike kindoki and fetishisme, la magie was not traced back to a traditional rural 
past, but was rather believed to be born out of the interplay between kindoki and 
something that came to Kinshasa from the exterior, from the “worlding” (Simone 2001, 
see chapter 2) of the city. Other synonyms for la magie in Kinshasa were occultism 
(occultisme), Freemasonry85 (franc-maçonnerie) or science (science). As we can see 
from these appellations, the Kinois believed that la magie developed from Freemasonry 
(which is believed to have a strong occult component) and from the ‘witchcraft of the 
White’86. Like Freemasonry, la magie also operated through sects. People who wanted 
to achieve success in life were believed to join these sects and to sacrifice a body part 
(an arm, or a few years of life) or a member of their own family in order to gain 
personal success. This is why it was the wealthy who were suspected of being part of 
these sects, in which, according to the Kinois, they ‘touched la magie’ (bazwaki magie). 
The distinction between magie and kindoki emerges here in the ways in which 
each are understood to take place. For magie people said “azwaki magie”, meaning 
“s/he took la magie”, whereas for kindoki they said “aliaki ndoki”, “s/he ate 
witchcraft”. The verb ‘to eat’ means to gain power in several African cultures (see for 
example Bayart 2009; Geschiere 1997; Mbembe 1992). Moreover, kindoki was 
believed to be passed covertly through food by witches, while people who wanted to 
become wealthy were said to enter the circles of la magie on their own free will. The 
fact that the Kinois used a different verb to describe the acquisition of witchcraft in la 
magie shows the different connotation that these two phenomena – kindoki and magie – 
had in their imaginary. 
Here, I begin to explore the distinct niche within which the contemporary 
phenomena of la magie emerged by presenting a case of magie which happened in my 
neighbourhood. Through this case study, I aim to show how la magie differed from 
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 Freemasonry is an international movement born around the late 16th-early 17th century in 
Europe. It promotes charitable work and self-help and propagates a form of civic morality. Masonic 
craft is accompanied by secret rituals, which have inspired conspiracy theories among non-masons 
(Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: 75; see also West and Sanders 2003). Congolese Freemasonry is very 
different from European masonry, as it is rumoured to have a strong mystical component and is 
centred on the idea that masons make a pact with the Devil in order to become wealthy. 
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 Since early colonisation, Europeans as well were believed to bear occult powers, as highlighted in 
the accounts of several scholars (MacGaffey 1970a, 1970b, 1977; White 2000; Bernault 2006; de 
Rosny 1985; Geschiere 1997). 
134 
kindoki, but also how the two interrelated in the imaginary of the Kinois. Through 
deaths, sacrifices and cheating, both were considered a source of mobulu for the Kinois, 
who traced back every misfortune, death or accident to occult dealings.  
 
A Suspicious Death: on la Magie and Diamonds 
 
One day, early in the morning, I was woken by cries and noise coming from the street. I 
went out just in time to see a few women carrying the body of a young boy towards the 
main road of the neighbourhood, in the direction of a medical clinic. Among the 
women I spotted Antoniette Mukoko, from the parcelle at the top of our street: an 
accident had happened in her compound. That morning, like every morning, the 
children of the family were getting ready to go to school after eating bouillie87. Little 
Jacques Ndiwa was already dressed and ready to go, when he saw a mouse in the 
backyard. He grabbed a long iron pipe, leaning against the blue electric wire that served 
as clothes line, in order to kill the animal. Shortly after, Antoniette came out of the 
house and saw her child standing in the middle of the backyard. She shouted at him to 
go to school but the child would not answer. Only when she moved towards him did 
she notice that Jacques was not moving. She screamed, took a plastic chair and pushed 
him away from the iron pipe. She was too late – her son had been fatally electrocuted. 
Long time ago, the blue electric wire in the courtyard was used to bring electricity from 
the neighbours’ parcelle to another parcelle across their plot. Apparently the cable had 
been disconnected for so long, that the family recycled it and used it as a clothes line. 
Inexplicably, that day, electricity was running through the cable.  
While Antoniette and her friends were at the clinic on the main road, trying to 
save little Jacques, Antoniette’s husband called to check if she had received the money 
he sent her. He worked near the Angola border, doing business in the diamond trade. A 
couple of days later, he was back in the neighbourhood, mourning the loss of his child 
with the rest of the family. 
A few months after the accident, I went to visit Pastor Cedrick Ndiwa, whom I 
met at Jacques’ funerary ceremony (matanga). He was friend with a member of 
Antoniette’s family and a pastor in another neighbourhood of Ngaliema, not far from 
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 Boiled mash made from corn flour, sometimes with added sugar. 
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where I lived. During my visit, the story of Jacques came up in the conversation and I 
took the opportunity to ask him what he thought about Jacques death: 
Silvia: So in the end, did they [the family] find the source of the 
problem of the death of the child in our street? 
 
P. Cedrick: Bon, there was… Voilá it was a problem of witchcraft 
[sorcellerie]. I was there observing. I saw that... God spoke to me 
and told me that there was a problem of witchcraft. Because a 
child who just woke up, he saw a small rat, he went over there 
and he died. That was a problem of witchcraft. As you know, his 
father... 
 
Silvia:   His father was travelling, right? 
 
P. Cedrick: He was travelling, as he works in the diamond trade... And you 
know, with diamonds there is a lot of witchcraft... [...]  
 
Silvia:   Really? 
 
P. Cedrick: Madam, it’s very difficult to catch them [diamonds]. So you have 
to sacrifice, to give someone...When you do, the person that you 
have sacrificed, it is him whom they will transform into 
diamond... The diamonds of la magie [les diamants de la magie]. 
The interview above shows how the Kinois gave shape to reality through 
rumours of la magie. It was known that Jacques’ father had a fruitful business in the 
diamond trade, as it was known that Jacques had been electrocuted. La magie provided 
the link between the two facts and created a relation of causality in retrospective. 
Jacques’ father was believed to have gained wealth through acquisition of diamonds in 
return for Jacques’ death. In a circular logic, then, this discourse was used to give 
meaning to reality, and understand events and their connections.  Moreover, in this 
interview we can see how people used different terms even in the same occasion, to 
describe the world of la magie. First, they tried to explain the death of the child with the 
French term sorcellerie (witchcraft, in Lingala kindoki), but a few phrases later they 
delved into the topic and explained that it was actually a problem of magie, which 
involved accumulation of wealth.  
De Boeck (1999, 2000a, 2001) has worked extensively on the mystical powers 
of diamonds. The diamonds in the Lunda Norte region at the Angolan border, where 
young people ventured in order to try their luck, were rumoured to be so difficult to get, 
so fleeting and dangerous that diamond smugglers were believed to resort to mystical 
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powers in order to catch them (De Boeck 1999: 788-789). De Boeck analysed the 
episode of a man who turned to a witch in order to find diamonds. The witch exhorted 
the man to sleep with a menopausal woman, or to sleep with his mother. However, after 
the mother fled in order to escape her incestuous fate, the man decided to sacrifice the 
life of one of his children, who died suddenly without being sick (Ibid). In another 
episode, similar to Jacques’s story, De Boeck and Plissart (2004: 219) reproduced the 
story of Mado, a diamond digger in Angola. When one day, on the way to the mine, she 
reached a river and saw corpses being hauled up from the river, she immediately 
interpreted those deaths as the sacrifice to produce diamonds. Diamonds were created 
out of those people. In the same fashion, gossip around my neighbourhood depicted 
little Jacques as the sacrifice for his father’s diamonds.  
The story of little Jacques outlines a number of key aspects which I will allude 
to in the chapter – the need to ‘make do’ causing people to go further than before, how 
accidents are explained through kindoki, but how la magie is interpreted through new 
avenues for wealth making. From this point of view we can say that the phenomenon of 
la magie holds strong connections with the development of market economy and the 
hardship of ‘making do’, as I am about to analyse.  
‘Making do’ in Kinshasa was extremely difficult and uncertain: people worked 
all day long in the streets in order to be able to feed their family for the day. However, 
one of the key elements of la débrouille is cheating and scams. Thus, there was this 
feeling among the Kinois that for every person who got rich, another got cheated and 
impoverished. This was evident also in the example of Baudouin and the car sale in 
chapter 3: Baudouin was able to make money by cheating me and Joseph into buying a 
car which was not worth our money. This is linked to the fact that according to the 
Kinois, the world of la débrouille is a ‘zero-sum universe’88, in which “the wealth of 
one person [can] only be at the expense of another, by means of theft or trickery” (Ellis 
& Ter Haar 2004: 120). Thus, for every person who succeeded, another one had to fail 
– and vice versa, for every person who failed and struggled in la débrouille, someone 
else was getting rich through cheating. 
Kindoki and la magie were also considered to operate along these ‘zero-sum’ 
lines whereby no success or wealth was without sacrifice, as I am about to show. The 
mechanisms of la magie, its differences from kindoki and the relation between the two  
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 See also Rowlands & Warnier 1988:123; Comaroff & Comaroff 1998:289; Austen 1993:92. 
137 
were explained to me during a conversation I had with Pastor Delphin Peyelinga, who 
preached in a Pentecostal church in Yolo-Nord, a neighbourhood in central Kinshasa. 
Pastor Delphin had been preaching for several years, and had witnessed the 
development of kindoki within the urban milieu of Kinshasa. This is how he related 
kindoki with its new manifestation, la magie: 
Silvia: There are some people who speak also about Freemasonry 
[franc-maçonnerie]... Is it another type of kindoki? 
 
P. Delphin: Freemasonry... La magie... It is kindoki but it’s different. It’s la 
magie. Kindoki is something that comes from our customs. But 
la magie... Those are things that are adopted in this world [that 
arrived from the outside]. For example they can say “Silvia, if 
you want to have a lot of money... If you want to have big cars, 
big jeeps, you have to take this [la magie]”. But you are going to 
have all that you asked. But, the bad thing is that, every month, 
or every day, or every year, you have to sacrifice something. You 
can sacrifice your child, your husband, your woman, your friend, 
depending on the contract89. 
Like la débrouille, la magie was considered as a zero-sum universe in which the 
wealth of someone came at the expense of someone else’s life. Both people who 
wanted to kill and get rich accessed the same mystical power of kindoki, and had to 
sacrifice a relative in order to activate it. However, unlike kindoki, la magie did not 
originate in the ‘village’. Pastor Delphin Peyelinga said those things “are adopted in 
this world”. Others highlighted that la magie did not come “from our customs” (la 
coutume). La magie was something that had an intrinsically foreign character, as it had 
been introduced from the outside – ironically, a point made by a pastor, himself a figure 
from outside the Kinois world. 
The Kinois soon baptised the use of kindoki in order to get rich as la magie and 
Freemasonry. In fact, people involved in la magie were believed to become part of 
occult Masonic sects, in which they were required to make sacrifices in order to 
increase their wealth. In the next section I shall explain the rationale behind these 
rumours, and why people associated la magie with Freemasonry. 
  
                                                 
89
 While kindoki was passed through food unbeknown to the victim, la magie was something that 
people chose quite spontaneously: “depending on the contract” signals a mutual agreement between 
two parties. 
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Freemasonry and Japanese Spiritual Practices: from the West to Africa 
 
As in other West-African countries 90 , wealthy people in Kinshasa were believed to 
enter occult sects of the order of Freemasonry and Rosicrucianism91 which provided 
them with wealth in exchange of the sacrifice of a relative. These two movements, 
which were exported to Africa during the colonial era, counted many Heads of States 
and members of parliament among their adepts. The success of secret lodges of 
European origin in Africa was partially due to the fact that African societies were 
already familiar with these kinds of organizations. Before colonialism, hunting and 
warriors’ societies and men’s secret associations (often called ‘leopard men’) were 
integral part of the fabric of rural communities. In the Cameroon Grassfields, secret 
societies and their masquerades 92  supported or contested the power of the palace 
(Argenti 1998, 2005). In Sierra Leone, secret societies were supported by political 
leaders, who used the influences of such groups on the population to gain votes and 
increase their popularity (Nunley 1987). Secret societies were an extremely important 
form of social organisation in West and Central Africa: they formed the basis of local 
government, performed executive and juridical functions, and acted as trading agencies, 
boosting the economy of local communities (Nwaka 1978).  
Many of these secret societies were incorporated into the colonial government, 
which saw in them a useful tool for their indirect rule. Freemasonry was introduced to 
the Congo by the colonists and during the years following Independence, has been 
popularised among the Congolese elite. The local notion of secret societies and the 
global organisation of Freemasonry mingled together. Many évolués considered 
Freemasonry as a means of social promotion able to put them side by side with 
members of the colonial state. 
Cohen (1971) posited that one of the main reasons for the success of Masonic 
lodges in Africa was the consolidation of a true brotherhood among its members. In 
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 On Freemasonry in the African context see also Cohen (1971), Probst (1989), Bayart (1995), 
Ngolet (2000), Ellis and Ter Haar (2004), Tonda (2005) and Geschiere (2010). 
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 Rosicrucianism made its appearance at the 16th century as a society cultivating “arcane or 
esoteric spiritual knowledge” (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004: 76). Rosicrucianism developed in parallel 
with Masonic lodges and often it is considered as yet another Masonic lodge, rather than a per se 
association.  
92
 The masks worn during the masquerades suggested that the power of the society was secret and 
mysterious in nature – as mysterious as witches and forest spirits. In fact, these masquerades 
operated through the same occult mechanisms of witches, the king and diviners, or those able to 
detect witches (Argenti 1998: 755). 
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unstable and fleeting politico-economic circumstances, members found in Freemasonry 
“welfare and social security benefits” (Ibid: 433) that expanded beyond the unstable 
network of kin. Freemasonry offered a means of securing one’s income by establishing 
useful links with influential persons, such as superiors within the civil service. If wealth 
was insecure, social elites turned to clientelism, both at the national and international 
level, to ensure their prosperity. Masonic lodges protected social and economic 
privileges and provided “the means for the articulation of the organisational functions 
of a political group [...] in sharp contrast with the loose and feeble political 
organisations” (Cohen 1971: 444). As such, membership to Masonic lodges in Kinshasa 
were an attempt by the local elites to ‘make do’ and to cope with insecurity.  
Although Masonic lodges offered many sociological advantages as explained 
above, the Kinois always emphasised their occult side. One should remember that in 
many African societies, power and witchcraft were perceived as two sides of the same 
coin (Rowlands & Warnier 1988; Geschiere 1997; Ellis & Ter Haar 2004). This means 
that in Kinshasa, masons who held senior positions were believed to make use of la 
magie. By contrast, any person who managed to tame the mechanisms of market 
economy and to accumulate some wealth was believed to be part of a Masonic lodge 93. 
The Kinois I interviewed also used the term ‘la magie’ and ‘Freemasonry’ to 
describe the new Japanese religions that arrived in Kinshasa in the second half of the 
twentieth century, and which have attained increasing popularity in the last decades. 
These religions, like Masonic sects, were believed to spread la magie through prayers 
and rituals. One of these movements was called Mahikari, an oriental mystic religion of 
Japanese origin that combined the spiritual doctrines of Buddhism and Shintoism. 
Precisely, Mahikari focused on: 
[T]he practice of okiyome, which consists of the transmission of divine light 
through the palm of the hand of an initiate to another person or to any animate 
or inanimate object in need of purification or protection. [...] The power to 
transmit the Light resides in an amulet [...] which is surrounded by numerous 
taboos (Melton & Baumann 2010: 2748). 
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 This occult reading of free-masonry is in line with many conspiracy theories which have set foot 
on a world scale since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall (West and Sanders 
2003). Many of these conspiracy theories involving Freemasonry and the Illuminati among others, 
have taken up an occult dimension, and people believe that members of secret lodges make rituals 
that put them in touch with the Devil, evil spirits and witches. 
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This movement had a number of elements in common with another Japanese 
sect in Kinshasa, called Church of World Messianity (Eglise Messianique 
Mondiale/Sekai Kyusei Kyo)94. This sect focused on a few basic practices, like the 
spiritual appreciation of beauty through floral arrangements (Ikebana in Japanese), and 
the practice of purifying the spiritual body through the imposition of Johrei (light of 
God radiating from the palm of the hand). As Melton and Baumann (2010: 2568) 
clearly explain: “Johrei is administered by a member who, wearing an amulet, or 
ohikari, raises the palm of her or his hand over the recipients, who may or may not be 
believers, and imparts to them the divine light of healing”.  
In Kinshasa, the doctrines of Japanese sects found a fertile soil to germinate. 
Elements of these doctrines mingled with those of local cosmologies. In fact the laying 
of hands and the use of amulets by the leaders of Japanese sects, resonated with the 
exorcism procedures of many Pentecostal pastors and prophets. In the eyes of the 
population, these figures operated through the same mechanisms, as they healed the 
sick by releasing mystical powers out of the palms of their hands. Furthermore, the 
vocabulary used by these churches was easily assimilated in the cosmology of 
Kinshasa: on one hand, oriental spirits and deities found translation in the cosmological 
world of Kinshasa, populated by witches, evil and good spirits, but also by God, the 
Holy Spirit and the Devil thanks to the influence of Pentecostalism; on the other hand, 
the Ikebana flower arrangement by the Church of World Messianity and the amulets 
used by the spiritual leader resonated with the healing properties of plants and charms 
which diviners (ngangas) prepared to counteract witchcraft.  
Japanese churches have been able to integrate themselves in the religious 
context of Kinshasa well enough to grow a respectable audience, thanks to the 
similarities between their practices and those of Pentecostalism. However, they 
nonetheless were considered by all the Kinois I interviewed as spaces of la magie, and 
as such, dangerous and illegitimate. I argue that this is the result of the influence of 
Pentecostal pastors, who depict these new Japanese religions as bewitched and satanic.  
Meyer (1992, 1995, 1998, 1999b) and Van Dijk (1995, 1999) have illustrated 
extensively the role of Pentecostalism in denigrating and ridiculing those religious 
practices linked to a rural and customary past. To put it with Meyer (1995: 237), 
Pentecostal churches have “an uncompromising attitude towards traditio nal religion, 
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 On this topic see Lambertz 2012. 
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which they depict as sheerly diabolical”. As I have explained in chapter 2, Pentecostals 
fostered the idea that all those religious practices which resort to means other than the 
Word of God to heal their followers were the work of the Devil. For example the 
divination system illustrated above and the figure of the nganga, the diviner, have been 
the target of strong attacks and denigrations by Pentecostal churches. However, in order 
to keep pace with the changes in the social context of Kinshasa, Pentecostal pastors 
have started to denigrate also more recent and more global religions, which are coming 
to Kinshasa from the outside rather than from the village. By describing the Mahikari 
and the Church of World Messianity as spaces of the Devil, Pentecostal pastors once 
again reasserted their power within the religious context of Kinshasa. We can say that 
this was their way to ‘make do’ in face of the challenge of other competing religions. 
As a result, many people I interviewed, including my Congolese family, saw these 
churches as dangerous places, in which the Devil was worshipped and death took place. 
Pentecostal pastors ‘Christianised’ the cosmological world of Kinshasa, depicting their 
churches as the only legitimated places where people could fight the evil by the power 
of God, in sharp contrast with other religious practices, which were depicted as satanic.  
According to the Kinois I interviewed, Freemasonry and Japanese sects  
provided their adepts with illegitimate wealth and fortunes. In fac t, wealth was 
considered legitimate and legitimately acquired only in the context of Pentecostal 
churches. Pentecostal pastors exhorted their followers to earn wealth legitimately “by 
the sweat of [their] brow95” rather than through la magie. At the same time, they quoted 
psalms from the Bible, and asked followers to donate money to God, who would 
reward them a hundredfold. Thus, whilst the Kinois saw wealth acquired through 
oriental sects and mystic lodges as illegitimate, they perceived wealth coming from 
God as a positive good. 
In this section, I have explained why Freemasonry and oriental sects were read 
through the lenses of la magie, a vision fostered by the thousands of Pentecostal pastors 
of Kinshasa. In the next sections, based on my ethnographic material, I shall focus on 
the mechanisms of la magie in Kinshasa, and how people associated it with notions of 
the West, modernity and progress. Through interviews and a case study, I will illustrate 
how the Kinois read the inequalities of everyday life and any accumulation of wealth 
through the lenses of la magie. 
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 From the Bible, Genesis 3:19.  
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La Magie, Modernity and Progress 
 
In the eyes of the Kinois I interviewed, Masonic lodges were organised according to a 
hierarchy of grades. The master of the lodge was believed to consult a very powerful 
magician (magicien) 96, who could access the world of la magie and initiate the other 
members to the cult. Satan himself was said to have initiated the magician, who 
operated according to Satan’s will97. In order to enter a Masonic lodge and to become 
wealthy, people were required to sacrifice members of their families. One Kinois told 
me specifically that each member of the lodge in turn had to sacrifice a relative to 
Satan, much like the members of the likelemba credit association described in chapter 
3. Should a member refuse to sacrifice a relative, he or she would be obliged to 
sacrifice themselves. Hence rumours about chronic disease, physical malformations and 
the sudden death of wealthy persons were often linked to Satanic dealings.  
As wealth was acquired though la magie, the power of the rich was perceived as 
mobulu. During my fieldwork, members of the government and of the military were 
described to me as powerful masons, who had joined Masonic or Rosicrucian lodges for 
selfish goals. By joining such lodges, they became part of a circle of power and wealth 
that allowed them to safeguard their riches (see also Cohen 1971). This was also 
highlighted in the words of Pastor Kelly Tchibani of the church Resurrection in 
Selembao, who believed that members of the elite were all involved in rumours of la 
magie: 
There are many ways to handle witchcraft. For example in the field of the job 
market, like the lodges of today, the sects in Europe, Freemasonry [ la franc-
maçonnerie], all of them, if you want to become powerful, to be at the head of 
the United States, become a mason! Like Obama, he did not have choice, he did 
not want to enter [la magie] but because of the imperium of power...  
According to pastor Kelly, as well as many other Kinois I interviewed, members 
of the Government were not only kulunas-in-ties who destroyed the country’s economy 
by pillaging its resources, but also masons and witches who obtained their offices and 
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 As explained in the introduction, the Kinois had conflicting ideas about who the agents of la 
magie were exactly. Some people mentioned a diviner rather than a magician, while others 
mentioned a powerful witch (ndoki). However, the Kinois agreed that these agents were the 
emissaries of the Devil and subverted the law of procreation and kin solidarity by killing members 
of their family – rather than taking care of them. 
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 On similar accounts of ‘satanic riches’ see Meyer (1995) and De Boeck (1999). 
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wealth through the use of la magie. Some research participants considered the Head of 
the State to be one of the top masons of the country. Rumours in la cité posited that 
Joseph Kabila ordered the assassination of his own father Laurent in 2001. In the eyes 
of some Kinois, Laurent Desiré Kabila’s assassination was the sacrifice that his son 
Joseph had to make to assume power and govern the country. Once again, a youngster 
was believed to have superseded the power of the older generation.  
 
 
FIGURE 8: A DVD sold on the streets of Kinshasa: “The rulers of the world: the 
Illuminatis”. By Alibaba, made in Iraq. Front and back covers.  
 
 
Not only was la magie believed to bring wealth within people’s lives, allowing 
for their personal development, but it was also believed to be the cause of the 
development of society at a broader level. Technological progress, western 
commodities and development in the field of medical research, urban planning and so 
on, were all believed to be the result of la magie which came from Europe. As one 
Kinois once told me, “la magie comes from the Whites” (la magie, ça vient des 
Blanches). Some people referred to it as ‘white magic’ (magie blanche), or ‘la magie of 
the Whites’, as opposed to the Congolese witchcraft (kindoki). Frédérique Tshibuabua, 
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one of the staff members of a Congolese Non-Governmental Organisation that I visited 
regularly, told me: 
It doesn’t make sense saying that witchcraft doesn’t exist, because it exists! We 
have black witchcraft, in the same way that you have white magie. For example, 
in Europe one can also produce bill notes without using the machine to 
manufacture the fakes. Simply imposing the hands on a paper, and pulling some 
smoke on top of it, and then closing the book, the magician is able to produce 
bill notes. Or for example Zidane... Zidane touched his ring before kicking a 
penalty. It doesn’t matter that he didn’t score; in any case he tried to use la 
magie. Another example: what for you is doping, for us is la magie. 
 People saw ‘white magic’ (la magie) as the antithesis of ‘black witchcraft’ 
(kindoki). Whilst the latter was employed to block people’s activities, the former was 
used to develop in life (évoluér) and to master modernity, progress and their products – 
such as forging dollar bills 98 . In fact, in the eyes of the Congolese, development 
(developpement99) and la magie were two sides of the same coin. 
The same was highlighted by Djenny Swanga, a sixteen-year old girl living in 
Maman Yemo. During our interview, she wanted to stress the different way people 
from Europe and people in Kinshasa deal with occult powers. What is interesting is that 
while Frédérique in his interview above seemed almost to place la magie and kindoki as 
opposites, in her interview Djenny speaks of only one witchcraft, which the White and 
the Congolese put to use for different reasons: 
Witches they destroy people by giving them diseases...They only make people 
suffering. For example the witchcraft of Europe is visible... In here people also 
say that Europeans are witches, but Europeans put their witchcraft in practice 
with things they do... Creations, airplanes... But we the Congolese, we don't put 
witchcraft in creating something, we're only there to make others suffering. We 
don't think good of others, we only want to hurt them.  
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 Rubbers (2009b) as well highlights how in Haut-Katanga people believe that “Whites’ opulence 
derives from the power of their spirits – a power demonstrated by the extraordinary goods imported 
from the West – and from their capacity to master the spirits in Africa” (p. 278). Moreover, some of 
the people Rubber interviewed “alluded to Whites’ invincibility to witchcraft, magic practices 
(evidenced by fantasy and horror films) and occult associations (the order of Freemasons or the 
Rosicrucians). In all cases Whites were credited with supernatural powers explaining the supremacy 
of their science and technique” (Ibid). 
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 The Kinois use indistinctively the French word développement (botomboli in Lingala, from the 
verb kotombwama, to go up) to denote both personal success in life (wealth) and scientific and 
socio-economic development (progress). The two meanings are one and the same, as in their eyes 
progress is good because it allows people to become wealthy. 
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Despite the variations between one informant and the other, all informants 
agreed that people involved in la magie and people involved in spiritual killings for the
            
sake of harming others, used kindoki for the opposite reasons. Whereas the use that the 
poor made of kindoki was seen in antithesis with development100, as witches blocked 
people’s social and economic development, la magie was considered part and parcel of 
development. In the words of the Kinois, development needed la magie to exist. 
According to the Kinois I spoke to, the Whites created airplanes and made 
scientific discoveries, which were both the cause and effect of development. As such, 
development in Kinshasa was a product of la magie: the more a country was developed, 
the more magie was involved. On the other way around, the more a country wanted to 
develop, the more magie it needed. This meant that all large foreign companies that had 
brought ‘development’ to Kinshasa from the West, such as the United Nations, the 
World Bank, or Doctors Without Borders, were rumoured to be involved in la magie101. 
Although the Kinois associated la magie with progress, riches and comfortable 
lives, they also acknowledged the other side of the coin: sacrifices had to be done in 
order to get rich. While often this involved sacrificing other people, such as relatives or 
very close friends, in other cases the sacrifices affected the very same people who 
resorted to la magie. While so far I have focused on the wealth and the progress that 
derives from la magie, the next section is devoted to the obscure side of the 
phenomenon, to deaths and sacrifices. 
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 On a same note, Smith (2008) highlight how in the Taita Hills of Southeastern Kenya, 
development derives its meaning from its contrast with witchcraft and the two exclude and inform 
each other in ambiguous ways. 
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 This is also confirmed in Ellis and Ter Haar’s work (1998, 2004) who report the words of a 
Congolese preacher called Evangelist Mukendi. In his book “Snatched from Satan’s Claws”, he 
describes the world of witches as organised like a modern metropolis and equipped with a huge 
airport. Some of the witches transform themselves in Whites and: “get out of their ‘planes’ and enter 
into bigger ones [...] destined to Europe, America or any other countries of the world. Their purpose 
is to acquire jobs in those countries posing as specialists or expatriates, to earn big salaries to be 
used for the international organization of sorcerers of the world” (Mukendi 1991 quoted in Ellis  & 
Ter Haar 1998: 184). On a similar story see Meyer (1995), who tells the story of a Nigerian man 
who published a booklet on his journey to the world of the Devil. 
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The Side Effects of la Magie 
 
Rumours and gossip regarding la magie were a daily occurrence in la cité. Allegations 
of la magie were only ever made a posteriori, after sudden deaths had occurred within 
wealthy families. Here the deceased were seen as sacrificial victims for la magie. Thus, 
the sudden death of a partner or a child within a wealthy family raised suspicions  
against spouses and parents.  
La magie involved serious side effects and required enormous sacrifices. 
Raphaël Malemo, a pastor who preached in a charismatic church in Ngiri-Ngiri, in 
central Kinshasa, expressed this as follows: 
P. Raphaël: If you want to get rich with la magie you have to sacrifice 
someone: your wife, your child, your husband, or your friend... 
But if you don’t want to make any sacrifice... For example I 
know a big man [patron]. He’s a man, but every month he has 
got the period.  
 
Silvia:  Eh! A man? 
 
P. Raphaël: Yes! A Man! But he has got a lot of money.  
 
Silvia:  And what does this mean? 
 
P. Raphaël: That it is la magie! So he’s going to get the money but he has got 
the period. This is his life, this is their lives.  
 
Silvia:  Ah it’s the sacrifice, right?  
 
P. Raphaël: But you can see that he has a lot of work to do, and that he earns 
a lot of money... He distributes money here and there... But, there 
are some things [some cons]. I know another man... In his life, he 
cannot sleep during the night.  
 
Silvia:  Really? 
 
P. Raphaël: So he sleeps during the day. If he sleeps during the night, it’s 
over. 
 
Silvia:  It’s over? 
 
P. Raphaël: You don’t wake up anymore. 
 
Silvia:  Eh! 
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P. Raphaël: That’s why you see a big man around 10pm, 11pm, he goes to 
the bar, women, and whatever else, until the morning. He’s got a 
lot of money.... In another case... You know, I know a couple. 
The husband can transform into a python. Every midnight, he 
transforms himself. His wife has the antidote, a magic ring. 
When he transforms, the python eats the cardboard and later he 
vomits dollars102. Then, after five or six cardboards, his wife uses 
the magic ring to hit him three times on the body, and the python 
transforms itself into the man. 
Masons who spent their fortunes on alcohol and women were believed to 
engage in lavish potlatch-style expenditures (buying beers and paying prostitutes for 
themselves as well as for their friends) to assert their power. The bar at night became 
the place where they spent mystical wealth103. Moreover, people who engaged in la 
magie twisted social and physical rules: they could transform into animals, they could 
engage in perverse sexual practices – like sleeping with one’s own mother, as 
illustrated above – and men could have periods. Stories of incestuous behaviour 
signified the distinctive character of la magie. To put it with De Boeck (1999) people 
involved in la magie in Kinshasa “inverts the natural flow of the life-stream from 
ascendants to descendants” (Ibid: 189) in order to achieve success. 
Although la magie was able to make someone wealthy, the price to pay was 
very high and could often result into the death of the person involved in such dealings. 
People could enrich themselves one day, but die the next. This contributed to foment 
gossip over the mystical character of wealth. Wealth and la magie were seen to work in 
the same way: both were fleeting, unstable and involved taking high risks. The next 
case study illustrates the pervasiveness of rumours of la magie in Kinshasa, as this 
episode concerned some relatives of the family I was living with.  
 
A Suspicious Death 2: of Death, Money and a Climber Plant 
 
While I was in Kinshasa, a case of la magie happened in Julia’s enlarged family. The 
husband of one of Julia’s sister-in- law, who used to work for the Congolese 
government, died on a mission abroad. His body was found in his hotel room in a 
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neighbouring country and death was apparently due to a heart attack. I was extremely 
surprised when the night after his death, while we were sitting in our veranda waiting in 
vain for the electricity, my friend Joseph said that he wanted to tell me “the true story” 
of the deceased. 
 
The man, Eliah Manuana, had managed to attain a position of power within the 
government after entering a Masonic sect. In order to maintain his power, he was 
required to make a sacrifice, and he decided to sacrifice his own health for money. 
Eliah had a large sore on his leg which would not heal104 and caused him a great deal of 
pain. The sore appeared shortly after his affiliation to the sect. After some time Eliah 
married his first wife, with whom he had four children and whom he later tried to bring 
into the sect. Joseph told me that Eliah’s wife also joined the sect out of love, and 
initially agreed to sacrifice one of her children. But she soon regretted her choice and 
decided to quit. However, she had to pay for her decision with her own life.  
A few days before her death, when she was already seriously ill and could not 
move from her bed, she called her two older brothers. She told them the full story about 
her and her husband’s magie, and asked them to visit their natal village in the east of 
the country to stop la magie from harming other members of her family. Once there, 
they needed to climb onto the roof of their family house, where they would see a plant 
with flowers (uwa in Swahili, the language spoken in the east of the country). In order  
to render la magie powerless, they were required to uproot the plant. The two brothers 
went to their family home in Bukavu by plane. But once in the East, they magically 
forgot why they were there. They started to visit different relatives and friends who m 
they had not seen in years, and got lost in the frills of celebration. 
Entire weeks passed and they had to come back to the capital. As soon as they 
put their feet down at Ndjili airport in Kinshasa, they abruptly woke up and 
remembered what they were supposed to do back at the village. They remembered the 
reason for their trip, and realised that they had failed in their mission. This is why la 
magie was still inside their family and why Eliah died. Apparently, the children of the 
man did not want to enter la magie, but rumours of their involvement in Masonic sects 
already started to circulate at their father’s funeral (matanga). 
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 Such sore was believed to be mbasu, an infection of the skin which provokes nasty ulcers. 
Mbasu, in the Kinois’ imaginary, was believed to be caused by mystical powers, in this case la 
magie. 
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The example of Eliah Manuana’s death explains the dangers of dealing with la 
magie, including the sacrifice of kin, wealth, sudden death, and gossip that it entails. 
We can say that Eliah sacrificed himself rather than to kill any of his relatives. As 
Geschiere (1997) put it in regards to witchcraft among the Maka (called djambe): 
“[o]ne can even say that the djambe armor – although strengthening the “big men” in 
certain respects – makes them more vulnerable in others” (p. 94). In fact, sacrificial 
death and misfortunes were more likely to happen to people who made use of occult 
powers. 
In this example we notice once again the interplay between the ideas of kindoki 
and la magie. It is thanks to occult forces present in the village (the symbol of a 
customary past and kindoki), that la magie can operate. The plant with flower (uwa) is 
like a charm, something that allows occult powers to flow not only between reality and 
witchcraft, but also between the village and Kinshasa. For many city-dwellers who 
migrated from the rural areas, the village was still an important benchmark for kinship 
networks and mystical powers. Moreover, according to Joseph, plants like the uwa were 
very common in people’s houses. This denoted once again the danger of witchcraft, 
which could affect any family without members noticing it – apart from the person who 
made use of it. Nobody could be sure of anything or anyone, not even in their own 
households. 
La magie was a source of mobulu not only for the direct forms of harm against 
relatives in the form of sacrifice, but also for the climate of mistrust and danger it 
creates within the family. When rumours of Eliah, the protagonist of the case study 
above, started to circulate about his belonging to an occult Masonic lodge after his 
death, this affected his daughters, who were suspected of being drawn into la magie 
themselves. The circle of whispering and accusations against the daughters highly 
affected their everyday lives. When I left them, they were trying to clear any 
involvement in la magie by venting their frustration with as many relatives as possible, 
and circulate a counter-rumour of their innocence. Thus, the invisible mobulu of la 
magie, through rumours and gossips, directly affect relationships in everyday life, 
contributing to more mobulu and insecurity at the material level of everyday life, 
particularly within the family and within the local community. We can now understand 
Joseph and Julia’s concern when I initially expressed a desire to visit a Masonic lodge: 
they were afraid that I might be persuaded to sacrifice a member of my (Congolese) 
family in exchange for wealth.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have introduced the reader to the complex world of witchcraft 
(kindoki), and in particular to the manifestation of la magie. These two are very 
complex and often contradictory practices: they share many elements yet at the same 
time maintaining a degree of uniqueness and differentiation. While kindoki was used in 
order to make people fail because of jealousy and hatred, la magie was used in order to 
become rich. Through examples and case studies, I have demonstrated how people 
circulated rumours according to which rich people would sacrifice members of their 
family in the world of witchcraft to increase their wealth through magic dealings.  
The world of la magie is a world of multiple forms of mobulu, such as killing, 
betrayals, secrets and lies. It is a world of predatory consumption, a consumption which 
requires the extinction of other people for the sake of enrichment. At the same time, la 
magie recalls the “predatory economy” (Devisch 1995: 610) of la débrouille in 
Kinshasa, according to which people resorted to petty thieveries, cheating and scam in 
order to survive – often at the expenses of someone else. From this point of view, la 
magie is deeply interrelated to the concept of se débrouiller. La débrouille is a more 
practical means of survival, which allowed people to empower themselves in face of 
conditions of economic impasse and state negligence – that is structural mobulu. Recent 
economic developments (or lack thereof) and the unpredictability of la débrouille have 
transformed social life and brought some young people into a fierce and often violence 
fight for survival. For example, the kuluna street gangs analysed in chapter 4 have 
taken it upon themselves to secure a passage to adulthood not waiting for the state. Like 
the physical forms of mobulu, la magie provides both a space of danger but also one of 
opportunity. 
This chapter speaks to all the over-arching themes threaded throughout this 
thesis: showing the interplay between the mobulu of the state, the mobulu of everyday 
life and the mobulu of la magie, and how these multiple dimensions contribute to shape 
notions of mobulu in Kinshasa. The mobulu employed by many young people to make 
do both in material and invisible ways, is not simply a destructive force, but we could 
describe it as a predatory force, a force which appropriate other forms of mobulu – state 
mobulu and everyday life mobulu – in order to create new avenues for empowerment.  
The poor of la cité faced the inequalities of everyday life through rumours and 
gossip about la magie. From this point of view, discourses on la magie helped the 
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Kinois shape and make sense of their social worlds. By accusing the wealthy of making 
occult dealings, the poor of la cité invested themselves with agency that diverted them 
from the “empire of modern passivity” (Bastian 2001: 89). Moreover, la magie helped 
the Kinois re-build a sort of morality in face of adversity. Through rumours of la magie, 
the poor were able to see rich people into a new perspective: the poor might lack the 
wealth to live comfortably, but they considered themselves to be honest people who 
earned a living through the sweat of their brow. Contrarily, the elite earned their wealth 
through illegitimate mystical forces. The elite and the powerful in society were 
described as mobulu, because they were rumoured to have acquired their wealth 
through the channels of la magie. 
In the next chapter, I will illustrate how the mobulu of everyday life has affected 
relationships not only within broader society, but also within the intimate sphere of the 
family, challenging pre-existing rules and structures and bringing transformation and 
tension – and more mobulu – among family members. 
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- CHAPTER SIX - 
HOUS EHOLDS IN KINSHASA: BETWEEN FLUIDITY AND RELUCTANT SOLIDARITY 
 
On Thursday evenings, Joseph Mutambu and I had the habit of attending prayer 
meetings at the local branch of the Primary Living Church Communities 
(Communautés Ecclésiales Vivantes de Base, CEVB) in Maman Yemo. During these 
meetings people discussed themes from the Gospel or the Biblical reading for the next 
Sunday mass. The meetings took place in the courtyard of one of our neighbours. In 
one of these meetings, after the initial prayer, the host, called moyangeli, affirmed that 
the theme of the meeting was unity in marriage and he asked for people to contribute 
and give their opinion. 
That day, a large group of young people aged about eighteen, was present. One 
of them stood up, encouraged by the presence of her friends. In Lingala, she blamed kin 
for causing problems for married couples: 
They [the parents] know that the couple is married, but rather than let them 
enjoy their goods, they still come to ask money from them... The father of a girl, 
when she gets married, says to his daughter: “Oh, when you arrive there [in the 
new household], do not forget about me [kobosana ngai te]”... How can the 
couple live in harmony? And then, for example, the married woman wants to 
help her family but she does not want to irritate her husband with requests of 
money. So she takes money in secret, like that, cache-cache [hide-hide]... When 
the man finds out the ‘hide-hide’ he will get mad, and this is going to cause 
problems. 
The host then gave the floor to a woman in her sixties, who replied: 
Once you get married, you are not excluded from the extended family (libota 
munene), you are still part of that. If your father or your mother needs 
something, why can’t you help them? Yes, parents should not be too much 
demanding of their children, they do not have to ask too much, but when 
problems arise, you should always help each other. You cannot cut us out.  
In the context of Kinshasa, the family (libota) had undergone several changes. 
Such changes were certainly due to the economic crisis, which had eroded solidarity 
among family members. Money and wealth were so insecure and volatile that it was 
impossible for family members to help each other as it was expected from them. At the 
same time, however, changes within the family were also caused by intergenerational 
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tensions between the youngsters and the elders of the kin, as the youngsters challenged 
the authority of their elders on a daily basis, by denying them any control or decision 
over their lives.  
The brief example I have illustrated above demonstrates the intergenerational 
tensions emerging in Kinshasa which I will discuss in the course of this chapter. In fact, 
whereas in the past, the elders were considered the holders of political and spiritual 
power within the family, today their decisional power has been compromised by young 
people’s emancipation thanks to market economy and the world of salaried labour.  
Kinshasa was born as a trade post for young, fit-to-work men. The wealth that 
young people earned in town clashed with the social power of the elders in the village: 
the first was a modern power which was produced in the city, the second a customary 
one which was valid in the village. The city itself, as a new, cosmopolitan space 
influenced by lifestyles and custom from a number of different places, contributed to 
emancipated young people from gerontocratic hierarchies of power.  
The city became the locus par excellence of the tensions between the older, 
customary power of the elders, and the newer social power of youth. This has also been 
demonstrated by the rise of the bill street gangs and the sapeurs since the 1940s. These 
two groups were the first to challenge the gerontocracy of power, and opened the way 
for a number of phenomena and movements which challenged the hierarchies of power 
in several fields of society: in the realm of la débrouille, in which women and young 
people really took over; in the new construction of manhood through force of the 
kulunas; and in the new disproportionate enrichment of young entrepreneurs through 
the obscure channels of market economy – entrepreneurs who were rumoured to be 
involved into the witchcraft deeds of la magie.  
In the same way as they did in other fields, young people seemed to take over 
also in the more intimate circle of the domestic sphere. In Kinshasa, the autocratic 
figure of the pater familias, the head of the family, has been eroded. Because of the 
lack of employment and the economic crisis, young people in Kinshasa struggled to 
find the resources necessary to create a family. It became almost impossible for young 
men to pay the bridewealth that sanctioned official marriages. Thus, the majority of 
young couples were almost obliged to subvert the power of the elders creating unions 
which ignored bridewealth. These unions were often short lived, because family elders 
often disapproved of them, and denied couples economic and emotional support. In the 
absence of official approval and support by the elders, younger people looked outside 
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their unions for self-help, creating a chain of short- lived unions with different partners. 
By creating their own unions and leaving parents as passive spectators, young people 
have ‘killed’ the authority of elders. Such social parricide, as I call it, and the shortened 
unions that resulted from it, profoundly affected the structure of the household. The 
households of la cité were very fluid units, whose membership varied drastically 
through time. 
I aim to show here how the economic hardship and the intergenerational 
tensions at family level have rendered households very unstable units, contributing to 
increasing mobulu within the family, which often resulted in witchcraft accusations – 
and therefore more mobulu. Thus, ‘the violence in the house’ (mobulu na ndako) was at 
the same time cause and effect of further mobulu, which often took on a mystical 
character. 
The scholarship on households in Africa has shown how in the African urban 
areas, it has become nearly impossible to define households in terms of static criteria 
such as ‘nuclear family’ or ‘unilineal cluster’. Ross (1996) in her article on domesticity 
in South Africa, proposes to define the household as a unit whose members were tied 
by the common responsibility to contribute to its maintenance. On the same note, 
Murray (1981), in his book on migrant labour in Lesotho, describes the household as 
formed by both “those who eat from one pot” and “those who make us live” (Ibid: 47- 
48), meaning those who bring income to the household. From this point of view, the 
two authors above saw economic co-operation as a more appropriate criterion of 
defining households than co-residence. In fact, the “practices and functions of 
(re)production and consumption” (Ross 1993 : 35 in Spiegel et. al. 1996) that 
characterised the family were often distributed in space, as relatives moved between 
different homes, and contributed to the maintenance of different domestic units. 
Households were thus extremely diversified 105, and many families were ‘stretched’ in 
space. This prompted Ross (1996) to describe households as “the (temporary) loci of 
densely packed social conglomerates that altered rapidly overtime” (p. 56), a 
phenomenon that she baptised as “diffusion of domesticity” (p.58).  
These explanations do not fully capture the family context of Kinshasa. By 
focusing only on domesticity, Murray (1981) and Ross (1996) exhibit an over-
optimistic view about household creation. My own research data suggest that there was 
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something about households in Kinshasa that was not domestic at all, because of the 
easiness with which strangers entered the intimate sphere of the house. Domesticity in 
this context becomes a very misleading concept. Rather than the mutual care and 
cooperation typical of the extended family, households in Kinshasa were affected by 
sudden changes to living arrangements (coerced child fosterage, or unexpected and 
unwanted guests for prolonged time), and often mistrust. This made households in 
Kinshasa extremely different from the model based on cooperation and trust of the 
extended family as described by Ross (1996, 2003). This suggests a new household 
pattern, which I call ‘exo-household’ because of its power to bloat the household and 
incorporate people who are considered extraneous and external to the domestic kin 
network. Exo-households gained dependents that were reluctantly accepted, and who 
sometimes put the lives of household members at risk through witchcraft.  
However, I also argue that there was a hidden order which lay beneath the 
apparent disorder of exo-households’ formation in Kinshasa. In the precarious 
economic and living conditions of la cité, families were affected by new rules and 
survival strategies, based on the fluidity of young men and women and their capacity to 
adapt to everyday hardship. 
The chapter starts with a brief description of the family in the pre-colonial era 
and the changes during colonialism, when the state imposed the nuclear family as 
model of domesticity in Leopoldville. However, politico-economic changes made it 
impossible for people to construct viable nuclear households. The Kinois rather 
reworked the notion of the family and re-evaluated solidarity mechanisms proper of life 
in the village. However, economic limitations made it difficult for city dwellers to 
satisfy the requests of their extended families. As such, borrowing Bähre’s (2007b) 
definition, I argue that Kinshasa’s  families were tied by bonds of “reluctant solidarity”, 
torn between customary obligations, the difficulty to fulfil them, and their quest for 
independence. 
If the notion of the family changed through time, so did the household. Exo-
households resulted from the mobility of young people, who navigated between the city 
and the countryside to make do through la débrouille, and entered into short-term 
unions. I then use the example of the exo-household of the young couple I lived with, 
Joseph Mutambu and Julia Wembi, as an extended case study, to show the fluidity of 
young people and their resilience in coping with economic hardship, customary 
obligations and the double-edged mechanisms of reluctant solidarity in Kinshasa.   
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From the Unilineal Family to the Colonial Invention of the Nuclear Family 
 
Vansina (1966) states that during the first half of the twentieth century, the populations 
of the Bas-Congo and Kinshasa regions were organised by matrilineal families in terms 
of descent, inheritance and succession106. As Doutreloux (1966: 121) highlights: 
The nuclear group is not the couple and their children, but the minimal 
matrilineage constituted by a brother and one or more of his sisters and their 
children. These different nuclear groups, assembled under the authority of the 
firstborn, form the matrilineage, mvumu (my translation from French).  
However, marriage was virilocal and the custody of the male children was 
patrilocal, which led to great mobility in residence (Vansina 1966: 26). The 
mechanisms of mobility and the circulation of women and children between families 
were at the base of alliances between different domestic groups. As such, marriage and 
progeny were political tools that assured the existence and development of a given kin 
group. Marriage was generally sanctioned by the payment of a bridewealth, which 
according to Vansina (1966), at the beginning of 1900, was still purely symbolic in 
many regions, particularly within matrilineal societies. Once a couple was officially 
married, the extended family provided economic and social support for the new couple 
and their children. In this way, the broader kin group sought to alleviate social tensions 
(such as the jealousy between co-wives and their children) and economic obligations 
(such as bridewealth and ritual payments).  
At the beginning of its development, Leopoldville was inhabited by young male 
Congolese workers who were brought into town as labourers from all regions of the 
country, and who were housed into labour camps (La Fontaine 1970a). At the time, 
women were forbidden from entering Leopoldville (Gondola 2009: 79), which 
functioned merely as a trade post and as industrial station rather than as an urban 
centre. 
The situation started to change in the 1930s. The Belgian government, aiming to 
create a middle class among the Congolese, started to focus on educating the 
population, and to establish Western life-styles and institutions such as the nuclear 
family (Comhaire 1956b; Hunt 1990). This is why from the 1930s, women started to be 
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allowed into town. Many of them migrated to join their kinsmen, whilst others arrived 
in town in order to escape the polygyny and patriarchy they were subjected to in the 
village107, and for the possibility of independence and enrichment the city represented.  
The model of the nuclear family (famille nucléaire), which was soon adopted by 
évolués eager to integrate the practices of the colonial state, was sponsored not only by 
the colonial administration but also by the missionaries. The latter aimed at creating 
“important connections between Western family ideology, the colonial construction of 
womanhood and domesticity, and the emergence of a colonised urban elite” (Hunt 
1990: 448-449). The nuclear family focused on the conjugal couple as the locus of 
domesticity, a vision which diverged from notions of the extended family and solidarity 
mechanisms endorsed in the rural areas.  
Whereas the model of matrilineal families, focused upon the authoritative 
maternal uncle, prevailed in villages, the model of the nuclear family in town 
empowered the figure of the husband-father. The rise of the figure of the father 
accorded with Christian teaching, and was reinforced by the fact that only men could 
obtain salaried employment in town (Comhaire 1956a: 12). The power structure within 
the nuclear family strongly collided with that of the extended kin, as fathers claimed 
power over their children while maternal uncles claimed power over their nephews. 
This tension was still present in many families during my fieldwork, and people were 
still trying to re-define their idea of families and figures of authority within them. 
Despite colonial efforts to reform the family according to the nuclear model, it 
was impossible for the Congolese to live by this standard. As Comhaire (1956a: 11) put 
it, “[b]esides tradition, low wages, unskilled employment, and the absence of pr ivate 
property all contributed to defeat the progress of the nuclear middle-class family” 108. 
Although the colonial government had discouraged collaboration between nuclear 
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the freehold rights to their plots. [...] The occupant was free to build on his parcelle, and when he 
left it he could sell the building or other improvements”. 
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families and other relatives in the rural areas, the exchanges be tween urban and rural 
kin gained renewed strength during the great depression of the 1930s, when the Congo 
and European industries were hit by the global crisis. Left without a job, many young 
people who had found in the city a place to disengage from customary obligations, 
rediscovered in their familial solidarity networks a source of survival (see also 
Ferguson 1992: 89). 
The economic crisis that followed the depression had a huge impact on the 
development of the urban layout of Leopoldville. Although at the end of the 1940s the 
houses provided by the government to the workers were “built for nuclear families” (La 
Fontaine 1970a: 5), households in the cités and the zones annexes were overflowing 
due to the huge number of relatives, who took advantage of the renewed solidarity 
networks between kin in the villages and kin in town.  
Rural-urban ties and the collaboration between extended families continued to 
affect the socio-economic context of Kinshasa during the 1950s and after 
Independence. Janet MacGaffey (1983) analysed the ties that existed between Kinshasa 
and the Bas-Congo village of Mbanza Manteke in 1965. Her data “reveal the 
interdependence of village and town and a form of family organization adapted to 
mobility within the total urban-rural social field” (MacGaffey 1983: 69). Because “the 
matrilineage offer[ed] security when necessary” (Ibid: 82), many city-dwellers found 
that their familial bonds assisted them in making a life in the often harsh living 
conditions of Kinshasa. 
Solidarity and cooperation within the domestic groups were also central to life 
in Kinshasa during the 1990s when, following Mobutu’s broken promises of political 
and socio-economic progress, healing churches preached a break with modernity and a 
return to “aspects of the lineage mode of production and family solidarity patterns” 
(Devisch 1998: 239). At the same time, the revaluation of the small neighbourhood of a 
few matrilocal households – a phenomenon which Devisch calls “villagisation” (Ibid) – 
helped in creating a new sense of communalism and confronting everyday hardship. 
Relationships between urban and rural dwellers kept informing everyday life in 
Kinshasa in the decades that followed, as explained in the next section. 
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The Notion of the Family in Contemporary Kinshasa 
 
At the time of my fieldwork in Kinshasa, the western concept of nuclear family (libota) 
and the unilineal extended family (libota munene) coexisted. Family was defined 
primarily according to the nuclear model of the married couple and their children. 
However, such nuclear families have joined together with couples formed by brothers, 
sisters and parents, forming what the Kinois called ‘enlarged family’ (famille élargie).  
Central to this idea of the family as a whole was the notion of ‘African 
solidarity’ (solidarité africaine), an expression popularly used in Kinshasa as well as 
other regions of the country (see for example Petit & Mulumbwa 2005). The adjective 
‘African’ was used by the Kinois to denote the difference between what they perceived 
as their way of life, made of sharing and helping, as opposed to a Western life-style, 
which they described as individualistic and characterised by selfish accumulation. This 
expression denoted the customary exchange of money and favours between members of 
the extended family as a way of helping each other and strengthening bonds of 
dependence. These solidarity mechanisms often took place through the c irculation of 
children between households (also called libota, like the family, or bana ya ndako, 
children of the house) of the same extended family. On the one hand, children from the 
city were sent to the village to learn about customs and kinship ties; on the other, 
children from the village were sent to town to receive schoo ling (see also Comhaire 
1956b). 
My research participants described African solidarity as the cornerstone of 
village life. Adults and elders in Kinshasa depicted the village as the locus of moral and 
social order par excellence; the place in which customary rituals and gerontocratic 
hierarchies were respected; where the bridewealth was a symbolic exchange of small 
gifts, and where exchange and reciprocity networks still operated. However, rather than 
reflecting the truth, such statements about the village offered a covert critique of the 
city and of the independence of young people109. In fact, some studies highlighted how 
families in the village were affected by a very high rate of divorce 110 , while the 
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bridewealth in many cases was far from being symbolic 111 . Discourses on African 
solidarity and on ‘the village’, in many cases just an imaginary abstract concept, 
symbolised an idealised way of life which stood in stark contrast to the unstable 
domestic context of Kinshasa. Migration from village into town, migrant labour, 
conjugal dissolution, low-life expectancies, poor living and economic conditions, and 
inadequate health care have led to the formation of diverse family and household 
structures. Among all, there were two factors which I believe were particularly central 
in this process. First, the fluidity of young people in the informal economy, and second, 
the fluidity of young people in bonding together in informal alliances. Both phenomena 
involved mainly youngsters, those “social shifters” (Durham 2004) who were most able 
to shift between rural and urban milieus, and local and global life-styles and economies. 
 
Young People’s Fluidity in the Informal Economy  
 
Migration flows between rural and urban areas (rather than simply from rural to urban 
areas) have always characterised Kinshasa and its hinterland. Whereas rural dwellers 
were attracted to the city because of the possibility of employment in the new market 
economy, urban dwellers have re-evaluated the country in times of economic impasse. 
As De Boeck and Plissart (2004: 44) put it, “whereas the c ity has become peripheral 
and in some respects village- like, the bush in the place where dollars are generated, 
where the good life is shaped and where villages are transformed into booming 
diamond settlements” (also see De Boeck 2000a, 2001). 
During my fieldwork, many Kinois engaged in trade with the neighbouring 
villages, collecting food and later reselling goods in town. Trade often concerned not 
only rural areas nearby the city, but also distant regions and foreign countries, such as 
Angola and the neighbouring countries along the eastern border of Congo112. A distant 
cousin of my friend Joseph used to travel by boat from Kinshasa to Kisangani, a 
perilous trip of roughly 1,700 kilometres by boat, which lasted about three weeks. He 
would sell bags full of shoes and clothing in the East, before returning to Kinshasa by 
the same route with fresh food from the rural areas. Traders like him spent long periods 
                                                 
111
 Accounts that describe village life and customary practices in villages from the 1900 describe an 
increase in the price of the bridewealth linked to the influence of the market economy and the trade 
with the Europeans (see Vansina 1973: 89; Hunt 1991: 479). 
112
 On this topic also see MacGaffey J. (1991), De Boeck (1999), and MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-
Ganga (2000). 
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of their lives between two or more households in different and distant contexts, often 
building parallel lives and parallel families. 
As a result of this mutual exchange between what has become an economically 
‘peripheral centre’ (the city) and a ‘central periphery’ (the rich and prosperous rural 
areas), many households in Kinshasa temporarily hosted kin from the village. Men and 
women moved back and forth between urban and rural areas, or between different areas 
of the same city, and it was exactly this movement of people that enabled families to 
survive. Constraining people into the boundaries of one single household, or one single 
social context (like the city as opposed to the rural milieu) would have meant to limit 
their survival strategies and possibilities of success (see also Ferguson 1990a, 1990b). 
La débrouille required a certain fluidity to be effective, and family structures had to 
stay fluid in order to soften the blows of the unstable market economy.  
 
Young People’s Fluidity in Marriage: Modern Forms of Alliance  
 
Young people’s fluidity in romantic relationships was the second factor of 
diversification and instability of households in Kinshasa. As I mentioned above, the 
payment of bridewealth established the prerogative to marry and form a family. At the 
time of my fieldwork, a couple who wanted to fulfil all obligations had to undergo three 
different marriages: a civic marriage (libala ya l’état), religious marriage (libala ya 
ndako ya nzambe), and customary marriage (libala ya coutume or libala ya bakoko, the 
latter meaning ‘wedding of the ancestors’). The most important of the three, the one 
who gave officiality to the union in front of the elders of the family, was the customary 
marriage. 
In Kinshasa, a proper customary marriage involved three stages. The first was 
the introduction of the groom-to-be to the bride’s family (a procedure called 
presentation), during which the two families met for the first time and agreed on the 
bridewealth. The second was the offering of a little-bridewealth (pre-dot or petite dot) 
to the woman’s family by the man’s family, which functioned as a sort of ‘deposit’ of 
the bridewealth to come. The third was the offering of the final bridewealth (dot, or 
mbongo ya libala, money of the wedding), followed by a lavish party with banquet and 
music. 
Due to economic restraints, many young men, although eager to become 
engaged to their beloved ones, were encountering difficulties in paying the bridewealth. 
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Several Congolese complained to me about the inflation of the bridewealth, described 
by many Kinois as much more opulent than in the past. A bridewealth at the time of my 
fieldwork included outfits and accessories for the parents of the bride (including Italian 
branded shoes, expensive watches and belts for men, and expensive Dutch-printed 
African fabrics for women), several boxes of beer and non-alcoholic drinks, goats and 
cows (the type of cattle depending on the region), food stock, items for the house and 
cash in American dollars. 
 
 
FIGURE 9: During a bridewealth ceremony: a member of the groom’s family presents 
gifts to a member of the bride’s family. Among the items we can see a suit, shoes, belt, 
a shirt, and a machete. However, the list (on the table) was much longer and involved 
also kitchen tools and cattle.  
 
 
The cost of bridewealth had become prohibitive, often exceeding $1,500. 
According to Wyatt MacGaffey (1983: 179), the inflation of bridewealth was the result 
of “the engagement of most men of working age in wage- labour from about 1900 
onwards, and represent[ed] a kind of tax levied on the capitalist sector by the villagers”. 
Increased educational participation also contributed to the increase in bridewealth. 
Many girls travelled to Kinshasa to enrol in university. Education was prohibitively 
expensive compared to the economic possibilities of the Kinois, and through 
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bridewealth husbands were expected to repay the debt girls incurred with their families 
because of education. As a young man who recently married explained to me:  
Here in Kinshasa, women are seen as merchandise. They cannot ask 2,000 
dollars for a woman! And today, with the education system, it is even worse, 
because when they give their daughter for marriage, the family says that they 
spent a lot of money to educate her, so the bride wealth should pay for that too. 
If the woman really wants to emancipate herself and have equal opportunities, 
she should start to change the bridewealth mechanisms and stop being 
considered as value of exchange! 
Formal education was considered the key to succeed in modern society and to 
access western commodities through the salaried market (La Fontaine 1970a; Bongo-
Pasi Moke Sangol & Tsakala Munikengi 2004). As such, girls were valued not only for 
the offspring they produced, but also for the possibilities of access to the job market. 
Girls were considered as a source of wealth because of the western education they 
received. In the eyes of the Kinois, university titles were the key to access the job 
market. Thus, without considering the economic crisis and the fact that most of 
Kinshasa’s young people stayed jobless after university, parents required the groom-to-
be to make up for the precious investment they were about to lose by wedding their 
daughters. 
It is worth noting that the elders of the woman’s family decided the price of 
bridewealth, while the elders of the man’s family were supposed to help him collect the 
amount required. As such, marriage between the couple was a familial affair, linked to 
solidarity mechanisms among the kin group. However, not many people in Kinshasa 
could count on the help of their extended families due to low life expectancies, familial 
tensions or simply because of poverty among their relatives. This, as well, has resulted 
in intergenerational tensions, as young people interpreted the expensive bridewealth as 
a means whereby the elders of the woman’s family obstructed their marriages.  
In the face of this difficult situation, many young Kinois have found alternative 
solutions by adopting different sorts of unions, that entailed the payment of a smaller 
amount of money.  
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 Shortened Marriage (Mariage Raccourci) 
 
In shortened marriages, the families of the young couple made an initial, provisory 
agreement through the payment of a small, symbolic bridewealth. This form of 
marriage developed in the same way as the normal customary marriage, but did not 
proceed to the final payment of the bridewealth. As some Kinois explained to me, the 
man gave the ‘little-bridewealth’ as if to reimburse the family of the woman, who 
would feel ‘robbed’ if they were not compensated for the loss of their daughter. A 
rhetoric of stealing was used, which denoted the constant tensions between 
generations113. The daughter then went to live in the man’s household, with the implicit 
assumption that he would pay ‘real bridewealth’ as soon as he was able to collect the 
money. 
The shortened marriage had the function of lowering the tensions between the 
two families, and set up the basis for acceptance into the solidarity networks of the 
extended family. For example, my friend Joseph offered only four boxes of drinks (two 
of beers and two cold drinks), a goat, and a little sum of money ($150) as bridewealth 
to the family of Julia Wembi. Even in this case, however, tensions arose when some of 
Julia’s older relatives started to provoke Joseph by verbally abusing him and 
denigrating him during the ceremony. In fact, some relatives found it offensive that 
such a small amount of bridewealth was given for their daughter, and tried to dissuade 
Joseph from becoming engaged to Julia. However, due to the economic hardship of 
people in Kinshasa, many families acknowledged the difficulty to collect the entire 
bridewealth, and agreed to this type of union.  
This form of shortened marriage had a double function: on the one hand, it 
allowed the young couple to start building a family. On the other, it allowed the elders 
of the woman’s family some control over their son- in- law, as the debt of the 
bridewealth was not yet paid. At the same time, the elders of the man’s family held 
some authority because the young woman was still not officially part of their family. 
This put great pressure on the girl, who was treated with less respect, and who was 
constantly on probation, to see if she could make a good wife.  
                                                 
113
 The same rhetoric of stealing is visible in a Kongo text introduced by MacGaffey (1986): 
“Supposing a young man were simply to elope with a woman, ‘stealing’ her [vo ukwelele mu zaku 
ngolo, nkento kayiba], subsequent difficulties would be on his own head” (Cahier 384 in MacGaffey 
1986: 28). 
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 ‘Staying Together’ (Yaka Tovanda) or ‘Free Union’ (Union Libre)  
 
Another very common form of union was called 'come, let us stay together' (yaka 
tovanda in Lingala). This form of union was not legitimised by either bridewealth or 
pre-bridewealth, and was known as a ‘free union’, although in some cases a payment 
could be made a posteriori (see below). Unlike in the shortened marriage, yaka tovanda 
was a temporary, emergency union for young people who had a baby out of wedlock. In 
order to understand how yaka tovanda worked, we need to look at its most common 
mechanisms. 
During my stay in Kinshasa, an unmarried girl who became pregnant had two 
options: abortion, which was performed illegally by nurses at home or in one of the 
poorly-equipped private clinics of la cité. According to some women I spoke to, the 
abortion procedure involved the ingestion of strong medicines and plant remedies, 
together with very violent methods to expel the foetus, such as beating and summary 
incisions. However, this was a very risky procedure and complicacies were very 
common, which often led to the death of the girl. The second option was to keep the 
baby and have a child born out of wedlock, with all the consequences that it involved.  
When an unmarried girl confessed that she was pregnant, her outraged family 
arranged a meeting with the family of the young man, whom they believed to be the 
father. Once the man had admitted the fact, the man’s family was obliged to host the 
pregnant girl during pregnancy and birth. In this way, the father of the child was made 
responsible for any medical expenses during the child’s delivery114. 
After the birth, the young couple, either because under pressure by their 
families, or because they were not sentimentally attached to each other, often decided 
not to stay together. This meant that the girl returned to live in her natal household. At 
this point the father was supposed to make a small payment for the baby (doter 
l’enfant), called ‘child-price’. Only after the payment of child-price could the father and 
his family claim any rights over the baby. If the couple decided to stay and live 
together, the young man was supposed to make a payment for the woman rather than 
for the baby itself. This payment, rather than being a child-price, was an a-posteriori 
                                                 
114
 The situation was more complicated in the case of a man having more than one relationship at 
the same time. In this case, the pregnant woman could not go and stay in the man’s household, 
where in many cases the other woman (the rival, mbanda) lived. As such, the pregnant girl stayed 
with her family while the man contributed to the girl’s expenses ‘from the dis tance’. 
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form of the little-bridewealth for the woman. However, even after the payment of the 
little-bridewealth, these types of marriage were extremely fragile. The grandmother of a 
child born out of his son’s yaka tovanda union explained me: 
In 90% of cases, they [the young couple] will not stay together in the future. If 
the boy, when he grows up, finds another woman, the first woman will have to 
go back to her place. And about the child, it will be decided together [among the 
two families] if he has to stay with the mother in her household or with the 
father and the step-mother. 
In many cases, young men did not want to pay for the child-price nor the a-
posteriori pre-bridewealth. They considered the baby as the result of a youthful error 
and neither they nor their partners wanted to engage in any relationship – let alone 
marriage. Many men were involved in different relationships at the same time, and 
could not afford to sustain the child and to pay for the child-price, which would mean 
officially acknowledge one relationship. Thus, the child born out of wedlock continued 
to live in the mother’s household. 
Other times, however, it was the mother who decided to leave her child behind 
and move on to form a new relationship. In fact new partners often disapproved of 
children born from their partners’ previous relationships: step-mothers, step-fathers and 
their respective families were often the first to try to get rid of the children, making life 
for them almost impossible or accusing them of being dangerous witches (see next 
chapter). In this case, the child could either stay with the woman’s extended family, 
while the mother went to live with his new partner; or s/he would be sent to stay in the 
father’s household, even if the latter had not paid for the child-price. This made the 
position of such unwanted children extremely fragile, as they were sent back and forth 
between different households, often under very stressful and harsh conditions 115. This 
facilitated the rise of witchcraft accusations against children, who were seen as to 
embody unresolved debts between the families.  
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 The situation for the children became even more fragile when one or both of their parents started 
to neglect them or died abruptly. Children were left without any kind of familial support, with 
nobody to fight for their inclusion within the family. Many people often refused (or found an 
excuse) to host them. Sometimes however, because of reciprocity mechanisms, avoiding 
responsibility for the child was simply impossible, and children were obliged to live in families 
along with people who did not really want them. This created tensions that often result in witchcraft 
accusations against the children. 
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The liminality of children born in yaka tovanda marriages became apparent 
during an interview in which Bernard Kabuaku, the father of a six-year-old girl accused 
of witchcraft, explained their family problems to me. Bernard was a young electrician 
who lived in Kingasani, a neighbourhood so overcrowded that it became known by the 
Kinois as ‘People’s Republic of China’ (Chine populaire). During a chat in the 
courtyard of his parcelle, Bernard explained to me how he was forced to leave his 
previous neighbourhood. During heavy rain, a power cable detached from an electricity 
pylon and landed in a puddle on the street. Two women were fatally electrocuted as 
they walked home and Bernard, being the senior electrician of the area, was accused of 
being responsible for the accident. At that time, his daughter Geisha had already been 
accused of being a witch and Bernard had no doubt she had caused the accident to 
undermine him and his business. Neither Bernard nor the maternal family wanted 
Geisha, who frequently relocated between households and the street. At the time of my 
fieldwork, Geisha lived in a shelter that had been established by an NGO. The day of 
our interview, Bernard explained me: 
I am the father of the child, who is called Geisha. Her mother gave birth to 
Geisha when I was still a student. Here in our culture, if you are a student, it is 
very difficult to live with a girl. This is why, when she gave birth, she went back 
to her place [meaning that until that moment, the mother of the child was in the 
man’s household].  
I went away to do the military service. After one year, when I came back, she 
was already with another man. She would often leave the child alone, as she 
was still in school. Her mother was director of the Catholic school and they 
often left the child alone in the house of another maman116... It’s them [maternal 
family] who said that she had witchcraft. We did not know anything, because 
they did not want to give us the child...  
Often, in the Congolese custom, when you give birth, eh, a pregnant girl, you 
[the man] have to pay something to get the child back, you have to pay a child-
price for the baby, [il faut doter l’enfant], you do not marry the woman but you 
have to pay the child-price. [...] We did not know anything at the time, as they 
had the baby because of the bridewealth [in this case, child-price, which had not 
been paid], and we did not see each other. One day, I was here on the street, and 
I saw Geisha’s mother arriving with the child. And I asked her “Why are you 
giving us the child without us coming to look for him [through child-price]?” 
“Oh no, you know, my husband does not like this child...There are many 
problems... And in our family...It’s better if the child stays here”. Bon. We 
stayed here with the rest of the family, and we also noticed that the c hild was 
bewitched. [...]  
                                                 
116
 Term of respect for a married woman. To be considered a maman in Kinshasa a woman needs 
also to have children. In fact maman also means ‘mother’. 
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That time, at the time of the cable accident, we all moved. Geisha moved too, 
and we thought she would go back to live with her mother, but her mother was 
pregnant again and had moved in the household of his husband. When Geisha 
went back to the maternal household, her [maternal] uncle did not want her back 
because he said that she had witchcraft, he did not even want to see the child! 
That’s when the child was left on the street. I retired towards Binza, down there, 
and they called me to ask me where the child was hiding. Hah! I called the 
mother and I asked “Where is the child...? You have to find the child...” 
Although yaka tovanda marriages circumnavigated the expenses for the 
bridewealth, they did not alleviate tensions and conflict within the familial sphere.  
 
 The Mario Phenomenon 
 
So far I have spoken of the circulation of women between households and I have 
stressed the fact that residency was always virilocal. In Kinshasa however, men 
sometimes moved into women’s households. ‘Mario’ was the nickname which denoted 
young men who engaged in relationships with elderly wealthier women. These women 
had usually passed the age of marriage: some of them had already been married and 
divorced; others were widowed, and were the head of a household. Young men were 
drawn into these relationships by gifts and promises of wealth in exchange for sexual 
favours. For some of these young men, residency became matrilocal, as they went to 
live in the woman’s household.  
This phenomenon, which was already present in Kinshasa at the beginning of 
the 1960s (La Fontaine 1970a:137), was baptised Mario after the name of a 1985 song 
by Franco and the Ok Jazz orchestra. The song told the story of a man called Mario 
who lived at the expense of his older lover, but behaved as if he was the household’s 
head. In a verse of the song, the woman says: 
Mobali akuti ngai na bomengo  The man found me with wealth 
 
Asengi akomander ngai na ndimi He asked to command me and I 
said yes 
 
Mobali akuti ngai na bangenge  The man found me with fortune 
 
Asengi adiriger ngai na ndimi He asked to become my boss and I 
said yes 
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Nabandi kobima na ye babandi  I started to go out with him, they 
kobenga ye Monsieur     started calling him Monsieur 
 
Mario avimbi moto akanisi biloko  Mario felt bucked up, he thinks all 
na ngai ya ye ah!    my stuff belongs to him ah! 
 
Ah Mario na baye yo o.    Ah Mario you annoy me. 
The song and the phenomenon it represented, were evidence not only of the 
increasing independence of women in Kinshasa, but also of the gender-based tensions 
that emerged, as the emancipation of women clashed with patriarchal hierarchies of 
power. 
This kind of relation did not last long. The couple usually disguised their 
relationship, which would evoke condemnation by the man’s family. Thus, unlike the 
two cases described above, it was not considered a marriage, but rather an unofficial 
union which could not be legitimised through bridewealth of any sort.  
 
From Modern Alliances to Modern Domestic Units: the Exo-Household 
 
The three types of unions above increased the circulation of people between households 
in an unprecedented way. As a consequence, households were very numerous and many 
family members engaged in different relationships at the same time. The partners in 
these relations frequently separated and entered into subsequent unions with different 
partners. This allowed for the constant incorporation of strangers into kinship networks. 
Thus, in Kinshasa, households were formed not only by kin, but also by temporary-kin 
(or semi-strangers, depending on your point of view) and the children born from 
different relationships.  
Rather than being bounded by obligations of solidarity and reciprocity, families 
in Kinshasa were linked by ties of shared debt and delayed repayment. Families often 
did not want to be linked to persons who entered temporarily the household through 
yaka tovanda or shortened marriage. When these relationships ended, people would 
rather forget about their connections and unresolved debts, although they were 
constantly reminded of them by the progeny of these relationships.  
Because of the inappropriateness of describing households according to static 
classifications (such as nuclear or extended cluster) or functional criteria (those who eat 
together, those who provide income to the household), I propose a new definition. I use 
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the term ‘exo-household’ to describe the fluid and fragile domestic pattern in Kinshasa 
that gathered together kin and non-kin such as temporary partners, close friends and 
acquaintances. Such households were the result of the hypertrophy of families that 
could no longer control the movements and affiliations of young people. At the same 
time, they were characterised by extreme mobility and diversification. The fac t that the 
majority of young people’s unions were not officially sanctioned rendered them much 
more precarious and volatile: this resulted in ex-partners leaving the circle of family 
and making room for the next one.  
A survey of twenty households in the neighbourhood of Maman Yemo 
illustrates the diversification of domestic units. Among the households, nine of them 
were headed by a couple, six were ‘single-headed’ and five were ‘sibling-headed117’. 
The average number of per-household members was seven: at the lowest extreme of the 
range, one household was composed by a single man (rumoured to have been accused 
of witchcraft by his family and expelled from his home) while another was formed by 
mother and her daughter; the two most populated households of the sample had twelve 
members each. Of the six single-headed households, in two cases the partner of the 
head of the household was outside Kinshasa for work. In other cases it was not the head 
of the household but some of the dependants who had left for migrant informal labour 
outside the capital. One should always remember the fluidity that concerned households 
and the rapidity with which changes took place. As such, household could drastically 
increase in members or decrease in very short time.  
Among the twenty households, five hosted exo-members who were not kin, but 
temporary partner affiliated through the types of modern union analysed above, or 
family friends. Six other households hosted young children who had been born from 
shortened marriages that had already ended. The children were left either with one of 
their young parents, with the parents’ rela tives, or with other carers. In total, eleven 
households out of twenty, more than 50% of the sample contained either exo-members 
or children born out of temporary unions. 
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 I define ‘sibling-headed’ those households that were headed by two or more siblings who 
contributed more or less equally to the maintenance of the households and its dependants. In one 
case I registered a couple of brothers; in another, five sisters; and in others, a multiple number of 
brothers and sisters. For a detailed account of sibling-headed households in a different African 
context see Niehaus 1994. 
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FIGURE 10: Number of exo-households on a sample of twenty living units in Maman 
Yemo. 
 
 
From ‘African Solidarity’ to ‘Reluctant Solidarity’  
 
The fast-paced rhythm through which households increased, changed and became exo-
households, put the notion of African solidarity under pressure. For many city-dwellers 
in Kinshasa, African solidarity became more a burden than a security net. Because of 
the economic crisis, people often found it exceedingly difficult to fulfil their obligations 
and solidarity requests from their kin.  
In this context, solidarity transformed itself into an individualistic ‘everyone for 
himself’ (chaque un pour soi) mentality. This attitude was definitely influenced by 
Pentecostal Churches, which described giving as a dangerous act, and vehicle of 
witchcraft rather than solidarity. In their sermons, pastors highlighted how people 
should live by the sweat of their brows (De Boeck & Plissart 2004) rather than through 
solidarity. This contrasted starkly with the notion of “villagisation” which stressed the 
crucial role of the extended family in supporting its members. The pastors knew that the 
majority of the family in Kinshasa had to resort to kinship ties and solidarity networks 
in order to survive. However, they continued to stress how solidarity and gifts were 
vehicle of danger and witchcraft, and were to be avoided. In this way, they contributed 
to create mobulu and tensions within the familial cluster, which was caught in between 
Diversification of living units in Maman Yemo 20 
Households headed by a couple   9 
 With family members only  6 
           With children in liminal positions               (3) 
 With family members and exo-members 3 
Single-headed households (3 headed by women and 3 by men) 6 
 With family members only  5 
           With children in liminal positions                 (1) 
 With family members and exo-members 1 
Sibling-headed households  5 
 With family members only  4 
           With children in liminal positions               (2) 
 With family members and exo-members 1 
Exo-households (ho. with children in liminal positions and exo-members)  11 
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the fear to rely on extended networks, and the impossibility of making do by 
themselves. This, in turn, resulted in more and more people going to church to make 
amends for their sins and to be purified by the word of God, aware of having engaged 
in extended solidarity networks and afraid of having caught witchcraft.  
This “crisis of the gift” (De Boeck 2005a; De Boeck & Plissart 2004) led many 
young Kinois to disengage themselves from networks of solidarity with their kin at the 
village (see also Nzeza 2004) and in town. People engaged in what Trefon (2002a) calls 
“despair solidarity”: “people help each other primarily if they can expect something in 
return” (Ibid: 488). However, because families in Kinshasa were obliged to rely on their 
kin to deal with the hardship of everyday life, African solidarity became something that 
was desired and avoided at the same time. People were bound by links of “reluctant 
solidarity”, as Bähre (2007b) put it, defined as “that help, particularly under conditions 
of destitution and hardship, [which] does not result in extensive unifying bonds of 
comradeship, but in small bonds fraught with social tensions” (Ibid: 52). This pushed 
people to look for new survival strategies by playing with kinship terms.  
 
The Tactical Use of Kinship Terms  
 
During the time of my fieldwork, the Kinois struggled to position themselves in the 
continuously changing domestic spaces. In this context, people started playing with 
kinship terms, in an effort to shape the household and the family unit in the most 
suitable way for its survival. As Bloch (1971) explains, kinship terms can be used not 
only to denote kinship roles, but also as a tactical means of transforming social 
situations. Kinship terms are thus charged with strong political and economic 
connotations which allow them to be used by kin and by strangers according to the 
situations at hand.  
This was visible in the case of young women who had children outside of 
wedlock and tried to marry officially through bridewealth. Sometimes single parents 
found it difficult to re-marry (through proper customary marriage as well as shortened 
marriage), as many partners did not approve of children born from previous 
relationships. This is why the grand-mothers (koko mwasi) often agreed to raise such 
children as if they were their own. The children addressed and referred to their 
biological mothers as ‘elder sibling’ (yaya). In the case that the mother’s siblings raised 
the children as if they were their own, children addressed their biological mother as 
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‘aunt’ (maman leki/maman kolutu or tata mwasi, depending on whether the child 
pretended the mother being the maternal or paternal aunt118).  
In the same way, if children lived with the father’s family, they often addressed 
their biological father as ‘elder sibling’ (yaya) or ‘uncle’ (papa leki/ kolutu or noko, 
depending on whether the child pretended the father being the paternal or maternal 
uncle). In this manner, young parents were free to pursue marriages. This tactic 
completely redefined kinship roles within the household for the sake of the whole 
family, as successful marriages were supposed to bring wealth to the family through 
solidarity mechanisms. 
 
Maternal family Paternal family 
Mother → Maman Mother → Maman 
Father → Papa Father → Papa 
Elder/Younger 
sibling 
→ Yaya / Leki Elder/Younger 
sibling 
→ Yaya / Leki 
Aunt → Maman leki/kolutu 
(younger/older mother) 
Aunt → Tata mwasi 
(the female father) 
Uncle   → Noko Uncle   → Papa leki/kolutu 
Grandfather  → Koko mubali Grandfather  → Koko mubali 
Grandmother   → Koko mwasi Grandmother   → Koko mwasi 
 
FIGURE 11: Kinship terminology in Kinshasa 
 
Sometimes non-kin members were included within an imaginary family through 
terms of “metaphoric kinship” (Rubbers 2009a: 638). Because of the loosening of 
solidarity mechanisms, relatives could no longer rely on each other, and people started 
to build emergency networks outside their own kinship. By addressing benefactors or 
friends through kinship terms, these people became incorporated into a network of 
obligations that favoured real-time cooperation and reciprocity disguised under familial 
ties (see also Rubbers 2009a). The use of kinship terms seems to have acquired not only 
moral and tactical meanings, but also political ones, because it created ties of patronage 
and clientelism among business partners.  
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 This terminological distinction is the same in both matrilineal and patrilineal clusters. 
174 
In order to show how the family unions and the other mechanisms introduced so 
far worked in concert in the creation of exo-households, in the next section I will 
described the development of Joseph’s and Julia’s household over the last few years.  
 
Joseph and Julia: an Exo-Household in Expansion 
 
Joseph Mutambu was the youngest of seven brothers and sisters and came from a Budu 
village in the Oriental Province (see map 1). At the age of twelve, he left his parental 
house to go to live with his older sister in a village 300 kilometres from home, near the 
city of Kisangani. When he was sixteen, following his religious vocation, he started 
attending the 'little seminary' (petit seminaire) and study the Bible in order to become a 
missionary. In addition to his religious training he also had other jobs. During his 
holidays from the seminary he would travel to the Bomili mine (Oriental Province, 
eastern Congo) with his older brother. Joseph described Bomili as a large mine that, at 
least until when he left for Kinshasa, was an artisanal extraction site, not controlled by 
big companies. While his older brother sold food and other fresh products such as meat 
and fish (vivres frais) to the workers of the mine, Joseph became involved in the 
diamond trade. He borrowed some money from his family and started to buy diamonds 
from the mine workers in order to resell them for a higher price at a private counter  
(comptoir119) in Kisangani. At that time, a raw one-carat diamond costing around $250 
at the mine, could be sold for $300 in town. However, usually the workers provided 
him with lower quality diamonds, varying from 0.05 to 0.50 carats. From the counter in 
Kisangani, the diamonds would be sold on to foreign investors for an even higher price. 
Through this trade, Joseph managed to accumulate a large sum of money, also 
considering that the missionaries provided for food and accommodation.  
Later, in 1998, he left the East to complete his studies at the main seminary in 
Kinshasa. However, the religious vocation and the missionaries disappointed Joseph 
greatly when they failed to take care of him when he became seriously ill. After twelve 
years with the missionaries, he decided to quit the seminary and start a new life in 
Kinshasa. 
Joseph contacted Claudine Tshituka, the wife of one of his distant cousins, now 
deceased, and asked to stay with her until he managed to find a job and become 
                                                 
119
 On the political economy of the comptoir see De Boeck 2000a, 2001. 
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independent. At the time Claudine owned two parcelles very close to each other in the 
neighbourhood of Barumbu. She lived in the first parcelle with her six children and two 
nephews. The second, smaller, parcelle was inhabited by a son of Joseph’s paternal 
aunt, his wife, their three children, and his sister- in-law. It was decided that Joseph 
would stay with his cousin's family. They gave him a bed, and Joseph started to work 
on his independence by buying a plot of land alongside the Ngaliema riverbank, quite 
far from Claudine’s households, but close to the communities to whom he used to 
preach. It was in that area that he met Julia Wembi, his girlfriend and the mother of his 
future child.  
Julia Wembi was a 27-year old Bashi woman from the South-Kivu province, not 
far from Bukavu in the east of the country. She was born in Burundi, where her family 
had moved years before because of Julia's father's job. After her father's death in a 
public transport accident in 1993, and her mother's death in hospital from an 
unspecified lung disease in 1997, Julia was sent to live with her oldest sister, Aimée 
Wembi, and her husband, Alain Bilolo, in Bukavu. They treated her as their own 
daughter, and as the first born child of the family (l’ainée de la famille), because she 
was older than Aimée and Alain’s six children. At the same time, Julia treated Alain as 
her father, and she addressed him with the epithet ‘papa’ (‘dad’ in French). When 
Alain, who had connections within the government was sent to work in a public office 
in the capital during 2002, the family moved to Kimbwala, a neighbourhood not far 
from Pompage in the commune of Ngaliema. The parcelle was initially formed by 
Julia, Aimée and Alain, their six surviving children (one died within a month of birth) 
and one of Julia's cousins, Grace, who had a very troubled family history.  
Grace was the child of one of Alain's brothers. Both Grace’s parents had died 
from sickness and by the age of eleven she was left orphan. At the time of their death, 
Grace was sent to live with a well-off uncle in Kinshasa. However, the uncle’s second 
wife was unhappy because her husband spent too much resources helping out his own 
kin. Grace was soon accused of witchcraft by the woman who tried to get rid of her in 
order to direct the (economic) attention of her husband towards her own children. This 
was the beginning of Grace’s journey between Pentecostal churches and relatives’ 
households in Kinshasa. At the time of my fieldwork she fluctuated between the homes 
of her paternal aunt and two brothers, one of whom is Alain Bilolo, who denied all 
witchcraft accusations against her.  
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FIGURE 12: Julia, Joseph and their respective households, August 2008 
 
 
Let us go back to Julia. Julia and Joseph started to see each other in 2008. 
Actually, Joseph became acquainted to Julia, her ‘father’ Alain and their kin well prior 
to this, through the pastoral work (la pastorale) he did at Kimbwala’s parish. At the 
time, Joseph was also Alain’s confessor. But this was a few years earlier. Julia found 
out she was pregnant during the summer 2008 but hid it for many months in fear of her 
family’s reactions. When she could not hide it anymore, she had to tell the family who 
immediately contacted Joseph. It was a real surprise for Alain, who would never have 
thought that his former confessor would impregnate his child. After a long discussion, it 
was decided that Julia would stay within Joseph's household until she gave birth. At the 
time, Joseph still lived in the parcelle of his distant cousin. However, as Claudine was 
Joseph’s closest relative in town, it was decided that Julia would stay in her parcelle, a 
few blocks away. 
 
FIGURE 13: During the last months of Julia’s pregnancy, December 2008 - March 
2009 
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After the birth of their son, Joseph did not have a place of his own in which he 
could welcome Julia and the baby. Julia thus returned to her family with the child, 
which increased the number of people in papa Alain’s household to eleven. Although 
Julia had returned to her family, Joseph was expected to participate towards the child’s 
upkeep. He would provide them with transport fees to visit him, money for hospital and 
also for baby care. Joseph could easily afford to pay these expenses, from the money he 
had accumulated during the diamond trade. However, Joseph still had to pay for Julia’s 
bridewealth, which meant that officially Alain still had the power to make decisions 
concerning Julia and the baby. Joseph was not yet ready to get officially married to 
Julia as he lacked accommodation and a regular income. He was not ready to invest 
money in the bridewealth either, because he was busy building a house.  
The diamond trade had brought Joseph quite a large amount of money. He had 
spent $4,500 to buy the lot in the Ngaliema riverbanks, and he had started to invest the 
remaining $12,000 in building the house. According to his calculation, he could then 
re-sell the parcelle for at least $30,000. Since the beginning of the construction, Joseph 
would spend every day in the Ngaliema commune, on the other side of town. Although 
he possessed a large sum of money, Joseph did not trust banks: their charges were too 
high and with the economic situation of the country he feared he would lose all his 
money in one way or another. Rather, he preferred to hide all the cash in a suitcase in 
his cousin’s home.  
One evening, after he had returned from the construction site, he opened the 
suitcase and almost fainted when he saw that of the $12,000, only $400 was left. Joseph 
panicked and searched for his cousin, but he was not to be found. He approached his 
cousin's wife and asked for explanations. The woman said tha t her husband had left for 
the east of the country with Joseph's money. There, he was positive that with this 
capital he could start a fruitful business as a diamond dealer or as a counter. “Joseph, do 
not worry, he will pay you back entirely”, the woman said. Joseph was furious. Several 
meetings were held among the family, but none of the family members took 
responsibility for the cousin's behaviour. It was pointless to go to the police, because 
Joseph lacked proof, and would need money to bribe the police to conduct an inquiry. 
After a while, the whole family started to avoid speaking about it, as none of them had 
money to reimburse Joseph for his loss.  
Scandalised by his own family's behaviour, Joseph left his cousin's place and 
was invited to stay with another distant cousin. He did not feel at ease there either. 
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After twelve years in the seminary and the recent scam by his family, he desired 
freedom from his familial network. After a few days, he politely thanked the cousin and 
decided to look for his own place to live. With the $400 left in the suitcase, he paid the  
deposit for a small parcelle in Kinsuka, along the Congo riverbanks in Ngaliema, far 
away from his family's neighbourhood and closer to the family of his girlfriend, Julia.  
Joseph started a small business with his sister who lived in the Oriental 
Province. He would purchase cheap clothes at the central market in Kinshasa and send 
them by plane to Isiro, a small town of roughly 180,000 inhabitants. The sister would 
then resell them at a higher price. However, the quality of life, inflation and economic 
crisis made it impossible for Joseph to rebuild his capital. He could not go back to the 
East, where the rest of his enlarged family lived. He did not want to leave his girlfriend 
and their newborn child, and he did not have the money to take them with him and start 
a new life there. Following an emergency, Joseph’s sister could no longer provide him 
with his share from the sale of the clothes in Kisangani. Joseph was left without funds 
and any viable form of income earning.  
 
FIGURE 14: After Julia’s childbirth, April 2009 
 
It is at this point that I entered the scene. When I started to arrange to live in 
Kinshasa with Joseph over the phone, he already lived by himself in the commune of 
Kinsuka, not far from Julia’s family’s household. Alain Bilolo allowed Julia to live 
with Joseph and me in the parcelle in Maman Yemo. He saw this move as a good 
opportunity for Julia to build useful contacts in the white persons (mindele) community. 
Although I paid almost all of Julia and the child’s expenses during my stay, I was 
always called bambina (Italian for child) by Joseph and Julia, a nickname I had been 
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given during my previous period of fieldwork in 2007 120. My role within the family 
became even more ambiguous when Alain Bilolo started to call me “my child” (mwana 
na ngai) and I started to call Alain’s brother ‘my uncle’ (papa kolutu). Even if I was not 
affiliated to their family through marriage, I became part of Julia’s household in a very 
particular way. They, but not other members of their enlarged family, considered me 
part of their family. 
While Julia’s family were addressing me in kinship terms, there was some 
concern over Joseph and his role within the family. In fact, during all the time that Julia 
lived with us, Joseph had not officialised their union yet. This meant that Joseph had 
‘stolen’ both Julia and the baby from Alain, without giving anything in return. Finally, 
eight months after we moved in together, thanks to a credit-system between me and 
Joseph, he managed to pay a little-bridewealth to Julia’s family, putting himself in a 
patron-client relationship with the elders of her family, who are still waiting for the 
final bridewealth now that I am writing.  
Sometime after the little-bridewealth payment, one of Alain’s children moved in 
with us. Michel Bilolo, who was twelve-years old, became responsible for many of the 
house chores and for looking after Julia’s baby whilst she was at university. Not only 
did he work in the house, but he was also a student at one of the secondary schools in 
the neighbourhood. While we provided Michel with food and accommodation, Alain 
paid for his school fees. Michel became part of our household, and he soon started to 
call me bambina like the rest of the family. 
 
 
FIGURE 15: After my arrival, January 2010 
                                                 
120
 Yes, I was the main source of income, but my ignorance of the Congolese customs and language 
confined me to the position of child. This might also be related to the gender tensions described 
regarding the Mario phenomenon. 
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During my stay in Kinshasa, tensions arose between Alain Bilolo and his oldest 
son, nineteen-year-old Wilson. For a few months Wilson had refused to go to school. 
He would rather spend the whole day with his friends in the neighbourhood. Everything 
became clear when a young neighbour informed Alain that Wilson was having an affair 
with his mother. Apparently, his mother would give Wilson money to buy new clothes, 
and also some extra cash, in exchange for sex. Wilson had become a young Mario. This 
is why Alain decided to send him abroad to study. 
In the meantime, Alain’s oldest daughter got married at the age of eighteen. 
After a formal introduction (presentation), Alain’s prospective son- in- law paid a little-
bridewealth to legitimise their union, and promised to pay full bridewealth in the near 
future. The girl went to live in the man’s household and the two had a baby girl. 
However, tensions soon arose between the girl and the mother-in- law, who described 
her as lazy and useless at housework. After less than a year, the girl was sent back to 
papa Alain’s house with the baby, and the marriage broke up. In the meantime, papa 
Alain’s wife, Aimée, had another baby, which brought the number of their offspring to 
seven. By the time I left Kinshasa, the household comprised Ala in and his wife Aimée, 
their seven children, their newborn grand-daughter and Grace. 
After my departure, Julia, Joseph and the child could not return to their previous 
places of residence. Now that Joseph had paid the pre-bridewealth, he was responsible 
for Julia and the baby. Allowing them to go back to Alain’s would have meant passing 
him all the rights over them, hence sanctioning the conclusion of the alliance with Julia. 
Moreover, Julia was pregnant with her second child (who unfortunately did not survive 
the birth), which made her even more dependent on Joseph, who was supposed to assist 
her during the months of pregnancy. This is why Joseph, Julia and the baby moved 
together into the home Joseph was constructing whilst his cousin robbed him. By the 
time of my departure, again thanks to our credit-system, the skeleton of the house was 
built. Michel moved with them as well, and while it was still Alain who was in charge 
of Michel’s school fees (minerval), Joseph also made occasional contributions for his 
studies. 
A few months later, Joseph’s older sister in Kisangani sent her daughter to live 
in Joseph’s place. The girl was meant to start studying Medicine at the University of 
Kinshasa (UNIKIN) next September. In this case, Joseph’s sister paid her daughter’s 
university fees, while Joseph provided with food and accommodation. In June 2012, 
Joseph’s and Julia’s second child was born, contributing to the enlargement of Joseph’s 
181 
household. In less than two years, Joseph passed from living alone to becoming the 
head of a six-person household. 
 
 
FIGURE 16: One year after my departure, June 2012 
 
One year after Joseph's cousin left with the stolen money, news started to 
circulate. Soon after his arrival in the East, the man had impregnated a 14-year old girl. 
The girl's family decided not to denounce him on the condition that he would maintain 
both the girl and her future child, and that he would pay a bridewealth as soon as 
possible. The man accepted, but by the time the child was born, he had spent all the 
money, supposedly on going out to bars and boîtes (clubs). The girl's family denounced 
him, and the man was taken to prison. However, he managed to escape soon after, by 
bribery according to rumours, and by the time of my fieldwork he was wanted by the 
police. According to the man's wife in Kinshasa, no one knew where he was, although 
some people within Julia’s family believed the story to be fictitious, in order to prevent 
Joseph from asking for the money he had lost.  
This account of the development of Joseph and Julia’s enlarged families gives 
us an idea of the mobulu to which households in Kinshasa were exposed on a daily 
basis. Tensions between family members, and the difficult economic and living 
conditions made households extremely unstable and fluid. Although Julia’s family was 
an example of a young exo-household, devoid of many intricacies between elders and 
young people121, it enables us to observe different mechanisms of household expansion 
– with all the tensions they entail.  
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 I trace this back to two main reasons: the first is the presence of both the head of the household 
and his first and only wife. This has allowed them to raise their children and be sure that they have 
been educated according to the parent’s standards. The situation would be completely different if 
one of the two parents were missing, as it would be difficult to maintain all of the children in the 
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Because Joseph had not paid bridewealth for Julia and the baby, his decision to 
take Julia to live with him in Maman Yemo created tension with Julia’s family, which 
he had to placate through a small a-posteriori payment. Wilson’s relationship with his 
friend’s mother jeopardised his relationship with his parents, and also with his friend, 
creating tensions within and outside the household. At the same time, the failed 
marriage of Julia’s second sister might also stir discontent, because the child born out 
of wedlock embodied economic obligations between the two families. Tensions could 
rise in the future over who should take care of the child and who should pay for his 
expenses (such as schooling or health care), especially if Alain’s household is going 
through a period of hardship. 
My arrival in Kinshasa altered the equilibrium between households. By calling 
me “my child”, Alain and his brother sought to pull me into a network of customary 
obligations and to acknowledge them as household elders. For example, on more than 
one occasion Alain joked that when I married he would expect bridewealth from my 
suitor. On another occasion Joseph made similar comments about my suitor paying the 
bridewealth to him. This shows the fluidity of this strategic kinship system, according 
to which kinship terms could be used by several social actors to fit different agendas.  
The case of Joseph and Julia’s household also demonstrates contestation about 
the notion of African solidarity. The case of Grace, who was first reluctantly accepted 
in his uncle’s household and later cast out as a witch, shows the difficulties of 
maintaining familial solidarity in the precarious context of Kinshasa.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have shown how the Kinois, both cadets and elders, were able to 
respond dynamically to the hardship of society – the elders by increasing the 
bridewealth, the youngsters by engaging in virtually bridewealth-free forms of union. 
The fluidity of exo-households resulted from conflicting relations between generations 
as well as between genders. Women and young people were “social cadets” (Bayart 
1985, 1992 – see also chapter 1) who found in shortened marriages a way to free 
                                                                                                                                              
same household for economic reasons, and some of them may be treated like Grace in the past. I 
have already pointed out that new partners do not generally approve of children born from previous 
relationships. The second reason why the family has not collapsed yet is because three of the 
children have not reached the age of puberty and marriage, which contains the possibilities of 
explosion of the family.  
183 
themselves from the grip of the elders, whom they saw as blocking their aspirations 
through customary practices.  
The high price of the bridewealth can be seen as one of the strategies through 
which the elders resisted young people’s emancipation. In this way, the elders made the 
boundary between cadets and adults more difficult to cross, in an attempt to preserve 
their gerontocratic authority. At the same time, by agreeing to shortened marriages, 
elders officialised the relationship of dependence between the young couple and 
themselves. In fact, this meant that young couples started their relationship in debt.  
African solidarity, like the notion of ‘the village’, was an ideological 
construction rather than a reality. Since the 1930s, this notion has helped to create an 
illusionary return to the extended family, as a form of resistance to the nuclear family 
imposed by the colonialists. However, this notion seemed to work poorly in the social 
context of Kinshasa. The family became an unstable and precarious nexus, marked by 
regular tensions and reluctant solidarity which increased mobulu in the familial circle 
and more broadly in society. 
The mobility of family members and the instability of the household became 
almost a necessity, if people were to survive the demands of everyday hardship. Thus, 
the mobility of young people in the informal economy, and the continuous search for 
different partners, can be considered as coping strategies which resulted from the 
mobulu within the family. From this point of view, the mobulu which interested the 
household was not simply a generator of intergenerational tensions, but rather a catalyst 
for new forms of socialisation, unions and independency among many young men and 
women. 
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- CHAPTER SEVEN - 
KINDOKI, THE INVISIBLE VIOLENCE OF WITCHCRAFT 
 
This chapter explores accusations of witchcraft (kindoki) in Kinshasa, and how such 
accusations are the result of multiple factors at play at the level of everyday life. 
Accusations of witchcraft were always born at the family and household leve l, and 
were the result of the mobulu of the domestic environment, as analysed in the previous 
chapter. This mobulu, in turn, had roots in the structural violence of the state, which 
affected everyday life through economic constraints and deprivation.  
Changes in the household composition and in the hierarchy of power within the 
family resulted in family members accusing each other of witchcraft deeds in the 
aftermath of misfortunes or deaths striking the family. Often it was children, who found 
themselves in between exo-households and consequently in between domestic tensions, 
who were accused of being witches. As such, the mobulu of economic hardship and 
domestic tensions at the material level have found expression in mobulu at the invisible, 
mystical level. At the same time, accusations of witchcraft against family members 
further increased tensions within families. As a result, people accused of witchcraft 
were often isolated from the family, or, in the case of children, expelled from exo-
households. Thus, while the mobulu of the state resulted in tensions at the everyday 
level and witchcraft accusations, the invisible mobulu of witchcraft in turn created other 
manifestations of mobulu in everyday life. 
While adults accused of witchcraft were usually able to defend themselves, or 
could provide for their own needs in case of isolation by the family, accusations of 
witchcraft against children put them in an increasingly liminal position within the 
family. Children suspected of being witches were mistreated and tortured at home, or 
taken to Pentecostal church, where the pastor usually acknowledged their guilt and 
forced them to undergo exorcism sessions (often involving laxatives or other medicines 
to expel witchcraft)122. Other times children were merely abandoned on the street, as 
the family was too scared of their evil powers to wait for exorcism to have effect. In 
several cases, it was children who decided spontaneously to quit their households or 
escape from church, tired of the psycho-physical maltreatments they had to bear. For 
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 Despite the harsh conditions to which these children were exposed, De Boeck (2005a) praised 
the role of Pentecostal pastors in getting children out of the abusive familial context, and in allowing 
their reinsertion within the fabric of the family, once the child has undergone a successful exorcism. 
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many of these children, living conditions on the street were better than at home, where 
they were left without food for days and bullied by other family members. Many 
children thus preferred the freedom of the streets of Kinshasa, where  they had a greater 
likelihood of obtaining food, western commodities and of making friends.  
Once on the street, witch-children became shegues123 (or bashegue), the street-
children of Kinshasa. There, they often organised themselves in stables (écuries) who 
competed against each other over the control of specific territories 124. Their activities 
shifted between legality and illegality, and they lived in spots that they created and 
domesticated between buildings, at the edge of the infrastructure of the city (Geenen 
2009). Recent estimates say that in Kinshasa there were between 20,000 and 50,000 
street children (Human Rights Watch 2006; De Boeck 2009), many of whom were 
abandoned or left home following accusations of kindoki. 
With this chapter I will contribute to the literature on kindoki in Kinshasa, 
which has in De Boeck (2005a; 2009; De Boeck & Plissart 2004) its main exponent. By 
analysing his work and my fieldwork data, I will elucidate some mechanisms of kindoki 
which I believe require more attention. Whereas De Boeck (Ibid) describes kindoki 
accusations as a bilateral process between children and the elders, I argue that children 
are considered as the intermediaries of the witchcraft between youngsters and elders, 
rather than first actors. Witchcraft accusations are a process which involves three sets 
of actors rather than two (see fig. 17). Furthermore, the role of children as 
intermediaries fits well into the discourse of children as liminal actors within the exo-
household. 
With the notion of the child as intermediary, I wish to contribute to the 
anthropology of childhood in Africa by analysing how a particular Western notion of 
the Child has influenced ideas of childhood in Kinshasa. Children in Kinshasa were 
depicted as innocent human beings in need of the care of family and school, who could 
easily be manipulated by external actors or environments and become dangerous – in 
this case, through kindoki. However, the image of the child as innocent and in need of 
                                                 
123
 The term 'shegue' can derive from two different sources. On the one hand, the word was born 
when Kabila entered Kinshasa in 1997 with his kadogos (child soldiers), who were seen as little Che 
Guevaras. On the second, the word is an abbreviation from Shengen, where the Shengen agreement 
was signed in 1985. People can freely travel around Europe as well as the shegues can 'freely' access 
all the resources of Kinshasa without restraints (De Boeck 2006; De Boeck& Plissart 2004). 
124
 These groups were however distinct from the kulunas. Shegues stables arose as a means of 
survival, while kulunas stables arose as a means of competition and aggression. 
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care as it was perpetrated by Western institutions and most of the Kinois, clashed with 
reality, as children often took advantage of such image and managed to empower 
themselves in their everyday life.  
I will begin this chapter with a brief exploration of existing academic readings 
of kindoki and witch-children, with a view to situating my own arguments within this 
field. Later, I will explore the concept of the child as intermediary of witchcraft 
accusation, rather than a primary actor in witchcraft deeds. Children were believed to 
be caught involuntarily into the world of witchcraft, their naivety exploited by witches 
who seduced them with a gift of food. This will lead us to the next section. By 
exploring old and new trends in the scholarship on childhood, I will explain how this 
idea of the child as ‘naive' and ‘unconscious’, to use the words of the Kinois, came 
from a Western idea of childhood promulgated by missionaries and humanitarian 
organisations in Kinshasa. 
Although the effects of witchcraft in Kinshasa were mainly visible through the 
increasing number of street-children, it is worth noting that also adults were accused of 
witchcraft. I shall then offer an overview of witchcraft accusations among members of 
the same family, analysing accusations which depicted both children and elders of the 
family as witches. In particular, I aim at showing the intergenerational tensions which 
affected families and exo-households in Kinshasa and which resulted in witchcraft 
accusations through a series of example from my fieldwork.  
Whereas in the past, accusations of witchcraft were often cast out against family 
members, in Kinshasa today also strangers can be accused of witchcraft. Often, these 
strangers took the shape of women who worked in the market, believed to having 
bewitched some children so that the latter could harm their relatives on behalf of the 
witch. In this next section then, I explain the tensions underlying the new independence 
of women in society, which resulted in witchcraft accusations indirectly against them.  
 Although children were considered innocent and in need of care, in the streets 
children were able to exploiting the channels of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) for their own débrouille activities, which often worked out of legality. Thus, 
NGOs became victims of the astuteness and resourcefulness of the witch-children in 
coping with adverse situations. Children who were the first victims of the mobulu 
within family circles, were able to turn such mobulu upside down, exploiting their 
liminal position to create new coping mechanisms and living strategies.  
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I conclude the chapter with an analysis of the link between witchcraft and 
intimacy, and how an understanding of witchcraft mechanisms can help us understand 
the link between material and invisible mobulu on one hand, and structural and 
everyday mobulu on the other. 
 
Witch-children: Intermediaries of Witchcraft 
 
The phenomenon of the witch-children was so overwhelming throughout the city, that 
many works have been dedicated to it, both in the academia and in the field of the arts: 
documentaries, songs, paintings and theatrical operas were all centred on the ‘witch-
children’ (bana-bandoki) of Kinshasa. In the academia, De Boeck (2005a; 2009; De 
Boeck & Plissart 2004) devoted several of his works to the phenomenon. De Boeck 
traced the phenomenon of the witch-children to some key factors. The first is the “crisis 
of the gift” which has deeply affected relationship and the whole fabric of society in 
Kinshasa. Because of the hardship of everyday life, giving has lost its bounding 
properties. In a context in which people struggle to earn a living, giving is no longer 
considered a spontaneous activity, but rather a calculated and dangerous act which 
embroils the recipient in a circle of debt and witchcraft. Due to their innocence and 
malleability, it is believed that children are not able to abide by the new ‘law’ 
prohibiting the acceptance of gifts. Accordingly, they are the first targets to be accused 
of witchcraft.  
This phenomenon has been largely influenced by Pentecostal and healing 
churches, which stress how “one should earn a living and work ‘by the sweat of his 
brow’” (De Boeck 2005a:206). The mechanisms of exchange and reciprocity, which 
have always underpinned social relationships, have been substituted with an 
individualistic mentality, according to which everybody should gain wealth by his own 
work. A consequence of this change has been that youth often refuse to share their 
wealth within the family. Traditional solidarities are thus substituted with an 
individualistic logic. Moreover, predicating the bible passage of Matthew 7:7, “ask and 
it will be given to you”, they are supporting the calculated act of giving (De Boeck 
2005a), and it is exactly this element that is stressed in witchcraft accusations. In fact, it 
is worth remembering that witchcraft is passed through a gift of food. People believe 
witches trap their victims in a debt obligation by giving them something to eat and 
asking their relatives in exchange for it.  
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The second main cause for the rise of accusations of witchcraft is the erosion of 
familial solidarity and tensions within the familial circle. De Boeck (2005a, De Boeck 
& Plissart 2004) explains that the urban milieu has witnessed changes in the landscape 
of the family and lineage, which put children in a very liminal condition within the 
family. Children born from ‘short-circuit’ marriages or polygamous relationships were 
often “‘displaced’ within the physical and mental maps that constituted the landscape of 
kinship in the city” (De Boeck 2009: 136). Yet, at the same time, he highlights that 
children and young people have been playing an increasing central role in the urban 
landscape of Kinshasa (De Boeck 2000b, 2005a). Especially in the economic field, De 
Boeck says, children and young people have demonstrated their ability to navigate the 
informal sector and profiting from it, imposing themselves as the main bread-winner in 
many households.  
De Boeck (Ibid) makes the example of the ‘children of Lunda’ (Bana Lunda in 
Lingala), men and women who migrated to the diamond-rich region of Lunda Norte in 
Angola in order to try their luck as informal diamond-dealers. Many of them came back 
to Kinshasa with a capital which surpassed greatly that of their parents, creating 
tensions between generations which resulted in witchcraft accusations. While the elders 
would accuse the youngsters because of their dangerousness, their power to bypass 
rules and enrich themselves in the face of the economic hardship, children, once they 
were accuse of witchcraft, “used their status of ‘witch’ to settle with some members of 
their families or, more generally, to evade familial control and create their own 
‘freedom’” (De Boeck 2000b: 50, my translation). To put it with De Boeck (2009), 
children “[were] not only vulnerable and passive victims, subjected to, or ‘made and 
broken’, by the contexts in which they live, but they [were] also active subjects, 
‘makers and breakers’, of that reality” (p. 140). Young people found in Kinshasa – 
particularly on its streets – a place to “create spaces of independence for themselves” 
(De Boeck 2005a:204). De Boeck (Ibid) thus suggests that witchcraft accusations 
against children arose from tensions between the elders and such children who evaded 
hierarchical rules and created alternative forms of sociality and authority.  
During my fieldwork, I had the chance to analyse in depth the phenomenon of 
witchcraft accusations. I agree with De Boeck (2000b, 2004, 2005a) when he argues 
that witchcraft accusations arose from tensions between family members of different 
generations. According to my data, many young people accused the elders of trying to 
punish their arrogance through witchcraft, while elders accused the youngsters of trying 
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to usurp their power by killing them in the world of witchcraft. Other times, accusations 
of kindoki took place between the two extended families of a young couple who 
married through shortened union. These unions often create tensions and debts, which 
often resulted in witchcraft accusations. Thus, if death or misfortune took place in the 
man’s family, they would accuse some members of the woman’s family of trying to kill 
them through witchcraft; and vice versa, misfortunes and death in the woman’s family 
was often traced back to witchcraft deeds by members of the man’s family. 
However, I find myself disagreeing with De Boeck in some aspects of 
witchcraft accusations. De Boeck depicts accusations of witchcraft as a bilateral 
process between children and their elders. De Boeck (2009: 141) described children and 
youngsters as “increasingly defy the authority of parents, elders, preachers and 
politicians”, as makers of new phenomena and new power hierarchies within society. 
However, many of the children accused of witchcraft I saw on the streets and in the 
churches in fact were as young as three years old, while the majority were between four 
and twelve years old. I think we need to re-read the phenomenon of the witch-children 
taking into consideration the young age of these children. When children as young as 
three or four are accused of witchcraft, they are put into a position of danger rather than 
empowerment, and in the majority of cases, are forced to leave their homes in order to 
escape abuse, rather than to create spaces of independence spontaneously. Many of the 
street children I had the chance to meet cried while remembering their relatives and 
parents, and they admitted that if they could they would want to go back with their 
families. However, the situation at home was unbearable for them, and they were left to 
find other ways to make do in the streets of Kinshasa.  
I argue that children, rather than being the main actors of witchcraft accusations 
against the elders, were the reluctant intermediaries of the witchcraft of their young 
parents against their elders, or between members of their mothers’ and their fathers’ 
families. Children who found themselves in between families and in between 
households, were considered to be the intermediaries of witchcraft accusations, 
delivering death through witchcraft from one family member to another. So for 
example, grandparents might accuse their grandchildren of trying to kill them on behalf 
of their children and their partners, while young men and women accused their children 
of trying to kill them on behalf of their parents or parents- in- law. Kindoki accusations 
were very fluid, and they could involve potentially any member of the family with 
whom the victim had some issue. However, almost always they implicated members of 
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different generations, or members of different exo-families. Thus for example, children 
who, after their parents’ divorce, lived with their father and the step-mother were often 
accused of taking with them the witchcraft of their mother’s family. Thus the step-
mother would accuse the child of trying to kill her on behalf of the child’s mother, who 
was jealous of the new partner of her ex-husband. 
 
 
FIGURE 17: Children as intermediaries of witchcraft accusations between 
generations and between exo-households. 
 
 
Witchcraft accusations, rather than being a bilateral process between young 
people (1st or 2nd generation) against their elders (3rd generation) as illustrated by De 
Boeck, was a process between three distinct sets of actors. Children found themselves 
at the intersection of familial tensions, which materialised in accusations of kindoki 
against them. 
The role of children as intermediaries, rather than direct casters of witchcraft 
accusations, demands a repositioning of the witch-children within the anthropology of 
childhood. I argue that we need to analyse how the Kinois’ idea of the child as liminal 
and at the mercy of the will of adults was influenced by a Western notion of the child as 
innocent and in danger, promulgated by Christian teachings and Western education in 
Kinshasa. Discriminated and abused children were believed to be easily recruited in the 
world of witchcraft. According to the words of many Kinois, adult witches found it 
more difficult to recruit other adults, whilst they could easily convince children to 
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sacrifice relatives to witches covens. Also in this case, the mobulu of witchcraft 
accusations against children was influenced by mechanisms at the structural level of the 
state, by globalisation and western cultural constructions.  
At the same time, the Kinois acknowledged that children were dangerous 
because of their liminal position within the family and their supposed vulnerability. 
Following economic hardship and the lack of employment, women, who were 
considered as the carers of children par excellence, were obliged to exit the space of the 
house and take the streets. As a result, children were often left home alone, without 
anything to eat and often mistreated by other members of the household. This is why 
the Kinois believed it difficult for children to refuse the deal of the witch, who offered 
children wellness, wealth and power in the world of witchcraft. Thus, although children 
were initially bewitched against their will, they were believed to be lured to stay into 
the world of witchcraft. According to the Kinois, very few had the moral awareness to 
go against the evil of witches and quit kindoki. The more victims children were 
believed to kill in the world of witchcraft, the more wealth they accumulated, in 
contrast with their precarious living conditions within their households. By accusing 
mistreated children of witchcraft, adults expressed their guilt for not managing to live 
up expectations of caregivers and providers.  
In the next section, I will analyse the latest trends in the anthropology of 
childhood, in order to situate the phenomenon of the witch-children within the 
literature. This will provide the reader with the tools necessary to understand why 
children as young as three were accused of witchcraft, and why they were depic ted as 
naive and ‘unconscious’.  
 
Vulnerable yet Dangerous: Contextualising Witch-Children in Childhood Studies 
 
Parents and carers in Kinshasa considered children to be dependents, morally unaware, 
naive and, as such, at risk. Children were often depicted as ‘unconscious’ ( inconsciente 
in French) persons that still had to develop their consciousness and their own morality. 
Adults in Kinshasa located children as being at an age of passiveness and 
unconsciousness, as opposed to adults, who embodied the notion of free will and 
consciousness. In other words, most adults described children as “something in the 
process of becoming rather than being” (James 1993).  
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The vision of childhood as an age of incompleteness, of a stage of life in 
preparation for adulthood is a Eurocentric one. It emanates from a Western and middle-
class idea of childhood, according to which the social transformation from child to 
adult follows directly from physical growth. The child, as a universalised social 
category, was depicted as a White, middle class boy who was developmentally 
immature, and needed to be dependent and have his life directed until he was ready to 
take charge (Thomas 2000). The child was considered as the passive recipient of the 
education promulgated by the family and the school, defined as the appropriate agents 
for the socialisation of children. To put it with De Boeck and Honwana (2005: 3), this 
idea of the child has “been universalised in such a way that youngsters who do not 
follow this path are considered either to be at risk or to pose a risk to society”. 
Similarly, Boyden (1990: 190) writes that: “The fear was that childhood innocence if 
not properly directed and trained at home and in school could give way to riotous and 
immoral behaviour”.  
The notion of children as passive and in need of protection has been superseded 
in the last two decades by studies on childhood which depict children as per se social 
actors who “are and must be seen as active in the construction and determination of 
their own social lives, the lives of those around them and of the society in which they 
live” (Jenks 2009: 94). Today, childhood is defined as a social and cultural construction 
(Ariés 1962; James, Jenks & Prout 1998; Jenks 1996), and children must be considered 
“worthy of studying in their own right, and not just in respect to their social 
construction by adults” (James & Prout 1990: 4). To put it with James and Prout: 
The immaturity of children is a biological fact of life but the ways in which this 
immaturity is understood and made meaningful is a fact of culture (see La 
Fontaine, 1979). It is these ‘facts of culture’ which may vary and which can be 
said to make of childhood a social institution (1990: 7). 
As childhood is a social construction, then it can be constructed, de-constructed 
and re-constructed, in order to keep pace with social changes.  
Anthropological studies of childhood in the last decade have focused the 
attention on the role of children as powerful actors in different social context, as 
breakers of impositions and makers of society (De Boeck & Honwana 2005), rather 
than mere recipients of the care and education of adults. Children have demonstrated 
their ability to turn adverse situations in their favour, especially in places in which they 
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were normally considered to be “out of place”, such as the street (De Boeck 2005a; 
Hecht 1998; Ennew 1994) or at war, in the case of child-soldiers (see Honwana 2005; 
Richards 1996; Jourdan 2004, 2010). 
Writing about the social context of Kinshasa, De Boeck (2000b) affirms that:  
In the social context of Subsaharan Africa [...] children who benefit from the 
protection offered in the West by the parents, the school and the state, are rare. 
In the African urban context, the local socio-cultural perception of childhood 
differs radically from the ‘cultural politics of childhood’ practiced in the West 
(p.45, my translation from French). 
However, I believe that in Kinshasa, the notion of the child has been deeply 
influenced by the model promulgated by Western actors, like the colonial government, 
the missionaries and, in the last decades, international and non-governmental 
organisations. I find myself agreeing with Boyden (1990) who explains how the notion 
of the World Child has been lately exported to the Third World by policy makers and 
humanitarian agencies alike. Honwana (2005) as well highlights how international 
humanitarian law has depicted children as “passive recipients of experience who need 
to be segregated from the harsh realities of the adult world, and to be protected from 
social danger” (p. 34). Children must be kept away from the world of the street, where 
they can be in danger – or become a potential threat to society. Boyden (1990: 193) 
argues that although the idea of the street as dangerous was born in northern Europe, “it 
is now generally accepted well beyond the frontiers of Europe that street life is morally 
polluting for the young. And in most countries convention holds that street children are 
both the most deprived and the most depraved members of society”. This certainty 
arose hand in hand with another stereotype exported from industrialised countries to the 
global South, which is the perception of children as young, innocent victims (Ibid). 
Children who find themselves outside of school education, and not cared for by their 
parents, are considered both in danger and dangerous.  
I argue that the concept of the child in the Kinois’ imaginary has been 
influenced by the notion of the child brought by Western education and Christian 
teachings. Since colonial time, the missionaries have promulgated an idea of the 
nuclear family composed by a working father, and a mother who takes care of the 
education of their children (see Hunt 1990, 1991). The child was thus to be reared and 
educated by the parents. This picture looks very unrealistic in contemporary Kinshasa, 
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where children are raised up in exo-households in which their parents rarely figure. 
However, despite that, this Western image of the child has taken root strongly in the 
social context of Kinshasa. In the eyes of the Kinois, going to school and being 
carefully brought up has become synonym with good child. This was also influenced by 
many humanitarian organisations, which highlighted the positive character of scholastic 
education for children – as opposed to early marriage and different forms of 
exploitation. According to the Kinois I interviewed, being able to send their children to 
school, thus depriving the family of a valuable source of labor, was considered a means 
of social prestige. Furthermore, as explained in chapter 6, formal education was 
considered the key to access western commodities through the salaried market. 
Children who went to school embodied the hope of a better life for their families. 
Educated children were a source of pride and were taken in more consideration than 
their siblings and peers who did not go to school. 
On the contrary, spending too much time on the street was perceived by many 
Kinois I interviewed as dangerous and shameful for children. In Kinshasa, children who 
roamed in the streets rather than going to school were a disgrace in the eyes of their 
parents. Moreover, because of their young age and lack of education, these children 
were believed to be easily lured into witchcraft dealings. This made children who 
roamed in the streets a potential source of danger for their families. On this subject, a 
woman whom I interviewed at a market, pointing at children sleeping in some corner 
on the street, exclaimed: “If you came to Kinshasa to look for witchcraft, then you’ve 
found it. Look at all those children, they are all witches! They spend all their days on 
the street, how could they not be?”  
In the Congolese imaginary, the two stereotypes – of the deviant child and of 
the innocent child victim – came to coexist. This fusion has taken root among the 
population also thanks to the hundreds of Pentecostal churches which dot Kinshasa. 
Indeed, Pentecostal pastors have extrapolated and re-contextualised some Christian 
teachings in their churches. Children were described as not only being in need of 
protection from the hazards of everyday life and the dangers of the street, as affirmed 
by the missionaries; but in the animist context of Pentecostal churches, they also 
needed protection from the misdeeds of witches, who tried to some family members by 
bewitching their children. During public ceremonies in church, pastors obliged children 
as young as three to confess who bewitched them through a gift of food, and to admit 
their nocturnal flights and their banquets with human meat. In Pentecostal churches, 
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children became the symbol of the moral degradation of the city, their innocence turned 
into a diabolic weapon which could destroy entire families. Children were both victims 
and perpetrators of mobulu through witchcraft. 
In their conversations with me, pastors as well as other adults defined children 
as ‘unconscious’, or else ‘subconscious’. This shows the influence of Western concepts 
in the imaginary of the Kinois. These terms, which were circulated during social 
science courses in universities and high schools, have been appropriated by the 
population and have taken root deeply in the vocabulary and the imaginary of the 
Kinois. At the same time they have been appropriated by many pastors, who claimed to 
better explain kindoki through the modern and appealing language of modernity, as I 
am about to explain. 
The unconscious nature of children was stressed by the words of many Kinois 
whom I interviewed. In the next example, a pastor of the Pentecostal church Siloam 
Miracle explained to me why children had an incomplete nature. According to him: 
The [bewitched] child will be simply submitted to the orders of that one who 
gave him witchcraft, “go and do this”...So that he can always hold [the victim of 
witchcraft] back. But the child does not know that he’s doing something wrong. 
It is the age of unconsciousness.  
Not only were children believed to be unaware of what is good and what is evil, 
but they were also seen as weak and passive to the will of adults. This emerged also 
during a conversation between pastor Serge Manuana of the church Spiritual Combat, 
my friend Joseph and myself: 
Silvia:   Why are children bewitched rather than adults? 
 
Joseph: Children are very weak. They don't know how to control 
themselves. You see? You can attract a child by saying “Come, 
I'll buy a bégnée [cake] for you”, and the child takes it. 
Children's spirits are much weaker than adults. The spirit of 
adults is too strong in respect to children. That's why the witches 
choose children to give them kindoki. And now those children 
start to grow up with that spirit. And he's not a child anymore. 
He grows up with it but it started during childhood.  If you see an 
adult with witchcraft it started when he was a child.  
 
P. Serge: Why do they give witchcraft to small children? Because little 
children don’t know anything. Because their memory is 
weakened. When someone asks them “give your dad”, they give 
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him, without discussion. Because they don’t know...This is why, 
because a little child doesn’t refuse. Whatever you ask...  
 
Silvia:  But also adults, right? 
 
P. Serge: No, the adults...When you ask him [an adult], he starts to 
reason... “If I kill my father, no it’s no good. If I kill my 
mother....neither. I will give them paternal aunt [tata mwasi]. But 
a child, when you ask him, he’s going to do it s traight away 
because he doesn’t refuse. And that witchcraft, at that age, it can 
finish your whole family, [all the members] all together! 
The words of Joseph and pastor Serge present children as victims of the will of 
adult-witches, who recruited them into witchcraft by offering something to eat. It was 
common knowledge in Kinshasa that children were the channel through which kindoki 
could pass to hit one’s family because of their naivety and weakness, as another pastor 
in Selembao told me: 
A witch wants to operate covertly. He wants to act without anyone knowing it. 
But then, people discovered that old people do too much witchcraft. To hide 
themselves, [old people] started to use a group of unconscious individuals, like 
children, whom one can manipulate easily, and they hide behind children to act. 
Children are like their masks. If an old man does [witchcraft], people know that 
it was him, so he hides himself behind a child. He acts in the name of the child, 
but it is the child that acts. It is like in the world of business: rather than signing 
himself, he makes someone else sign for him. Often, behind a child there’s an 
old person. Because children are unconscious, they are still young, and they still 
don’t know the evil side of witchcraft, so he can accept easily and you can start 
using him. 
Once again, children were described as intermediaries, conduits in the 
witchcraft of older people. Children’s passiveness and naivety were highlighted also by 
Frédéric Tshibuabua, a staff member of a non-governmental organisation in Kinshasa 
which takes care of street-children. Frédéric mentioned how children were bewitched 
with the aim of harming their parents and relatives. Intimacy and affection were 
potentially dangerous in Kinshasa, as the child was able to harm parents because of the 
intimate link between them125. Once again, the most dreadful danger came from those 
who were closest to you: 
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 On witchcraft, intimacy and trust see Geschiere (2013). 
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Children's witchcraft... The child is often used. I am a witch. You've got 
children. I want to have you in the world of witchcraft but I cannot succeed, so I 
am going to use your children. I'll give your child witchcraft to harm you. You 
see? It is not your child who’s a witch. It is me, and I am passing through your 
child to possess you. Because he's your blood and he can easily have you. A 
child doesn't have initiative inside witchcraft, what is he going to do...? The 
child is passive, he's going to do what you tell him to do.  
Although the Kinois interviewed above described children as passive victims of 
the lust of older witches, they also acknowledged that children were dangerous killers. 
Only they could kill their victims through witchcraft. Thus, although the Kinois denied 
any agency to children, unwittingly they acknowledged their role as active agents of 
witchcraft deeds. 
Witches who lured children into witchcraft were believed to do so by offering 
them luxury items and commodities which they could never attain in everyday life. In 
particular, children in the world of witchcraft were believed to marry and have a 
numerous offspring, while enjoying a life of comfort. These two factors (marriage and 
wealth) were the prerogative for young people to enter the world of adulthood, as 
explained in chapter 4. By joining the world of witchcraft, children were believed to 
reach a social power and wealth which was denied to most young people in society. In 
the eyes of the Kinois, children have found in witchcraft a better world to live in, in 
which they could reach social power which otherwise they would never be able to 
enjoy. This was often repeated during interviews, as the following extracts reveal.  
One day, while I was interviewing a family in the neighbourhood of 
Bandalungwa, the father of a witch-child explained to me: 
The witches tell the child that they are going to give him nice cars, expensive 
telephones... He can also live in Buckingham Palace! At night they take the 
plane, you know what their plane is, don’t you? The peanut shells, and they 
travel around, naked, and they can arrive in Europe or America... How can 
someone refuse? 
This was confirmed by Shadrak Mankondo, a twelve-year old child that I met in 
the Centre of Spiritual Healing of Ma Campagne. Shadrak confessed to have eaten his 
mother and maternal aunt, and that he tried to kill his father’s sister in exchange for an 
airplane: 
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One evening, before maman Juditte [the neighbour who bewitched him] and I 
went out to work on our plane, she told me that if I wanted to become a general 
I had to sacrifice yet another member. I was not sure because I had already 
eaten my mum and also my aunt, but she told me of a palace in Europe full of 
gold where we could live together with our children. Maman Juditte is my wife 
in the world of the night126. That night we went to eat my little cousin. The day 
after, when my aunt woke up, she started to tell around that she dreamt of me 
chocking her with my hands. This is when she took me to church. Now I want 
to leave witchcraft and become a pastor.  
These representations of the world of witches as a world full of luxurious 
modern commodities and of “perverted and predatory consumption” (Shaw 1997: 857) 
resembled the world of wealth and power of la magie. Both worlds worked as zero-sum 
universes, in which a few people obtained wealth at the cost of someone else. In fact, 
the more relatives the witch-children sacrificed, the more power they acquired. Like in 
la magie, human lives were exchanged for wealth and money. The only difference was 
that while masons and members of government did occult dealings to enrich themselves 
in everyday life, witches enriched themselves in the invisible world of witchcraft, while 
maintaining a deceptive passive profile in everyday life.  
The world of witchcraft, as well as the world of la magie, reflected the desires 
of both children and adults in Kinshasa. Airplanes, gold and palaces were mirages for 
the poor who struggled to make do through la débrouille. It was a world of desire, 
uncanny riches, sex and mobulu. Through a discourse on witchcraft, people gave voice 
to their worst fears and highest aspirations.  
The phenomenon of the witch-children was born out of people’s reactions to the 
mobulu of society and western ideas of childhood. Children were stigmatised for being 
naive, and had to undergo abuses by their families because they were considered a 
threat to their family members. Thus, the next section illustrates kindoki mechanisms 
within the intimate circle of the kin.  
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 In the world of the night, witch-children were described as being married to ‘husbands of the 
night’ (maris de nuit) if they were girls, or ‘wives of the night’ (femmes de nuit) if they were boys. 
Together with their partners of the night, these children could give birth to a numerous offspring – 
up to hundreds of children. 
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Intergeneration Tensions: Kindoki within the Family 
 
In Kinshasa, relationships within the family and exo-households were extremely 
unstable and constantly shifting. Children were positioned in between exo-households 
and were thus considered the vehicle through which members of one family could 
bewitch members of the other. In order to understand the intergenerational matrix of 
kindoki accusations, and how these circulated within the family, I shall present a few 
case studies from my fieldwork. 
I met Louise Lukatula, at the Centre of Applied Parapsychology and 
Psychosomatic Medicine of Ebale Mbonge127 (Centre de Parapsychologie Appliquée et 
de Médecine Psychosomatique de Ebale Mbonge). The centre, which served both as 
psychological consulting room and a charismatic church, was renowned for exorcising 
witches and demons and for treating different diseases including venereal diseases and 
AIDS. Louise was a mother-of-two, in her forties who had visited the centre because 
she had a serious eye infection causing the right half of her face to become swollen and 
deformed. With a mixture of hope and helplessness, she explained to me that after a 
few unsuccessful attempts to cure her ailment at various private hospital clinics across 
la cité, Louise’s husband, Jérémie Kabongo, advised her to seek the help of God. She 
then started to attend the Centre of Ebale Mbonge, where the senior specialist, who 
called himself ‘priest of God’ (Nganga Nzambe) identified Louise’s father as the person 
to blame for her infection. Louise firmly believed that her father not only gave her the 
infection, but also bewitched her two sons, Pier and Christophe. Indeed Pier was 
affected by a skin disease, and despite consultations in several hospitals, he did not 
manage to recover. Moreover, Louise’s uncle was also believed to be involved in the 
kindoki dealings. During a visit to Louise and Jérémie’s house, he allegedly confessed 
that he had agreed with Louise’s father to kill her. Because the disease had not killed 
Louise, however, the two witches proceeded to bewitch her children in order to get her. 
However, he immediately added that he wanted to redeem himself, and that this is why 
he had come to visit her. 
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 The centre was named after Ebale Mbonge, a well-known Congolese prophet of the 1980s, and 
also referenced local perceptions of European science. 
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A few weeks later I visited Louise and Jérémie in their house in Malweka, a 
small neighbourhood surrounded by wild vegetation in the North-Western part of 
Kinshasa. I asked Jérémie about Pier’s skin disease: 
Silvia:  Didn’t the doctors prescribe him a cream, anything...?  
 
Jérémie: No no, there are no microbes! And we discovered that it’s true 
because the man [papa], my father- in- law, he ran away, he 
doesn’t even dare to put an eye on his grandsons [petit-fils], 
because we talked to him [to the father-in law], we told him that 
“No, your nephew says that this disease comes from you”. This 
is why he fled. That’s it, and we are struggling like that, I also 
lost my job, it seems that Pier said that it’s always the grand-
father, because the man needs to see me suffering, [that I] sell 
everything and go back to my place, so that Louise goes back to 
her place [to her father’s place] with the children, in that moment 
he will easily get Louise and the children back... [...]  
 
Silvia: Why did the man [papa] choose to give [in sacrifice in the world 
of witchcraft] Louise and not someone else? 
 
Jérémie: Bon, since we have known each other, Louise and I have not 
done the marriage according to custom. At the beginning... When 
he knew about our engagement, he refused. The man says that I 
haven’t given anything to him yet. This is why he takes 
advantage [of the situation], as I haven’t given anything yet, he 
can do whatever he wants! [...] 
 
Silvia: And why do you think that Louise’s father chose to bewitch your 
children to [kill] Louise? Couldn’t he bewitch Louise directly?  
 
Jérémie: Sure. I asked the children... Because Louise is his daughter, he 
can pass directly [to her]...but the children say no, because as 
Louise and the children are at my place, they are under my 
protection. So the man has decided that I should lose the job; that 
I had to stay home... 
Jérémie’s and Louise’s children were very aware of what was going on in their 
households, and Pier, the one affected by the skin disease, did not hesitate to explain 
me what was going on: 
Pier: What is happening is our grandfather’s fault. He always comes to 
bother us [spiritually].  
 
Silvia  Also during the day? 
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Pier:  Yes. 
 
Silvia:  How does he do that? 
 
Pier:  When he comes, he wants us to give him our mother.  
 
Silvia:  And what do you reply? 
 
Pier: We always refuse, but he says that if we don’t give him our 
mum, he will kill us. He is not alone, there are plenty of witches.  
 
Silvia:  And what do they do? 
 
Pier: When they go out at night and they see that their fuel is over, 
they send mosquitoes to bite people so that they can put blood 
into their tank. Then they travel where they usually go and start 
eating. 
Like in many other witchcraft stories, witches were believed to travel at night 
on their airplane in order to go and spiritually kill their victims during their sleep. The 
case of Louise and her family exhibits a common pattern with many other witchcraft 
stories: the youngsters of the family had refused to pay bridewealth, got married 
through a shortened marriage, and believed the elders of their families tried to punish 
them by bewitching their children.  
The very elaborate and detailed explanations made by one of the children also 
show that children played an important role in witchcraft accusations: they were the 
ones who could reveal who had bewitched them, and they could add elements to 
witchcraft stories. This would seem to agree with De Boeck’s (2005a, 2009, De Boeck 
& Plissart 2004,) assertion that kindoki created a productive space for children. 
Children and young people, according to De Boeck, used confessions as a stage through 
which asserting their power within the family and redirect tensions against their elders. 
However, it must be noted that children who confessed their witchcraft deeds in church 
in front of pastors did not do it spontaneously, but were rather obliged to do so by 
parents and pastors, who pushed them to confess. In front of witchcraft accusations 
against them, children had no choice but to construct elaborate stories through which 
they tried to drag themselves out of the circle of physical and psychological mobulu to 
which they were daily exposed. It was very easy for parents to influence children’s 
stories of witchcraft: suspicions of witchcraft were discussed openly at home between 
adults, often in the presence of children. People would discuss suspects, and the reasons 
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why they would try to kill others through witchcraft. The same happened in church, in 
which witchcraft exorcisms were public, and entire families witnessed the confessions 
of redeemed witches and their ‘liberation procedures’. Children had a whole repertoire 
of stories to draw upon when constructing their own stories. Family members often 
took the richness in details of such stories as proof of their truthfulness.  
Another example of intergenerational tension is represented in the next 
interview, in which Anne, the maternal grandmother of a child called Jojo, explains 
how her son- in- law tried to kill her by bewitching her nephew: 
I took Jojo with me immediately after his birth and I didn’t witness any 
problem. However, after a few years, when I moved, our new neighbour told me 
that she saw something weird in Jojo. One day, I took Jojo and I asked him what 
was wrong. That time, after a long time, he admitted that he was bewitched. I 
asked him: “Who gave you witchcraft?” And the child replied that it was his 
father. So I asked him how that happened, and he explained to me that while his 
mom, who lives with her husband’s family, was washing the nappies, or while 
she was showering, she would give Jojo to her husband, who gave him 
witchcraft inside the bouillie [porridge]. Jojo’s mother and father got together 
thanks to a free union, and she went to live in her husband’s house as soon as 
she got pregnant. 
So starting from there, the neighbour started to get mad, there was always 
something wrong in our parcelle, at night a lot of cats would meow... And Jojo 
started to create problems, to fight with other children and be impolite... So I 
took the decision to take him to church.  
Jojo managed to escape from the adverse living conditions of the church, and 
became one of the thousands of street-children in the capital. Also in this witchcraft 
story, the child was used as an intermediary to try to kill a member of the other family 
through witchcraft. Only this time, it was a member of the older generation who 
accused a member of the younger generation.  
Children born in shortened marriages for whom no bride wealth was paid were 
extremely liminal. Because they created a bridge between the mother’s and the father’s 
family, who often harboured resentment between each other, children were perceived as 
dangerous subjects who carried debts, jealousy and witchcraft. At the same time, they 
were children who were not firmly placed within any household or family. As such, 
they were in danger of witchcraft accusations.  
Children’s liminality was even greater when their parents separated, or when 
one of them died. In fact, those parents who took the children to live with their new 
partners, often condemned them to a life of abuse by the stepmother or the stepfather, 
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who refused to raise them. New partners were often the first to cast witchcraft 
accusations against the children of their partners’ previous relationships, as seen in the 
case of Grace, Julia Wembi’s cousin (see chapter 6). Children were considered as 
embodying debts, tensions and jealousy, therefore new partners were afraid that the 
child’s family would use him or her as an intermediary to cast witchcraft against them. 
This is why, often, the mother or the father would disperse the children to other 
relatives (the grandparents or some uncle or aunt) while they engaged in other 
relationships. 
However, when the child was left with distant relatives, tensions arose because 
of economic hardship. Households in Kinshasa usually hosted a high number of 
children. As such, food, clothes and school fees were often the cause of tensions 
between household members, especially when the parents of the child were unable to 
contribute to the expenses. Children staying with distant relatives were often 
disadvantaged in comparison to the children of members of the household. They were 
often the ones who were left at the bottom, wearing old clothes, eating leftovers (if 
there were any), and without being sent to school. These children were often considered 
resentful for their liminal situation, and were considered more vulnerable to being 
recruited into witchcraft by members of the extended family.  
One example was provided by Linda Nsimba, an eighteen-year old girl whom I 
interviewed during a visit to a Pentecostal church around the ne ighbourhood of D.G.C. 
in Ngaliema. After the death of the father, Linda was obliged by her mother to live with 
the uncle, so that she could start a new relationship. However, Linda’s uncle was afraid 
that the child had been bewitched by some relatives. In church, Linda admitted that she 
was recruited into witchcraft by her paternal grandmother so that she could kill her 
mother:  
It is my grandmother who comes and picks me up at night. She comes by bus 
and she takes me too far away, at the borders of the country. Also Arnold [her 
brother] comes out at night, but he does not know it. I know it. There is also 
Adonie, our little brother, who comes out at night, but he leaves at the village 
with the grandmother. It is our grandmother who gave him witchcraft through 
food. After giving us some peanuts she asked us to sacrifice someone. This 
happened shortly after the death of our father. After he died she bewitched us 
and she asked us to give her our mum. When we go out, she first picks up 
Adonie at the village, then she comes to pick us up and we go. There are also 
other two men but I don’t know them. They are from the village too. When they 
come at night they ask me to sacrifice my mother but I refused. Our 
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grandmother always tells me: “If you sacrifice a person, then you will be at 
ease. But you don’t have to tell people. If you do so, if you reveal the secret, we 
will kill you”. Our mum is in another village now, but they have to pass through 
us if they want to kill her. But we have to say yes and I do not want to. 
Linda was brought to church by her maternal uncle, who, while I was recording, 
listened to her confession with relief. The fact that Linda agreed to talk against her 
grandmother’s wishes in front of the pastor, was a sign of her willingness to forsake 
witchcraft. The church in this case gave Linda the possibility to solve the crisis and 
being reinserted in her uncle’s household free of kindoki. 
In the next example, I illustrate the misadventures of Christine Ndaya, an eight-
year-old girl who was obliged to leave her family and live on the street. After the death 
of her father, her paternal family accused her of having killed her father and other 
members of the family through witchcraft. Christine and her mother, who were living in 
the father’s household, were thus expelled and sent back to the maternal household. 
After a short time, Christine’s mother entered in a relationship with another man and 
became pregnant. Her mother then moved into the new partner’s household, while 
Christine was left with the rest of the mother’s family in their household. When I went 
to visit the household, Francin Lusamba, Christine’s maternal uncle, explained to me 
how he was obliged to expel Christine because she tried to kill members of the maternal 
family. Because Francin did not want to send Christine out on the street, he sent her to 
live with her mother and her new partner. However, once Christine had arrived in her 
new home, her mother’s husband’s family also accused her of witchcraft. Christine’s 
maternal uncle recalls: 
Francin:  Since when the child [Christine] had left our home, everything 
improved, money, wealth, and I understood that it was the child 
who was doing all of that [blocking]. I didn’t want to throw her 
on the street, but I told myself enough is enough. Because she 
didn’t want to leave her witchcraft, I sent her to stay with her 
mother. 
 
Silvia:  But how come, did not you leave in the same parcelle? 
 
Francin: No... Before, her mother used to live in another parcelle not far 
from here in the neighbourhood [the parcelle of Christine’s 
biological father]. It is when they moved back here [after 
Christine’s father’s death] that problems started to arise. Then we 
sent the child to her mother, who was living with her new 
husband. [...]It is Christine who said “I ate the husband of my 
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mother, I ate my dad”. It is Christine who ate him through 
witchcraft. I have told you that my father was also sick. [...] She 
blocked my wife, she wanted to eat also children who were still 
into the wombs of the mothers. But thanks to the prayer she was 
not able to do so. [...] At the beginning, Christine’s mother would 
not believe me, she would ask: “Why are you kicking away my 
child like that?” But now she believes me, because Christine’s 
two youngest brothers were contaminated by her witchcraft. It is 
Christine’s mum who says that. Christine’s mother has five 
children and she was born in 1981. We told her that if she 
wanted she could come and stay with us at her mother’s 
household, but she always prefers to enter into new relationships,  
to be married... Christine one day told me that it is her who made 
her mother wander about like that.  
Life expectancies in Kinshasa were very low and the death of one or of both 
parents often worsened the situation of these children. The tie that connected 
illegitimate children with the extended family had loosened up, and nobody was eager 
to take the child’s side if accusations of witchcraft arose. This resulted in children being 
mistreated and obliged to quit their home to live in the streets.  
During my brief stay in Kinshasa during 2007, I visited one of the many shelters 
for street children that dotted the city. The shelter was assigned to very young children, 
and the majority of them were between five and twelve years old. The staff of the 
shelter had carefully recorded the arrival of every new street-child together with a brief 
resume of their familial story and the reason of their stay in the street. Out of thirty-one 
street-children who lived and ate in the shelter, twenty had been accused of witchcraft 
by members of their families128. For two of these twenty children, the staff recorded no 
data on their parents. In six of the remaining cases the parents were both alive and 
separated (apart from one case in which the parents were said to be still together), and 
in twelve cases one or both of the parents were deceased. This means that the chances 
of being accused of witchcraft increased greatly with the death of one or both of the 
parents. Some of the dossiers of the children read:  
CAROL NGOMA: Both parents dead. The father had a woman at home, 
Veronique, but Carol’s mother lived somewhere else. After Carol’s mother died, 
the father took him to Veronique’s place [the new wife]. There, Carol’s younger 
sister admitted being a witch and to have bewitched her two brothers. Veronique 
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 Of the rest, five spontaneously took the street as the result of physical abuses by relatives; three 
as the result of negligence; and two children were travelling from the exterior to Kinshasa are lost 
sight of their relatives once arrived in the capital.  
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took them to church for exorcism while their father was absent. After a month, 
the father came back from Kitona [a military base in Bas-Congo]. The father 
died and Veronique kicked the children out on the street.  
  
NTOTO MASINDA: Father unknown, mother dead. The child used to live out of 
Kinshasa until the arrival of the army [Kabila’s forces in 1997], when his 
mother ‘took’ a soldier. The soldier declined all responsibilities over the mother 
and the child as soon as they arrived in Kinshasa. The [maternal] family took 
charge of the child. Ntoto went to stay with the maternal uncle while the mother 
went back to ... [a village]. His mother died. It was in the uncle’s home that the 
child received witchcraft. Taken to church by the maternal aunt to be exorcised, 
the child fled the church and went to the street.  
 
ERIC M’BUZE: Father dead, mother alive. The father died when the child was 
only four months old. The mother could not maintain herself and after some 
time she got married again. In her marriage the mother lost three children, killed 
by Eric. Eric himself said he is a witch, initiated by a woman in the 
neighbourhood who sold peanuts. After taking him to church for exorcism 
without success, the child fled from the pastor and came back to Kinshasa. 
Although it was less common to find a child who admitted practising witchcraft 
when questioned by his or her relatives, this was not rare. Some of these children, after 
repeated psychological, physical and moral abuses, found it easier to comply with their  
relatives’ accusations – often the only way to end their abusive behaviour. Other times, 
children used admissions of guilt as a way to position themselves within or outside the 
family. Let us not forget that children accused of witchcraft lived in extreme ly 
precarious conditions. As such, some children, like Eric above, found it better to detach 
themselves from a violent domestic environment, at the risk of undergoing often violent 
exorcisms. Other times, however, as in the case of Linda above, children co nfessed 
being witches in order to reaffirm their position in the family. “The grandfather asked 
me to sacrifice my mother, but I refused”; “The neighbour bewitched me and my 
brother. She asked us to kill our father but I refused, it is my brother who did it”. 
Stories like these can be read as intricate strategies through which children turned 
accusations of witchcraft to their favour, swearing allegiance to their family, in an 
attempt to gain a safer position (from further witchcraft accusations) within its circle. 
However, not many children managed to turn their liminality in their favour. The 
majority were condemned to a life of violence and uncertainty within the family.  
The mobulu at the familial and at the exo-household level has had a direct result 
on the invisible mobulu of witchcraft: children are accused of being witches because of 
intergenerational tensions within the family. In order to escape this difficult situation, 
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many children paradoxically have found shelter on the street. However, this has led to 
further accusations because in the streets adults could bewitch them more easily. In the 
next section I shall explain how the street and the market in particular, have become 
dangerous spaces of bewitchment for children, who are lured into witchcra ft by adults, 
and particularly women. The fact that women at the market are often accused of 
bewitching children is another result of changes at the socio-economic level and the 
new role that the woman covers within the household. As we shall see, the mobulu of 
everyday life has had an impact on the mechanisms of transmission of witchcraft.  
 
From Carers to Breadwinners: Women as Liminal, Women as Witches. 
 
In Kinshasa, kindoki was developing in unpredictable ways (see also De Boeck 2004, 
2005a). Whereas until a few decades ago, kindoki was believed to be passed mainly 
within the close family circle, in 2011 also strangers could attack the fortress of the 
family and block people’s lives and business out of jealousy. Many times thus, kindoki 
was believed to be passed to the child by someone outside of the family network. 
Sometimes this person was a neighbour, because of their physical proximity with their 
victims; but other times it was a complete stranger. Interestingly, these witches were 
almost always described as women. A recurrent rumour was that children were 
bewitched by a woman at the market or a woman on the street. The next example shows 
the case of a child who was bewitched by someone outside of the kin network, while he 
was on the street. 
Nine-year old Claude Bashala, born out of an extramarital affair, was accused of 
witchcraft because both his mother and his father did not look after him properly. 
Claude’s mother, who was busy finding a stable relationship, gave him in custody to 
her sister. However, Claude spent too much time on the street, as his maternal aunt told 
me: 
The child, Claude, used to live here with his mum, my sister. Claude’s mother 
and father weren’t married. The father was already married and the mother was 
his concubine. I think this is one of the reasons that led to Claude’s witchcraft. 
If the child had been born within the marriage and had received a good 
education, I don’t think he would have been trapped in witchcraft. But in this 
case, the child used to spend the whole day alone, until the night. He was 
hungry and it’s normal that he asked somebody for something to eat, a friend or 
a woman let’s say. And then he got witchcraft. It is logical that it was like that, 
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because I know his mum very well. She was always away from home, selling 
goods on the streets until very late. It is the mother who is responsible for the 
education and the well-being of the child, but in this case the mother didn’t take 
her responsibility. 
According to many Kinois, witch-children were the embodiment of the 
economic collapse of the city and of the emergence of new power relations within the 
family. Women had become, for many families of la cité, the main source of income 
through la débrouille. They were liminal subjects who shifted between the domestic 
environment and the outside; the untamed word of the street. However, their new 
independence and social power produced suspicions of kindoki. In fact, some women 
working in the market were believed to give children food and recruit them into 
witchcraft. As such, women were believed to bewitch children and set them off to kill 
victims for them, in order to gain power and success in the world of witchcraft – as 
much as wealthy people were rumoured to enter Masonic sects in order to get rich. And 
vice versa, when misfortunes stroke someone, people accused their children of blocking 
them in order to make someone else rich. The zero-sum universes of everyday life and 
witchcraft were constantly dialoguing in Kinshasa: deeds in the former were often 
explained through deeds in the latter, and vice versa.  
Many people traced the phenomenon of the witch-children to the fact that 
children were not properly educated or cared for by their mothers or female carers. This 
gave children the opportunity to evade the control of the family, and to venture on the 
street, where it was easier to be bewitched – usually by women. Women in Congo and 
in this case in Kinshasa were traditionally more tied to the home and raising a family. 
As the next examples explain, they were the ones in charge not only of the household, 
but also of raising their children. However, following the economic impasse and the 
need to make do through la débrouille, many women had to leave the space of the 
house and take the street. Women, together with young men, were the main actors of la 
débrouille, and spent the entire day at the market, selling the products of their wooden 
stalls. Once again, this resulted in tensions against them, as they are perceived as 
subverting their traditional role of carers of the family to pursue their economic and 
social independence. Thus, according to zero-sum mechanisms, the ambition of women 
in la débrouille was counterbalanced by the bewitchment of their children. This is 
evident in the next interview, in which Marie, a mother o f two, explains how her 
neighbour bewitched her children while she was working at the market:  
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Witchcraft came by the neighbour, so that she could arrive to me through my 
children. One morning, when I went out from home, the neighbour gave my 
children some bread and some tea. Marie thought that it was only some bread 
and tea but spiritually it was blood and a piece of human meat. That night, the 
neighbour came to pick up Marie for them to do their ‘night job’. [...] One day I 
went out and left the children alone. That day as well, the neighbour exhorted 
them to give me away. But Jacques said: ‘Please, don’t take my mum, if you 
want someone from our family please take me! If mum dies, we will suffer!’ 
Marie, on the other hand, had already agreed, given that she was in communion 
with the witch-neighbour. But the boy didn’t want to, and offered himself 
instead of me. 
Jacques died in a traffic accident in 2008. In the eyes of his mother, through his 
death he sacrificed his life instead of giving away that of Marie.  
The words of Marie denote tensions between an ideal of staying at home and 
taking care of children, and the constraints of everyday life that obliged her to leave her 
children alone to find some income. Indeed, rumours of children bewitched on the 
streets revealed a certain irony: on the one hand, children were bewitched because their 
mothers, rather than taking care of them at home, were working at the market; on the 
other hand, children who wandered about the streets looking for something to eat, were 
lured into witchcraft by women at the market. This shows a strong tension towards the 
figure of the woman in society.  
This tension was also highlighted by some elderly informants whom I 
interviewed during a visit in a hospice (maison de vieillards) in Kintambo in 2007. 
Sitting among a group of seven elders, I introduced my curiosity towards the 
phenomenon of the witch-children. An old woman among the elders then told me: 
Let’s think about a woman that leaves home early in the morning to go to the 
market. [...] Sometimes she comes back home late in the night. In the meantime, 
the children are alone all day long, hungry, without anything to eat. The woman 
thinks first of all about herself. She doesn’t care about her children’s education. 
[...] She goes to the market and takes her tea. She eats and comes back late in 
the night. She doesn’t even know whether the children went to school, what 
they have eaten… So it’s her irresponsibility. On the other hand, children are no 
longer monitored and have to look for something to eat by themselves. The 
mother almost tries to get away from her children because she doesn’t want to 
be bound by them.  
Children were believed to be left on the street to fend for themselves and 
parents, most of the time women, were described as not taking responsibility for them. 
Children’s wellbeing and education depended on their carers: from this point of view, 
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accusations against children were indirectly also accusations against those adults who 
were unable to take care of them. In the eyes of the children’s carers, children who 
begged for food on the street personified their failures: the failure of men to keep pace 
with modern times and get a salaried job, the failure of women to maintain a household, 
the failure to marry according to custom and create a family and so on. When guardians 
accused a child of being into the world of witchcraft, they were unintentio nally 
admitting their own faults and inability to provide an education and stable livelihood. 
As such they projected their sense of guilt against the child. At the same time, parents 
and carers perceived the witchcraft of children against themselves as a sort of 
punishment for not being able to take care of them. Children who were mistreated and 
abused at home, were believed to be more easily lured into witchcraft mechanisms.  
Although I have argued that children who are accused of witchcraft are 
subjected to the will and abuses of their families, they have been able to turn this 
adverse situation a posteriori, when they take the street following accusations of 
witchcraft. In the next section I will briefly outline how children were able to build 
their lives by taking advantage of the channels of non-governmental organisations and 
missionaries’ shelters for street-children. As such, children have demonstrated to be 
able to play with the same western stereotype of the child, which was at the base of 
their accusations of witchcraft. Children have been able to transform their role from 
passive subject to active agents.  
 
Street-Children: Victims and Exploiters of Humanitarian Agencies 
 
The number of street-children in Kinshasa has bloated considerably in recent years. 
Statistics have it that street-children vary between 20,000 and 50,000 (De Boeck 2009), 
the majority of whom have been accused of being witches. This phenomenon has gone 
hand in hand with the rise of dozens of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
international organisations which deals with street-children in disparate ways: 
organisations give them shelter, pay for their school fees, put children into 
apprenticeship programmes, and supply them with food and basic health care. Children 
are assigned to different shelters according to their age and sex. In this way, it is easier 
to monitor the children’s activities, as they all follow the same courses or classes. 
Shelters can host any number from ten to more than sixty members: the most crowded 
are those who host young children who have just been introduced to the shelter by their 
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friends from the street. Children spend the first years in these shelters, while the staff 
tries to get in touch with their families in order to reunite them. More often than not, 
however, unfortunately families do not want to take responsibility for their children: 
many of them have been accused of witchcraft, and families are afraid that the child has 
not been successfully exorcised. This could result in more family members dying or 
being struck by misfortune as a result of the children’s witchcraft. If families did not 
want to re-admit their children home, the NGO would take care of the child and his or 
her education personally. 
In a context like Kinshasa, in which the majority of families eat once a day – 
and in some cases once every two, NGOs shelters have demonstrated to be a great 
backup plan for many children. During my fieldwork, children would spend the day in 
the street, looking for food leftovers and quick cash through la débrouille, and would 
go back to the shelters every time they needed to take a bath, a meal, or some health 
care. Certain NGOs would organise night patrols accompanied by a nurse in order to 
carry out medical examinations on groups of street-children who were unable to reach 
the shelters due to distance, or who were able to fend for themselves on the streets. 
NGOs try to prevent children staying out at night, when they could become victims of 
sexual abuses and beatings by civilians and the police. However, many of them, 
especially the girls, have found prostitution to be a money-making activity, and prefer 
to sleep outside the shelters.  
The street has become for these children a space of freedom, where they can 
access western commodities, food and sex (see also De Boeck 2005a; De Boeck & 
Plissart 2004). Moreover, it has also become a space of profit: children worked for 
women at the market, who would pay them back either with some small cash or with 
something to eat from their stalls129; some worked as prostitutes, while others engaged 
in theft and criminal activities. Once their working day was over, they could save their 
small change in some NGO shelters which worked as a bank, in order to keep their 
money out of the reach of other street-children. 
NGOs shelters have enabled children with certain freedoms, while providing 
them with care and attention when they require it. For many street-children who spent 
their days between the street and the NGO shelters, the shelters became a ‘time-out 
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 This shows a clear parallelism with the bewitchment of children, as explained above in the 
chapter. 
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space’ in which they recharged their batteries and re-organised before taking to the 
street again. Shelters became spaces for the street-children to gather, to peddle the 
goods they were able to find in the street, to plan activities and to share the booty of 
their petty-thieveries130. Moreover, some children would organise criminal activities, 
and also carry some thieveries within the centres themselves. During my first day in 
one of these shelters, I remember the words of one member of staff, who advised me to 
secure my mobile phone with a thread to my trousers, if I did not want to have it stolen 
during my first day. Children would try to steal anything they found in the shelters in 
order to resell it in the streets: mobile phones, money, notebooks and pens with the logo 
of the organisation. Thus, time within the centre was for many of them a battle for 
resources not only against the other children, but also against the staff members.  
Giovannoni et al. (2004: 100) have pointed out that: “In a society where people 
are forced to multiply their chances of opportunity (to find food, work, psychological 
sustenance), the NGO is just one more card to play”. Children have been able to make 
the most out of NGOs, playing with the stereotyped version of the child as innocent and 
in danger promulgated by the state and western institutions, and building a whole 
lifestyle out of it. Although finding themselves in the street is initially traumatic for the 
children, soon they manage to enjoy the benefits of NGO shelters, like safety and 
education, leading a life much better than that at home, made of maltreatment and 
abuses. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have explained in detail the world of witchcraft and the invisible 
mobulu of Kinshasa. I have shed light on a few important mechanisms of witchcraft 
accusations, which need to be highlighted in order to better understand the phenomenon 
as it is understood in Kinshasa. I have demonstrated that children found themselves at 
the intersection of intergenerational tensions within the family. However, rather than 
being the main actors of witchcraft, children were considered to be bewitched by adult 
witches in order to carry out the spiritual killings as intermediaries, and vice versa; 
children found themselves in between witchcraft accusations, and were believed to be 
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 Like the kuluna gangs of young men, who distributed the booty according to a pyramidal 
scheme, so the street-children would earn their rewards according to their role in the hierarchy in the 
stable, and also according to age. 
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the only means through which witchcraft could pass. Thus, although children became 
involved in witchcraft accusations involuntarily, they were believed to be very 
dangerous actors. At the same time, children were believed to be chosen as  
intermediaries because of their naivety and innocence – a result of the western notion of 
childhood promulgated by humanitarian agencies, missionaries and non-governmental 
organisations. This resulted in an important number of children been obliged to live in 
the street in order to escape the abuses of their families. There, they were able to take 
advantage of the same humanitarian agencies and missionary-based organisations 
which had indirectly led to witchcraft accusations against them.  
An in-depth analysis of the mechanisms of witchcraft accusations is necessary if 
we are to understand why children in particular are accused of witchcraft in Kinshasa. 
The cultural impositions of the missionaries and the  western education and lifestyle 
promoted by the colonial government, had a strong impact into the imaginary of the 
Kinois, reconfiguring their concept of childhood and also of witchcraft. Thus, 
accusations of witchcraft against children can be read as a result of the interplay 
between concepts coming from the West, and the mobulu created at the familial level 
by intergenerational tensions. 
Geschiere, in his book on “Witchcraft, Intimacy and Trust” (2013) noted that 
“the nexus between witchcraft and intimacy may be studied as an unstable relation that 
constantly produces new avatars” (ch. 1, section 5, para. 8). In particular, he highlights 
the fact that also in Cameroon where he did fieldwork, there were new forms of 
witchcraft, which seemed to be effective against anybody, kin or no kin ( Ibid). In 
Kinshasa as well, witchcraft has overcome the boundaries of the family. Today, 
witchcraft can be passed between strangers. Often, it is believed to be passed from a 
woman who works at the market, as if to remind to mothers what is expected of them in 
the household. However, it is important to highlight once again that although strangers 
can pass witchcraft, it is always someone from within the family who has the power to 
kill through it. This is why older witches bewitched children, who became 
intermediaries against their family members. Intimacy is always necessary for 
witchcraft to be effective. 
As witchcraft, intimacy and kinship were closely interrelated,  discourses about 
witchcraft in Kinshasa were discourses about the family, about who was in and who 
was out. Boundaries between family members and non-family members had become 
extremely tenuous, making it difficult to understand who was who in relation to  
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someone else. Children born out of shortened marriages contributed to connect families 
and households which otherwise would have nothing to share, as often partners split up 
soon after the birth of the child. From this point of view, accusations of witchcraft 
contributed to create or reinforce familial ties, and to distinguish kin from non-kin. 
This chapter has contributed to our understanding of the relationship between 
material violence and invisible violence, and structural violence and everyday violence. 
Accusations of kindoki result not only from tensions within the familial circle, but also 
from the aspirations of the Kinois and the obscure mechanisms of wealth. It was only 
by getting in contact with the world of witchcraft (either through kindoki or la magie) 
that people could become rich. Thus, members of the government and of the military 
were believed to become rich by using kindoki through the channels of la magie or 
franc-maçonnerie, while witches used the channels of kindoki to enrich themselves in 
the mystical world of witchcraft. They would sacrifice family members in order to get 
mansions, money and luxury items, which they would enjoy among themselves in the 
world of the night. In the eyes of the Kinois I interviewed, witch-children who enjoyed 
a life of luxury in the second world of witchcraft, have been able to turn the mobulu 
casted by their relatives against them on itself, in order to create an alternative, 
successful mystical life by re-channelling the mobulu they were subjected to against 
their relatives through spiritual killings.  
While witch-children were believed to live well in the world of witchcraft, they 
were actually chased away from home and abandoned to live in the streets. However, 
despite the hardship and the psycho-physical maltreatment that come along with living 
in the streets of Kinshasa, street-children have been able to take advantage of the 
humanitarian agencies, living out of those same actors who circulated the image of the 
child as innocent and at risk. Children accused of witchcraft, like the kulunas, were able 
to turn the mobulu of structural violence on its head, and used its channels to survive 
and build a different life in the streets.  
  
215 
- CHAPTER EIGHT - 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis I have analysed the multiple facets of violence in Kinshasa which I have 
envisaged through the complex nuances of mobulu, the Lingala translation for 
‘violence’. Indeed, mobulu is not simply translatable as ‘violence’ but rather stands as a 
complex concept composed of intersecting relations which were shaped by the interplay 
between different forms of violence: structural violence, the violence of everyday life, 
but also the invisible violence of witchcraft. I have demonstrated how mobulu was also 
utilised to define the economic hardship of Kinshasa whereby people constantly 
complained that “today making money has become difficult” (mikolo oyo mbongo eza 
mobulu), or that “the commerce is insecure” (commerce eza mobulu). Mobulu was also 
used to describe the political situation of the country, torn by armed conflicts and all the 
type of violence which comes with them – violence against women, pillages, and so on. 
During my interviews I heard the expressions “violence is in the East” (mobulu eza na 
este), or “disorder is with the country” (mobulu eza na mboka) several times. The 
security forces, rather than defending the population, were the first to perpetrate crimes 
against them: “Be careful of soldiers, they are dangerous” (keba na basoda, baza 
mobulu), people would warn me in Kinshasa. The same was said for kulunas, street 
gang members who fought against each other and pillaged boutiques and market stalls 
during raids. 
Other times, violence was less spectacular, and was hidden entangled within the 
practices of everyday life. Children who spent too much time on the street, playing and 
fighting with their friends rather than staying home with their families, were believed to 
acquire the ‘education of the street’ (éducation ya balabala), which was in complete 
antithesis with the ‘education of the house’ (éducation ya ndako). As a result, children 
were believed to become impolite, stubborn and aggressive: “That child is 
troublesome” (mwana oyo aza mobulu) relatives would complain to me, and would 
consider the child almost like a betrayer, someone who preferred the street to their care 
at home. Children who spent too much time in the streets, were more readily accused of 
witchcraft. Being defined as mobulu was a clear sign of the suspicion of the family 
against one child. At the same time, women as well could be considered mobulu, when 
they took up too many relationships at the same time: “That woman is troublesome” 
(mwasi oyo aza mobulu), people would say. Women who entered in relationships with 
216 
several men were considered troublesome because of the mobulu they created between 
the men and their extended families. Moreover, further mobulu would fall upon the 
children born out of these unstable unions, who found themselves in very liminal 
positions within their families.  
In order to understand the complexity and totality of the concept mobulu, in this 
thesis I have analysed its manifestations in every social field of Kinshasa. In particular, 
my aim was to understand how the violence of the state, with its impositions, the 
corruption of its machinery, and its poor services, reflected itself upon the everyday life 
of the Kinois, their lifestyles and their daily choices. However, following Galtung’s 
(1990) thought, we can say that the state was not the only structure to impose certain 
rules and mores to the population. The military have also highly influenced the coping 
strategies of many Kinois. My neighbours had to abide by an informal curfew and code 
of conduct, in order not to attract the attention of the men in uniform patrolling the 
street. Pentecostal churches were also very powerful institutions within everyday life: 
in Maman Yemo, two brothers stopped taking care of their old blind mother because 
the pastor at their church told them that she was a witch – a witch who owned the 
parcelle where the pastor was about to build his new church. Not everybody could cope 
successfully with the structural violence which engulfed everyday life: young people 
were the ones who could better shift from passive subjects of violence, discrimination 
and marginalisation, to active creators of social niches from which to slowly rebuild 
their lives. 
At the same time, the mobulu of everyday life was very much influenced by the 
rumours and gossips of witchcraft. Witchcraft accusations were taken extremely 
seriously in Kinshasa, with people being executed or exorcised in very violent ways as 
a result of the rumours. Witchcraft accusations were often cast over people from one’s 
own family circle, which contributed to an increase in the sense of insecurity within the 
family and the community in general. However, also in this case, people accused of 
witchcraft, especially children who were chased away from the family, were able to 
take advantage of the terrible situation in which they found themselves. 
Many young Kinois were able to appropriate the violence of the state and other 
actors, and use it to their own advantage, creating original coping strategies and social 
phenomena. I argue that not only were people making the most out of violence, but also 
violence was such a fruitful business for many, that they did not hesitate to engage in 
what others would define as mobulu in order to cope with everyday hardship. This is a 
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strong argument which I have illustrated through various examples in this thesis. My 
aim was to explain why different social actors considered mobulu a positive factor in 
their everyday lives. In considering la débrouille as an example, several people I 
interviewed made fun of those who did not cheat in order to make a profit. Cheating, 
and earning money at the expense of others, was considered essential to survive in la 
cité. Everyday life was a cycle of cheating, as several people got cheated and in turn 
cheated others in order to make do. Moreover, making money out of the incompetence 
of state jurisdiction and the faults of the public system was actually celebrated - 
something to recall with amused pride, like the general who distributed the operating 
costs for the office maintenance to his subordinates.  
Similarly, but in a different social field, some unemployed young men would 
look at the military and its violent methods as model of masculinity. While the majority 
of the Kinois I interviewed frowned upon pillaging and engaging in violent fights, some 
young people trained themselves in the gym in order to be able to bear the blows during 
fights. Building up their bodies and being known for their physical force and their 
misdeeds was a cherished means of prestige for many young men of la cité.  
Several men and women whom I interviewed spoke with regret about the 
tensions which affected their families (mobulu na ndako), especially with the older 
generations. And yet, looking for some independence and entering into several 
relationships at the same time – even if that meant bypassing customary rules – was 
considered as the only means to sustain the hardship of everyday life. Thus many 
women looked for partners who could host them in their households, while men 
benefitted from the networking generated through several love relationships, in order to 
fend for themselves. La débrouille in Kinshasa was sustained and governed by kinship 
and clientelistic networks. Thus, mobility in kinship ties and relationships also meant 
more possibilities for success in the volatile economic context of Kinshasa.  
As the majority of the people in la cité could not cope with the hardship of 
everyday life, unexplained riches were all traced back to witchcraft dealings. This also 
explains the increasingly insistent rumours of people entering the circles of la magie, as 
these sects offered their members socio-economic support through the brotherhood and 
comradeship of freemasonry. The members of these sects engaged in la débrouille at a 
different – magic – level. The same was said of children, who were believed to se 
débrouiller in the world of witchcraft, where they could have wealth and success. 
Although for many children this meant being chased away from home, they were able 
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to make the most out of life in the street, where they engaged in scams, robberies and 
any sort of illegal activity to fend for themselves. Thus, if on the one hand they were 
victims of mobulu, on the other they found in la débrouille – and more mobulu – a way 
to survive. Mobulu, la débrouille and witchcraft were intrinsically linked in Kinshasa’s 
everyday life. Engaging in activities labelled as ‘mobulu’ by most of the population, 
was considered by many young social actors a vehicle of positive change and success.  
Mobulu in Kinshasa is a multifaceted phenomenon, which can be fully grasped 
only by taking into consideration all these elements and their interplay. Before going 
through all the manifestations of mobulu analysed in the thesis, let us briefly revisit the 
theoretical contexts of violence within which this thesis is situated.  
 
Contextualising Mobulu, Contextualising Violence 
  
Anthropological studies of violence are quite young, as until recently, “violence was 
not considered a proper subject for the discipline” (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois 2004: 
6). Anthropologists were focused on the working of social rules, rather than how 
violence challenged and usurped the social order. Thus, violence was a kind of ‘anti’-
topic of research, something which people did not acknowledge in their studies and 
which actually impeded them. Whitehead (2007), in “Violence and the Cultural Order”, 
suggests that anthropological studies of violence gained impetus by studying the 
clashes between global politico-economic forces and the lives of people living at the 
margins of global networks. As such, studies of violence in Africa followed colonialism 
and the inequalities of power that followed. While only few, in the different societies of 
colonial Africa, were able to make the most out of globalisation, the rest was left as 
passive spectators or, rather, subjected to the wave of new impositions which the West 
brought. 
Riches (1986) in his “The Anthropology of Violence”, a symposium of eleven 
papers on violence in different contexts, described violence as “an act of physical hurt 
deemed legitimate by the performer and illegitimate by (some) witnesses” (1986: 8). 
Riches’ approach to violence as an act of physical hurt lends itself very well to broad 
comparison on a functionalist level. As violence is a form of social action, which takes 
place between concrete actors, and produces concrete results, it becomes clearly 
accessible to comparative analysis. However Leach (1986) in his review of Riches’ 
book (1986), highlights the limitation of his approach. He writes (Ibid: para 1):  
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The English of the present day take it for granted that violence is a ‘bad thing’, a 
characteristic of law-breakers and terrorists: policemen and soldiers who may 
appear to be acting in much the same way are seldom described as violent. But 
at other times in our history and in other countries at the present day violent 
action has been differently assessed.  
Following Leach’s argument, I argue that violence is something that cannot be 
easily translated from one context to another. Violence takes different forms and is 
confronted in ways which differ according to the social context. Although Riches 
(1986), with his collection of essays on violence, has the merit of bringing violence to 
the forefront of anthropological studies, the scholarship would have benefitted from a 
broader analysis of the phenomenon, in order to catch all the nuances of violence and 
the meanings it holds for the local population of every social context. At the same time, 
I argue that violence does not connote only physical attacks, but rather it represents a 
broader spectrum of incidents which may not necessarily manifest themselves through 
blatant physical violence. 
Often, the violence described in the anthropological scholarship of recent 
decades is the violence of the powerful against the weak. This was the approach of 
‘structural violence’ introduced by Paul Farmer, who aimed at studying how the state, 
through its institutions, created a “social machinery of oppression” (2004: 307). His 
analysis of violence focused on the perpetrators of violence, showing how the state 
created inequalities, suffering, subjugation and death among those at the bottom of the 
pyramid. Populations affected by war, genocides, epidemic and extreme poverty were 
all described as passive subjects in front of the power of their government and its 
political-economic choices. In a passage, Farmer (2004: 100) writes that: “[I]t is 
necessary, at some point, to acknowledge what the poor have been saying all along: that 
their rights cannot be protected while the present economic and social structures foist 
injustice and exploitation upon the vast majority of our people under the guise of law”. 
Farmer’s aim is to explore how the structural violence of the state is translated into 
everyday life in distress, disease and other forms of violence which are not as overtly 
brutal as armed violence. He asks the reader: “By what mechanisms, precisely, do 
social forces ranging from poverty to racism become embodied as individual 
experience?” (Ibid: 30, emphasis in original). 
Farmer’s analytic model of suffering (2004) inspired more works on violence in 
society, as recent studies have demonstrated (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois 2004). 
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Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004; also in Farmer 2004) have repeatedly highlighted 
the importance of Farmer’s attempt to build an anthropology of ‘structural violence’. 
However, they find such concept too elusive, as they note: “Violence is a slippery 
concept” (2004: 1). In their works they highlight the need to elaborate, complicate and 
diversify violence, in order to see global forces and power inequalities that propel 
intimate suffering. In particular, they urge a need to: “[D]isentangle the causes, 
meanings, experiences, and consequences of structural violence and show how it 
operates in real lives – including how victims become victimisers and how that hides 
local understandings of structural power relations” (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois in 
Farmer 2004: 318). Thus, while the scholarship on structural violence has the merit to 
highlight the extreme conditions of hardship and injustice to which the poor of different 
regions of the world are subjected to, it will benefit greatly from an in-depth analysis of 
the relationship between state violence and local, everyday violence.  
Up until the last decade, anthropological studies which explored violence in 
everyday life, have focused mainly on people’s resistance to such violence in different 
social contexts. For example James Scott’s “Weapons of the Weak” (1985) explores the 
everyday struggle of the rich and poor in modern Malaysia against the new modern 
harvest techniques imposed by the state. Scott drew attention to:  
 
[E]veryday forms of peasant resistance – the prosaic but constant struggle 
between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labour, food, taxes, rents, 
and interest from them. [...] Here I have in mind the ordinary weapons or 
relatively powerless groups: footdragging, dissimulation, false-compliance, 
pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth. [...] They 
require little or no co-ordination or planning; they often represent a form of 
individual self-help; and they typically avoid any direct symbolic confrontation 
with authority or with elite norms (p. 6, emphasis in original).  
The author goes on to explain how these passive non-compliances, subtle 
sabotages, evasions and deceptions were a necessary tactic to delay the implementation 
of the new agricultural techniques imposed by the state. Scott’s definition of resistance 
highlighted the struggles of the powerless against the socio-economic changes at work 
in rural Asia.  
However, Ortner (1995) accused much of the literature on resistance, including 
Scott’s, of “thin description” and “ethnographic refusal”, highlighting that authors often 
focused only on the politics of resistance, that is, the relationship between the 
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dominants and their subordinates (p. 176). For Ortner (1995: 177), what was missing 
from the analysis was the resistors’: 
[O]wn politics – not just between chiefs and commoners or landlords and 
peasants but within all the local categories of friction and tension: men and 
women, parents and children, seniors and juniors; inheritance conflicts among 
brothers; struggles of succession and war of conquest between chiefs; struggles 
for primacy between religious sects; and so on.  
Moreover, she adds that this cultural thinning also fails to give justice to the 
subjectivity – the intensions, desires, fears, projects – of the subordinates (Ibid: 190).  
My approach in this thesis differs enormously from resistance studies, inasmuch 
as it depicts the continued renegotiation of what power is and where it lies. Is power 
within the state and its impositions, or is it within the social phenomena which young 
people have created in multiple social fields in their everyday life? Although part of my 
thesis highlights the mobulu of the state, I also explained how the abuses of the state 
have given rise to new spaces such as the mobulu of the street, la débrouille and the rise 
of the kulunas in response to the lack of jobs. This is not resistance to a lack of 
opportunities, but the production of a distinctly new opportunity for the creation of 
personal livelihood. 
Likewise with kindoki, which itself could be viewed as a form of structural 
violence – albeit a mystical one – as an imagined force which materialised through 
liminal actors, who have emerged in the spaces left open by the absence of a strong 
state. People tried to combat economic insecurity by seeking to get rich and accumulate 
power through the channels of kindoki and magie. In this sense, everyday life exists in 
between forms of mobulu whereby individuals seek to get by through appropriating 
'violence' against another before it can be enacted upon them. Moreover, making do is a 
form of 'violence' itself, as one person’s success would most likely mean another’s 
failing, some survive and some do not. From this point of view, my thesis seeks to 
contribute to the scholarly understanding of violence by analysing how people have 
embodied the structural violence of the state in their everyday practices, and how this 
embodiment has contributed to develop social phenomena which allow them to live 
according to their own rules and moralities.  
Often, new phenomena at the everyday level seemed to replicate elements of the 
mobulu of the state. Many people resorted to images of state violence to empower 
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themselves. For example, in chapter 1, I have showed how my friend Joseph Mutambu 
initially went along with the rumours that he was a general, in order to instil respect 
among the neighbours, and to discourage people from robbing our parcelle, as military 
officers usually carried weapons with them. In chapter 5, I have showed how thieves 
also mimicked the military, by dressing in military uniforms to instil fear among the 
people they robbed. Seen as the only source of power, soldiers became a model of 
masculinity and success for many young men. The kuluna gangs of la cité adopted the 
military as their imagined state, reproducing the actions of government and soldiers 
who enriched themselves illicitly. Like the military in the east of the country, they used 
violence to compete for resources to which they would not otherwise have access. By 
pillaging, kulunas gained wealth and redistributed it along hierarchies which recalled 
those of the military. 
The violence of the state and of the military was considered to be a necessary 
means of attaining success. Argenti (2007), in his book on youth and violence in the 
Cameroon Grassfields, also highlights how people who combated gangs and thieves 
used the same methods used by the police and gendarmerie, which were seen as 
“dangerous, corrupt, and inept”. Thus: 
[T]he antigang members reversed the moral order of coercive power, using it, 
unlike the state, for morally sanctioned – if often tragic – ends. Yet the 
crosscutting similarities between the antigang members and the gendarmes they 
emulated in their quest for alterity preclude any easy Manichaeism opposing 
one to the other. (Ibid: 182). 
Argenti illustrates that rather than appropriating and reproducing the same 
military power, antigangs “transformed an external danger into a new, alteric way of 
being that sanctioned youth as a political force in the Grassfields” (Ibid). In the same 
way, some men in Kinshasa found in the figure of the soldiers and in the violence of 
pillages a way to transform their status from mere youngsters to batu pomba, strong 
men who were respected and treated like adults because of their physical force. From 
this point of view, mobulu is a transformative power. 
Inspired by Argenti (1998, 2007), Farmer (1996, 2004, 2005), Scheper-Hughes 
(1992; Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois 2004) and Bourgois (2003, 2009; Bourgois & 
Schonberg 2007) I have put an accent on how the population of Kinshasa, through the 
colonial encounter, post-modern Zaireanization and through present state failings, have 
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shaped alternative spaces for creating meaningful lives in the intersection between local 
and global, where mobulu is negotiated and appropriated through various different 
guises. For example, the movements of street gangs and the sapeurs of the pre- and post 
Independence have shown to do more than resist to the colonial power. In their 
movements, they were able to appropriate the structural violence of the state – 
unemployment, the post-war economic crisis, social and racial discrimination – in order 
to create new phenomena which denounced the economic and moral order of Kinshasa, 
while shaping new counter-cultures from below. The kulunas, in the same way, were 
born from the inequalities and economic hardship, and from the will of young men to 
find another way to overstep their elders and access social maturity and prestige. These 
young men have found in violence a means to attain adulthood and to emancipate 
themselves from the grip of the elders. Moreover, they were able to use mechanisms of 
the state and adjust them to the context of the street in which they operated: in their 
stables, kulunas shared the booty in the same pyramidal scheme used by public officers 
– as in the example of the General, who distributed the money for the office 
maintenance among his co-workers and kept most of it for fuel and ‘home 
maintenance’ (chapter 3). Illegal, everyday coping strategies seem to be strongly 
interrelated with the mechanisms of the state and it is difficult to discern between what 
is deemed legal and illegal in society, as the chapter on la débrouille explained. 
The few episodes above allow us to understand that violence is not an obviously 
observable phenomenon without any consequences, nor is it a static notion. The mobulu 
of Kinshasa is multifaceted, contradictory, destructive yet constructive at the same 
time. Mobulu gives birth to more mobulu, but it also creates new social phenomena. 
Mobulu is not only an “act of physical hurt” – borrowing Riches’ (1986: 8) definition: it 
was the economic insecurity which gripped the city, the social insecurity created by 
armed thieves at night; it was the violence and tensions within the familial household,  
the incapacity to marry and become economically independent; it was the pillaging of 
street gangs and the robberies of fake soldiers at night; and it was the accusations of 
witchcraft which split apart so many families in Kinshasa. Mobulu was everywhere, in 
society, in the street, in the household, and among the closest re latives – as the example 
of Joseph Mutambu’s theft by his cousin demonstrated (chapter 6). 
Anthropological studies of violence so far have omitted an important 
phenomenon from their scholarship. Violence is not only a material, or mundane 
phenomenon. Much of the violence that happens in some contexts was born in the 
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spiritual field. With my thesis, I contribute to explore that side of violence which has 
been so far underrepresented or ignored. In the next section, I shall remind the reader of 
the close relationship between material and invisible violence, and how we cannot 
understand the multiplicity of mobulu in Kinshasa without considering both sides of the 
coin. 
 
Kindoki and la Magie as Catalysts of Mobulu 
 
In his collection of essays on violence, Riches (1986) alludes to the fact that discourses 
on violence often fail to do justice to mystical violence. He writes: 
[M]uch physical hurt is invisibly enacted. Thus witchcraft and sorcery, their 
reality as unquestioned as in the reality of visible physical hurt, must be 
included as instances of violence, even though their performance has to be 
inferred from their eventual result: the misfortune, injury or death of the 
recipient (Ibid: 8). 
In Kinshasa, witches and their dealings were violent not because of what they 
materially did. In fact they operated in an invisible world, whose rules and mechanisms 
were imaginable only through gossip and rumours. Their power laid in the 
consequences of their deeds: in the death of a relative, the bankrupt of a business, the 
disease of someone. Mystical violence, or imagined violence, can often be more 
terrorising and powerful than physical violence. On this subject, Strathern, Stewart and 
Whitehead (2006: 6-7) write:  
People’s thoughts about the world often run far beyond its obvious empirical 
manifestations, and [...] the frameworks that are built out of peoples’ thought 
become as important as, or even more important than, their everyday empirical 
observations. 
This is why Riches (1986) and also Strathern et al. (2006) argue for the 
inclusion of witchcraft in the anthropology of violence. I believe that witchcraft 
accusations mirror the context of a given society, its desires, fears and also frustrations. 
As such, witchcraft needs to be examined in tandem with its material context in order to 
be fully grasped. This section is devoted to understanding how an ethnography of 
witchcraft rumours and accusations is vital if we are to give a full picture of mobulu in 
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society. Witchcraft and other forms of everyday mobulu are so intertwined that it is 
impossible to analyse them separately.  
People in Kinshasa would say: “Violence is in that family, because of kindoki” 
(Mobulu eza na famille oyo, ya kindoki). Kindoki is an omnipotent concept in Kinshasa: 
it is always there, whether people like it or not. Witchcraft is always considered the 
reason behind deaths, accidents, diseases, sudden riches, sudden misfortunes, and 
unexplained events. Even those people, like my friend Joseph, who insisted not to 
believe in witchcraft, were inevitably drawn into this world of suspects, rumours, 
gossiping and fear. I remember that although he considered himself a devoted 
Christian, also because of his past with the missionaries, Joseph would do the sign of 
the holy cross on my forehead every time he knew I had to visit the families of some 
witch-children. In the same way, he prohibited me to visit any Masonic lodge, where 
people were rumoured to practice la magie. Kindoki and its nuances were always 
present, also for those who refused to believe in them.  
An important characteristic of kindoki is that it operates within the family. 
Although the ‘witches who bewitched’ might be from outside the familial circle, as 
demonstrated in chapter 7, the ‘witches who killed’ needed to be very close to the 
victim in order to strike. As kindoki could only be effective when it was carried out 
from one family member to another, it contributed to define and engage familial 
relations. As explained in chapters 6 and 7, children in between exo-households often 
connected families who did not want to have anything in common: families of young 
people who married unofficially through shortened marriages and then separated, or did 
not marry at all, rarely wanted to be associated with one another. The debts and 
tensions these created were causes of conflict within the families, which often resulted 
in accusations of kindoki. In this case, those children born from shortened unions, 
which found themselves in a very liminal position, within the exo-households and in 
between families, were accused to be the emissaries of kindoki deeds. Interestingly, also 
in this case, it was a debt which engulfed children into witchcraft deeds, a debt which 
had to be repaid through the sacrifice of a human life to the master witch. Kindoki 
accusations against the children and their instigators signalled that they were (often 
reluctantly) still considered part of the wider family. Witchcraft accusations in this 
sense highlighted boundaries between inside and outside. The ‘violence of the house’  
(mobulu na ndako) was cause and in turn effect of the mobulu of witchcraft 
accusations, which contributed to increase tensions within the house.  
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Kindoki was strictly linked to the mobulu of economic hardship, as the example 
of the debt has illustrated. Family members accused children to try to kill them through 
witchcraft in order to avenge a debt between families – a debt which the other family’s 
members were trying to have repaid by taking the lives of the debtors through 
witchcraft. However, the relationship between kindoki and the economic sector did not 
stop here. Witchcraft accusations often interested those families in which efforts to 
survive through la débrouille did not corresponds with the results and wealth 
accumulated. Thus, economic failures, unfavourable economic conditions, poverty, 
unemployment and accidents, all fuelled rumours and gossip on kindoki. From this 
point of view, la débrouille and kindoki were deeply interrelated notions of social life. 
On one hand, la débrouille was a more practical means of survival: with its illegal 
commercial transactions, scam and cheating, la débrouille was seen like a space of 
opportunity which, however, was very difficult to master. For the majority of the 
Kinois, la débrouille did not allow for enrichment, and it was a mere survival 
mechanisms. Thus, recent economic developments (or lack thereof) have transformed 
social life in Kinshasa and brought people into a fierce and often violent fight for 
survival. For example street gangs have found in the violence of pillage a way to 
upgrade their lives, and to secure a passage to adulthood not waiting for the state, in the 
same way that thieves and fake soldiers have found in criminality and robberies a 
profitable activity. On the other hand, kindoki offered an imagined difference between 
those who succeeded and those who didn't, those who died and those who lived 
explaining this difference through an intangible force. If people did not succeed in the 
informal economy or in social life, it was because of the deeds of witches, who blocked 
other people’s development in order to enrich themselves in the world of witchcraft. 
Like the physical forms of violence, kindoki was believed to provide both a space of 
danger but also one of opportunity.  
Accusations of kindoki often turned into psychological and physical abuses. In 
Kinshasa, this had devastating effects upon children, who had to leave their homes and 
find rescue in the streets of the city. In chapter 7, I have demonstrated how accusations 
of witchcraft against children are the result of the imposition of a Western notion of the 
child, which depicts children as in need of care and in danger of abuse. This Western 
idea went hand in hand with the local notion of witchcraft as passed through food: 
children started to be perceived as naive subjects who could be easily given bread and 
thus taken into the world of witchcraft. At the same time, because of the mobulu of the 
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house, children were put in very liminal situation between families and exo-households, 
making them the favourite emissaries of witchcraft from one family to the other. 
Structural violence in this case worked together with the mobulu of the house in the 
creation of the phenomenon of the witch-children. 
Although many Kinois I interviewed described children as the victims of 
witchcraft accusations, it is worth noting that they were at the same time very aware of 
the dangerousness of these children, who could exterminate entire families in order to 
become rich in the world of witchcraft. Witchcraft accusations gave children an agency 
which turned against them and was to their detriment. Nonetheless, children accused of 
witchcraft were able to gain some kind of autonomy and agency once they found 
themselves in the street. In there, they were able to take advantage of the channels of 
NGOs – which have contributed to promulgate this idea of the child as naive – using 
them as needed. Often, street-children would use NGOs shelters as meeting points, 
trading posts or headquarters, where they could reunite and decide how to carry out 
their activities in the streets – from irregular jobs, to prostitution, to organised crime. 
Other times, it was the NGO shelters that became the targets of children’s thieveries: 
children would steal mobile phones from the staff members, notebooks, pens, and 
whatever they found in the shelters, in order to resell them on the street. Although 
accusations of kindoki victimised children and cast them out of their families, they also 
created new avenues of survival for thousands of street-children in the capital, who 
took advantage of the NGOs that had victimised them in the first place. La débrouille 
became the favourite space for children to build their life in the face of the structural 
violence and the mobulu of the family. 
Both kindoki and la débrouille were interpreted by the Kinois like a zero-sum 
universe in which one person’s loss was another’s gain. In la débrouille, often people 
tried to enrich themselves by cheating others: like in the case of Joseph’s own cousin, 
who robbed him in order to try his luck in the diamond commerce in the east of the 
country; or like Baudouin, the driver who made money by selling us the zombie-car. In 
the same zero-sum way, in the world of witchcraft witches were believed to eat victims 
in order to enjoy a life of luxury. Someone’s life had to be sacrificed for someone else’s 
wealth. Thus it seems that kindoki is a concept of equal cause and effect, where life is 
envisaged within a system of balance. However this could not account for the larger 
discrepancies of inequality - initially between the colonisers and the colonised and 
latterly between the poor and the new rich of Kinshasa. Thus, alternate explanations for 
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wealth accumulation have emerged in the form of la magie. La magie, a concept born 
in recent times in light of contemporary transformations in Kinshasa, became a new 
avenue for wealth making. In Kinshasa, the search to 'make do' is contrasted with a 
desire to 'get rich’: la magie appears to have emerged in the intricate space in between 
the two as a means of negotiation for individuals to survive but also to thrive. 
Kinshasa is a metropolis in which global notions of wealth, musical taste, 
fashion and lifestyle have mingled with local, customary rituals and habits, creating 
original phenomena in every field of society. The cosmopolitan character of the city has 
also contributed to transform the aspirations and desires of the Kinois, who have turned 
their eyes to West. However, the politico-economic choices of the state have influenced 
the way in which the Kinois can access the multiple forms of wealth and commodities 
in Kinshasa. The majority of people are left out of market economy, struggling to 
getting by and to find their daily bread. 
In this difficult economic context, young people were the ones who were able to 
navigate with more flexibility between the state imposition and the opportunities and 
styles of the market economy, the new communication and transport system, as well as 
new technological devices. The phenomena analysed in this thesis show the ability of 
many young Kinois to bypass the impositions and deprivation of structural violence, 
and to transform elements of structural violence in order to create new social 
phenomena. The sapeurs, the bills, and the kulunas drew from elements of Western 
dressing code, Western movies and movie heroes and generated movements with which 
young men were able to contest structural violence while empowering themselves in 
society. In the same way, those couples who married through shortened unions were 
able to bypass the payment of the bridewealth, which had become an obstacle because 
of the volatility of wealth. La débrouille and discourses of la magie and kindoki all 
provided new ways to take advantage of the wealth which circulated in Kinshasa but 
which was forbidden to most of the Kinois. 
This thesis suggests that to grasp the full meaning of mobulu in Kinshasa, one 
has to combine state violence with everyday violence, and physical violence with 
mystical violence. A focus on state violence risks minimising the agency of people in 
their local contexts, their ability to make front to obstacles by transforming them into 
springboard for the creation of original phenomena. Although the state and its violence 
have played a huge role in shaping people’s lives, social phenomena such as the rise of 
kuluna youth gangs, la débrouille, witchcraft rumours and accusations, and household 
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structures acquire a new meaning when explored from the bottom. Everyday life 
provides a privileged point of view to understand violence from the point of view of 
those who appropriate it and re-elaborate it on a daily basis. People on their local 
everyday life are able to transform the violence of the state, often in unpredictable – 
and invisible – ways.  
The mobulu of Kinshasa, rather than being a mere negative notion, is a 
constructive and potentially transformative tool, which the Kinois engage with on a 
daily basis and use to create new phenomena able to challenge the structural violence of 
the state. It would be simplistic to classify mobulu as purely as ‘violence’. Mobulu is a 
productive social space which shapes relations between individuals, between people 
and a place, between citizens and a state, between the world of witchcraft and the world 
of the day. Mobulu is a framework which draws together all aspects of the Kinois social 
world. Mobulu is the lens through which the Kinois visualise the world. 
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